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Abstract 
 
The South African government embarked on a liberalisation path of the telecoms sector 
in 1996 in order to establish a knowledge-based society and thus enhance all aspects of 
the economy to make South Africa globally competitive.  Liberalisation of the telecoms 
sector was an integral part of its overall vision to improve the quality of life for all South 
Africans.  Market-based reform was the central philosophy underpinning the growth 
strategy for South Africa.  ICT was recognised as key to growth and development. 
 
To date, international telecoms reform has focused on managing the transition from 
traditional monopoly markets to effective competition.  The key steps in this process have 
been the commercialisation and ultimate sale of state-owned assets, licensing 
competitors, setting sector-specific regulation by independent national regulatory 
authorities to implement the market reform policies and ensure public interest objectives 
are met.  As a result of rapidly changing technology, the unanticipated rapid and 
pervasive uptake of mobile services, the influence of international financial advisors and 
suppliers of telecoms equipment who all stand to gain, the reform process in developing 
countries has been controversial.  Also, often after the first phase of market liberalisation, 
entrenched private sector incumbents make further reform in developing countries 
difficult.  The focus of this study is on the second-phase of reform in South Africa after 
the initial market liberalisation. 
 
The research analysed the changing configuration and structure of the South African 
telecoms network market during the transition from monopoly to competition (2000-
2003) within the framework of competition rules to determine how government’s 
“managed liberalisation” policy and regulatory decisions have shaped (and are shaping) 
the competitive dynamics of the South African market.  The findings were utilised to 
analyse its implications for the development of South Africa’s information society and 
provide a framework for policy-makers and regulators on effectively shaping telecoms 
network markets in transition.   
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This study contextualised the South African telecoms situation within the dynamics of an 
international market by examining the changing role of the market in telecoms policy 
formulation in both developed and developing countries.  This research looks at the 
current debates on the information society and liberalising telecoms markets in order to 
assess the impact of policy and regulatory interventions in selected national markets 
deemed relevant to this investigation e.g., United States, United Kingdom, India, Nigeria, 
Morocco, Uganda and Sri-Lanka.  Based on an information society paradigm, the study 
involved multiple methods incorporating primarily qualitative research to investigate the 
actual development on the ground of competition in South Africa since the start of the 
managed liberalisation process.  Secondary statistical data was utilised to understand 
market development and dynamics.  The analysis combined competition rules and 
regulatory principles based on international experience together with the South African 
experience with sector liberalisation derived from interviews, focus groups and data 
analysis of the market.  The study uses market structure analysis, with specific reference 
to telecom network markets as the basic framework of analysis.  This is further enhanced 
by analysing the broader dynamics of the business, communications, policy and 
regulatory environments and an analysis of the performance of infrastructure companies 
in the telecoms network market in South Africa.   
 
The analysis explains how the managed liberalisation policy of the South African 
government has constrained growth, allowed incumbent operators to entrench 
themselves, generally failed to meet the needs of most consumers and limited South 
Africa’s aspirations to join the global information society.  Despite technically meeting 
the form of most international best practice standards on market reform, there has been a 
lack of commitment to the substance i.e. effective competition, inconsistent application of 
regulation, the absence of a clear strategic framework and failure to undertake detailed 
market analysis throughout the process.  The result has been artificial barriers to 
investment and constrained growth in the telecoms sector.  In particular, a pre-occupation 
with the narrow licensing of individual technologies and specifically defined service 
classifications has created an unnecessarily complicated implementation regime 
hindering market development.  The lack of competition at the core infrastructure level 
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has constrained growth and innovation at the upper levels of the telecoms sector value 
chain, i.e. network services, that are dependent on access to the fixed line network. 
 
The study provides recommendations to increase investment in the South African ICT 
sector which include:  clarifying national policy objectives and reviewing the current 
licensing framework; implementing widespread market reform; instituting market and 
competition review processes; allowing for increased competition review processes and 
increasing independence and accountability of the regulator. 
 
The research outlines strategies to counter the effects of a weak competitive environment, 
infrastructure and resource shortages and the lack of strong administrative structures in 
South Africa that are applicable to most developing countries.  It suggests the following 
measures to drive competitive markets and enhance ICT growth:  ensuring political 
commitment to market liberalisation and market-driven macro-economic policies; 
focusing on licensing major operators; instituting technology neutral licensing; reducing 
the need for regulatory decisions by accelerating competition and harnessing regional 
skills to strengthen regulatory effectiveness.   
 
Finally, this study demonstrates that ICT market development and policy is rooted in and 
influenced by many factors and disciplines.  Thus the research suggests an integrated and 
holistic approach for analysing network markets in transition. 
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Glossary of terms 
 
ANC – African National Congress 
BMI-T – BMI-Technology, South African telecommunications market research firm  
BT – British Telecom 
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ISP – Internet service provision 
ITU – International Telecommunications Union 
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MCTS – Mobile service telecommunications service 
MTN – Mobile telephone networks 
NCC – Nigerian Communications Commission 
Nepad – New partnership for Africa’s development 
OECD – Organisation for economic cooperation and development 
PSTN – Public service telephone network 
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PSTS – Public service telecommunications service 
PTO – Public telecom operator 
SACP – South African Communist Party 
SADC – Southern African development community 
SLA – service level agreement 
SNO – Second network operator  
SOE – State-owned enterprises 
TRAI – Telecom regulatory authority of India 
UCC – Uganda Communications Commission  
UK – United Kingdom 
USA – United States of America 
USAL’s – Universal service area licence 
VANs – Value-added network services 
VoIP – Voice over Internet Protocol 
VPN – Virtual private network 
VSAT – Very small aperture terminal 
WLL – Wireless local loop 
WTO – World trade organization 
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1 Introduction and overview 
1.1 Context  
There is widespread international acceptance that information and communications 
technologies (ICTs) can act as a catalyst for economic growth, alleviation of poverty and 
enhanced business competitiveness.  The information intensity of the global economy has 
increased vastly over the past few years, creating increased demand for improved 
communications, a wider range of services and cheaper communications services.  In 
many emerging economies, ICT has been identified as a strategic industry and it has 
become one of the key drivers of socio-economic growth.  The availability of telecoms 
infrastructure is regarded as an important indicator of economic development and is the 
third most important factor in the location decisions of multinational corporations, after 
political stability and a skilled workforce (The Straits Times, 1997b in Heracleous, 1999).  
Further, recent studies on the impact of telecoms on economic growth in developing 
countries have found that a 1% increase in mobile phone penetration increases overall 
economic growth by 6.75%. (Sridhar and Sridhar, 2004; Waverman, Meschi and Fuss, 
2005) 
 
As a result, governments have made conscious decisions to restructure the sector towards 
more competitive markets in order to attract private sector investment and entice new 
entrants into the market through gradually relaxing and reducing the rules and regulations 
governing the industry.  Telecoms reform also has been driven by massive technological 
innovation, which has allowed for improved telecoms services at substantially lower 
costs.  To attract private sector investment, a policy and regulatory environment that 
creates certainty, is predictable, encourages competition and can be regulated efficiently 
(where necessary) is required.  However, to date, varying levels of market reform have 
been reached, particularly in developing markets.  Governments have struggled to 
introduce competitive markets and, in some instances, especially in South Africa, further 
entrenched private sector monopolies. 
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1.1.1 Reform in South Africa 
Since the first democratic elections in 1994, the newly elected ANC-led government has 
faced the dual challenges of repairing the imbalances created by apartheid and developing 
an economic policy that would reassure the financial markets to continue investing here.  
The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was designed to address issues 
of basic service provision to underdeveloped areas as part of the larger macro-economic 
reform programme.  The RDP was later complemented by the Growth, Empowerment 
and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, which called for a tightening of fiscal policy 
through a reduction of government spending combined with an increase in revenue. 
Addressing the legacy of inequality and inappropriate infrastructure provision has been 
key to government’s reform strategy.  Privatisation was to play a crucial role in achieving 
these objectives by: 
• Generating revenue for the implementation of the RDP; 
• Contributing towards the targeted reduction of the budget deficit;  
• Enabling job creation and redistribution of wealth to disadvantaged communities; and  
• Enabling efficiencies and increased sector investment in key industries through 
private sector involvement. 
 
Since the publication of the initial RDP document, there have been a number of further 
elaborations of the government’s key objectives in various policy statements, including 
GEAR and the National Framework Agreement in 1996.  The policy documents 
consistently focus on restructuring the economy, expanding infrastructure provision, 
creating competitive markets and attracting foreign direct investment.  Government has 
adopted a gradual approach to liberalisation in an effort to manage the various conflicting 
pressures around privatisation of the sector, maximising state benefits and addressing the 
legacy of inequality.   
 
To further market-based reforms, the Department of Public Enterprises outlined its plan 
for the restructuring of state assets in 2000.  In its plan, the restructuring of state assets 
was identified as important not only to maximise the contribution to state funds but also 
to improve the standard of living of the majority of the population and ensure sustainable 
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economic and social benefits.  “Government’s strategy focuses on restructuring that 
benefits all South Africans by expanding infrastructure services that are competitively 
priced and accessible, and provide an opportunity for economic participation.”  
(Department of Public Enterprises framework document, 2000)  Privatisation of state-
owned enterprises and gradual market liberalisation is an important strategy underpinning 
the ANC’s plans for macro-economic growth. 
 
As part of these macro-economic changes, the ICT sector has been identified by the 
current South African government as particularly important to growth and development 
as early as the 1990’s with Minister Jay Naidoo.  President Thabo Mbeki further outlined 
the importance of the ICT sector in South Africa a decade later by establishing a National 
Presidential Commission on Information Society and Development, constituting 
representatives of South Africa, along with an International Presidential Task Force on 
Information Society and Development, comprising CEOs from major international 
corporations and experts active in the field of information and communication 
technology, “because of the critical importance of this sector” and “to assist the 
government as it works further to ensure that we do not fall further behind the rest of the 
world as a result of the digital divide.” (Mbeki, 2001)  Some of the key objectives 
outlined by Government in its macro-economic policy and telecoms policy include: 
• Lowering resource input costs, including inflation targeting; 
• Developing an internationally competitive infrastructure; 
• Spearheading development on the continent; and 
• Attracting foreign investment and job creation. 
 
Furthermore, as part of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad), President 
Mbeki and other African leaders have identified the ICT sector as one of three key areas 
in which a co-ordinated effort will be initiated across Africa to stimulate greater 
investment from the private sector, both local and foreign.  Nepad identifies infrastructure 
development as one of the steps in sustainable development.  Poor ICT infrastructure, 
“combined with a weak policy and regulatory framework and limited human resources, 
has created inadequate access to affordable telephones, broadcasting, computers and the 
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Internet” and combined with high service costs has resulted in African countries being 
unable to capitalise on the benefits created by the ICT industry.  (Nepad document, 
2001:23)  Key objectives have been to double teledensity to two lines per 100 people by 
2005, with an adequate level of access for households, to lower costs and improve 
reliability of service, among others.  The Nepad programme has largely been spearheaded 
by the South African government and forms a key strategic initiative for South Africa.   
 
In addition to national and regional strategies to enhance ICT development, South Africa 
is a signatory to the WTO agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services and has 
committed to opening its telecoms markets by undertaking to do the following: 
 
Before 2003 • Liberalise resale services 
End 2003 • End monopoly supply and introduce a competitor in public switched, 
facilities-based services including voice, data transmission, telex, fax, 
private leased circuits and satellite-based services 
• Review feasibility of allowing additional suppliers of public switched 
services 
In addition • Duopoly supply of mobile cellular telephony 
• No limitations on the number of suppliers of paging, personal radio 
communication and trunked radio systems 
• Foreign investment in telecoms limited to 30% 
• Also to uphold the commitments in the Reference paper on regulatory 
principles 
1.2 Problem 
Telecoms reform is a complex process, encompassing a wide range of social, economic 
and political objectives, some of which are conflicting.  In many countries, it has taken 
years for policy-makers and regulators to understand the dynamics driving the sector and 
to implement relevant reform processes.   
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To date, international telecoms reform has focused on managing the transition from 
traditional monopoly markets to effective competition.  The key steps in this process have 
been the sale of state-owned assets, licensing competitors, setting sector-specific 
regulation to prevent incumbent abuses of monopoly power and installing independent 
national regulatory authorities.  Most (or Many), countries have had varying degrees of 
success in implementing reform and, in some instances, there is less competition, fewer 
consumer choices and higher prices than prior to reform.  As a result of rapidly changing 
technology, unanticipated uptake of mobile services, the influence of international 
financial advisors and suppliers who all stand to gain from the process, the reform 
process in developing countries has been controversial.  Also, often after the first phase 
of market liberalisation, entrenched private sector incumbents make further reform in 
developing countries difficult. 
1.3 Purpose of the research 
Policy and regulation have a profound impact on the development of competition in the 
telecoms sector.  This research seeks to analyse the changing configuration and structure 
of the South African telecoms network market during the transition from monopoly to 
competition (2000-2003) within the framework of competition rules to determine how 
government’s “managed liberalisation” policy and regulatory decisions have shaped the 
competitive dynamics of the South African market.  The findings were utilised to analyse 
its implications for the development of South Africa’s information society and provide a 
framework for policy-makers and regulators on effectively shaping telecoms network 
markets in transition.   
1.4 Limitations 
This is a multi-disciplinary study that involves research in the academic literature and 
practical experience in the sector and, as such, the following limitations were 
experienced:   
 
• The applicability of utilising benchmark indicators from other jurisdictions in order to 
establish trends, market development, policy, regulatory and firm strategy, etc, for the 
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unique South African situation.  Broad examples of policy and regulatory strategy are 
highlighted with subsequent market impact to provide some background and context. 
• Market, policy and regulatory development is ongoing, particularly the licensing of 
new operators.  Many of the stakeholders, including government and other operators 
were reluctant to openly discuss issues certain issues around strategy, given the 
sensitivity and competitor advantage. 
• Rapidly changing technology continues to significantly affect the industry dynamics. 
 
Finally, the author is currently employed by a large operator in the telecoms industry and 
thus the objectivity of some of the responses may have been influenced (aka biased) by 
the respondents knowing who the interviewer worked for.  In addition, although every 
effort has been taken by the author to remain objective, some of the inherent bias could 
have been introduced by the views of the author. 
1.5 Significance of the study 
The results of this research may be pertinent to authorities responsible for policy and 
regulation in the ICT sector, particularly in South Africa.  Furthermore, many developing 
countries are in similar stages of market reform and the findings of this report could be of 
interest to policy-makers who are likely to face similar policy decisions as they seek to 
introduce competition in their own markets. 
 
The research seeks to contribute to telecoms research by providing policy and regulatory 
recommendations for markets in transition.  It also seeks to provide a basis for private 
sector investment in order to give a greater understanding to policy-makers and regulators 
for the markets which they seek to regulate.  The results of this are intended to provide 
inputs into recommendations into policy and regulatory factors that can reshape the 
market amid the backdrop of changing political, technological, social and economic 
forces.  The challenge for developing markets is to develop policy and regulation that 
support the underlying vision. 
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1.6 Theories of the information society 
Information society discourse varies in its analysis of the social, economic and political 
significance of the information society, but, all commentators agree that the combination 
of information technology, telecoms and media will bring about fundamental changes in 
society – whether good or bad.  Overly optimistic theorists link changes in technology to 
changes in lifestyle and improvements for society.  Others see new technologies as 
hindering development, threatening cultural identity and imposing technological 
dependency on developing countries.  Regardless of the points of view, information 
society issues are increasingly on national and international agendas as governments 
attempt to harness the advantages of technology.  This section will attempt to provide a 
background to information society discourse which will form the basis for the research 
methodology undertaken in this study. 
1.6.1 Premise of the information society 
The roots of the information society idea are intertwined in a complex web.  Some of the 
ideas are not new and are situated within the context of post-industrialist theories.  When 
industrial society replaced agricultural society, the emphasis shifted from land to 
manufacturing.  In post-industrial society the emphasis is shifting from manufacturing to 
service provision.  In post-industrial theory, society is interdependent with technology 
and the economy is more dependent on government and the political process.  There are 
identifiable differences within the information society that set it apart from 
manufacturing economies.  Castells defines this as information to act on technology 
rather than knowledge to increase the power of technology (1999:49), while Lyon argues 
that “knowledge and information supplant labour and capital as the central variables of 
the economy.” (1995:56)   
 
The underlying premise for information society theories is that “modern productive 
systems no longer depend on labour, land and capital as their primary input; rather they 
require information” thus creating new production systems and new ways of working 
(Mackay, 2001:8).  Information society debates are centred on a few major themes: 
primary among these is the changing economy, the changing nature of work and 
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changing patterns of inequality.  Information as new knowledge applies primarily to the 
generation and processing of knowledge and information rather than application to a 
technology as in the industrial revolution.  Processes of production, distribution and 
management across organisations are linked through a series of networks and flows.  The 
information society is characterised by an increase in network technologies and an 
increase in service-related sectors.   
 
Access to telecoms and computing is increasingly biasing access to economic activity.  
Information society theorists argue that there is a reordering of the social structure as 
power and status are distributed in new and different ways.  Access to information and 
communication technologies reflects and reinforces social divisions, with a growing 
polarisation between access to information and “information have-nots”.  Real-time 
access to information at any time and any place implies that time and space are of less 
significance in shaping social organisation and interaction.  Castells identifies a global 
economy as “an economy in which all processes work as a unit on real time throughout 
the planet; that is, an economy in which capital flows, labour markets, the production 
process, management, information and technology operate simultaneously at the world 
level.” (1999:54)   
 
The modern economy is dominated by corporations, particularly large transnational 
organisations that operate at both a local and a global level.  These corporations often 
determine the local landscape and dominate global and local policy.  Power increasingly 
rests with transnational corporations.  Transnational corporations do not develop along 
territorial boundaries; instead, they invest where the labour, government policy and 
infrastructure are favourable and promise higher profits.  “The movements of capital and 
labour across the globe are further facilitated by the transportation, telecommunication 
and tourism technologies that have made central and global strategic planning possible.” 
(Tehranian and Tehranian, 1997:133)  To be able to conduct business, investment 
decisions are influenced by a number of factors.  Key among these is the availability of 
infrastructure.  Tehranian and Tehranian further elaborate that “productivity and 
competitiveness rely less and less on primary resources and use more and more 
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knowledge and information – cheap, unskilled labour and raw materials cease to be 
strategic inputs in the new economy.”  (1997:133)  Countries are dependent on foreign 
capital and increased investment.  What this implicitly implies is that to be globally 
competitive, countries need the technological infrastructure underpinning the global 
economy to support this.  Any country that does not have this infrastructure maybe 
effectively excluded from participating.   
 
Overt claims of technological determinism are evident in information society theories — 
“the notion that technology shapes society, that technology is an independent factor, 
somehow outside society, and that technical change causes and is responsible for social 
change.” (Mackay, Maples, Reynolds, 2001:29)  Technological determinism assumes a 
passivity about technology by focusing on the effects of technology and society’s 
challenge in adapting to the constant stream of new technologies.  But, it fails to consider 
that society can also influence technology and the inherently political nature of 
technology.  Castells attempts to address the problem of technological determinism by 
arguing that the network society “represents a new variant to capitalism”, thus creating a 
new class system. (2000:71)   
 
The new technologies which handle and process information simultaneously influence 
diverse but significant aspects of social, cultural and political reality.  Information society 
theory is resonant with the theoretical immaturity of a new paradigm.  It lacks the critical 
analysis and rigour of more developed social theories.  But similarly, “in presenting his 
social epistemology Kuhn does not pretend to be offering a fully worked-out solution to 
the problem of the basis of our knowledge.  He merely offers a beginning, a starting point 
for our thought.” (Barnes, 1985)  Information society theories offer a starting point for 
analysis and must strike a balance between overly optimistic futuristic predictions and 
critiques.  Rather, it should be situated within the realities of political, economic and 
social dynamics.  As Lyon notes, information society theories assume a vital role for 
serious social analysis in the policy-making process, “analysis which is not simply shut 
up within either optimistic or pessimistic scenarios.”  (1995:70)  
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These ideas on information society are particularly useful in multi-disciplinary studies 
involving political, social and economic elements that are inter-related and dependent in 
some instances on technology, society and government policy.   
1.7 Research question and sub-questions 
The previous section outlined the relevance and importance of the availability and 
affordability of ICT’s to the growth and development of a country.  For a developing 
country like South Africa that is primarily dependent on primary industries, a move 
towards ICT’s is necessary to stimulate GDP growth, increase employment and attract 
investment thus ensuring a better quality of life.  Thus, the research question and sub-
questions were formulated with the objective of providing a framework within which to 
analyse the changing configuration and structure of the South African market during the 
transition from monopoly to competition (2000-2003) within the framework of 
competition rules, in order to provide a framework for policy-makers and regulators on 
effectively shaping telecoms network markets in transition.   
 
Research Question: 
How has policy and regulation shaped the structure of the market in South Africa during 
the transition from monopoly to competition? 
Sub-question 1: To what extent does the managed liberalisation process 
demonstrate government’s commitment to the creation of effective 
competition in telecoms services, driven by private-sector 
investment? 
 
Sub-question 2:  How has the policy of managed liberalisation affected consumers of 
telecoms services and thus development of the information society? 
 
Sub-question 3: How has the policy of managed liberalisation and regulation 
affected firm performance and behaviour? 
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By attempting to understand market development and performance through the 
examination of the various facets of the market, the research question attempts to provide 
guidance for regulators and policy-makers in creating policy and regulation that will 
allow for healthy competition and sectoral growth that will be of benefit to consumers, 
the economy and society. 
1.8 Structure of the report 
This thesis is divided into twelve chapters.  Chapter one outlined the context and purpose 
of the research and the research question.  The study is based on an information society 
paradigm, and involves multiple methods which incorporate primarily qualitative 
research methods to investigate the development of competition in the South African 
market since the start of the “managed liberalisation” process.  Secondary statistical data 
from recognised sources like the World Bank, IMF, Statistics SA, ITU, etc, was also 
utilised to understand the market development and dynamics.  Chapter two outlines the 
methodology used in this study.  Chapters one to three attempt to provide a theoretical 
basis within which to examine the South African market and contextualise it within the 
global marketplace in order to understand market developments here based on the 
experience of other markets. 
 
Telecoms market development is intricately linked and influenced by global 
developments in telecoms, especially policy and regulation, demand dynamics and 
changing supplier dynamics.  As such, this thesis attempts to contextualise the South 
African telecoms situation within the dynamics of an international market.  This study 
uses market-structure analysis.  It attempts to provide a characterisation of the South 
African telecoms network market structure by relating the market structure with the 
behaviour of the economic agents who operate in it and the performances these 
relationships generate (Clarke, 1985:10).  It is important to recognise, however, that one-
way causations running from structure to conduct to performance can be simplistic as a 
theoretical framework, particularly in a diverse and complex market such as South 
Africa, which exhibits characteristics of both First and Third World markets.  Added to 
this is the complexity of network industries and the various dimensions within this 
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industry.  Therefore, the study takes cognisance of the complexity of relationships 
between structure, conduct and performance and attempts to provide a holistic picture of 
the South African market by analysing the broader dynamics of the business, 
communications, policy and regulatory environments and a strategic-company analysis.  
Chapter four examines the changing role of the market in telecoms policy development in 
developed markets, attempts to detail the theory of monopolistic and competitive 
markets, specifically telecom network markets, in order to understand the economic 
dynamics driving sector reform.   
 
The issues driving reform in developing countries are vastly different from the 
compelling issues that drive market reform in developed markets and thus, chapters five 
and six attempt to understand the changing role of the market in developing economies 
and the key issues driving sector reform.   
 
The analysis of the South African market in chapters seven, eight, and nine attempts to 
provide an overview of the South African telecoms marketplace, including a broad 
macro-economic overview of the country, detailing the reform process and attempting to 
understand the market dynamics based on the research and the firm dynamics within the 
sector.  
 
Chapter ten attempts to draw conclusions about the South African market based on the 
material analysed in preceding chapters and to make recommendations for further reform. 
 
Chapter 12 utilises the findings and analyses from the previous chapters to make overall 
policy recommendations.  This research looks at the current debates on the information 
society and liberalising telecoms markets in order to assess the impact of policy and 
regulatory interventions in key markets, e.g. the United States, the United Kingdom, 
India, Nigeria, Morocco, Sri-Lanka, Botswana and Uganda as well as an analysis of the 
performance of the South African market during its period of transition.  A large body of 
research has been driven by developing-country experiences with market reform.  This 
research departs from the literature in that the primary focus is on the impact of policy 
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and regulation for markets in transition.  Existing literature has a primarily public-sector 
focus.  This research also attempts to provide a characterisation of the development of the 
market and company behaviour from a private-sector perspective.  Finally, this research 
attempts to utilise the findings from the overall market analysis to provide a framework 
for policy-makers and regulators on effectively shaping telecoms network markets in 
transition. 
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2 Methodology 
Introduction 
Multi-disciplinary studies that seek to understand a range of issues require a range of 
research data in order to gain a holistic perspective on the issues.  This will include both 
quantitative and qualitative data analysis.  In keeping with this, this research adopts 
multiple approaches that seek to examine a number of factors in order to provide a 
holistic framework of the key drivers and trends in the market.  The chapter outlines the 
research design and some of the key theoretical debates. 
2.1 Research methods 
The purpose for this research is not to “triangulate” the interview and focus group data 
with the statistical data, (i.e. to verify one set of data against another) but it is to be used 
in a complementary manner (Bryman and Burgess, 1994:222).  In a period of dynamic 
change, there are several limitations to quantitative data, e.g. trends are often difficult to 
capture as they are not static and data points have a short lifespan.  The data analysis is 
important to understand the overall telecoms market development.  The qualitative 
component will provide a depth of understanding to the different dynamics affecting 
effective competition in the market.  More particularly, each brings its own strengths to 
the research process and contributes to enriching the analysis. 
 
While data indicators like teledensity, line growth and revenues are useful to provide an 
indication of the development of the market, it does not fully represent the dynamics of 
the market, i.e. quality of service, vertical integration, customer service, new products, 
etc.  It is also difficult to determine the behaviour and practices of the incumbent operator 
utilising quantitative data alone.  In a market in transition that has only had a monopoly 
operator, customer experiences become increasingly important as they provide anecdotal 
evidence on the market conditions that would not otherwise be indicated in the 
quantitative data alone.  As a result, the two methods complement each other and provide 
a holistic picture of market development.  Bryman (1988:10) acknowledges that there is a 
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view that “quantitative and qualitative research are different ways of conducting research 
and that the choice between them should be made in terms of their appropriateness in 
answering particular research questions.”   
Qualitative research methods 
The fundamental characteristic of qualitative research attempts to view events, actions, 
norms and values from the perspective of the people who are being studied.  This 
approach also entails a capacity to penetrate and understand the frames of meaning within 
which the research is being undertaken.  Qualitative research is assumed to generate 
concepts that are then able to form the building blocks of theory (Bryman and Burgess, 
1994:219).  There is still significant debate about the extent of the generalisability of the 
theory created as well as the degree to which theory is being generated, however. (Glaser 
and Strauss, 1967:220)   
 
Qualitative research is situated within a holistic context, so that the meanings ascribed are 
set within a context of values, practices, underlying structures and multiple perceptions.  
As a result, the multi-dimensional aspect of the research must be considered to include 
the social, political and economic aspects that drive policy change and ultimately affect 
market structure.   
 
Nevertheless, this is a multi-disciplinary study that involves both research in the 
academic literature and experience within the sector itself.  Therefore, the methodology 
must involve multiple methods by which information is drawn from various sources 
using different methods.  The research incorporates a range of methodologies, similar to 
the approach adopted by Krairit (2001). 
 
Literature review:  Using international experience with telecoms liberalisation, the 
researcher attempted to establish a frame of reference and against this evaluated the 
success or failure of key policy choices, e.g. market structure, market performance and 
ongoing sector regulation within the South African ICT sector.  These included 
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examining both developed and developing countries to provide a benchmark for South 
Africa. 
 
Discourse analysis:  Through the analysis of communications arising from the public 
consultation processes surrounding the new telecom policy, the researcher sought to 
ascertain the positions of various industry stakeholders on critical political, competitive 
and economic issues, e.g. managed liberalisation. 
 
The first two steps were completed as part of the detailed literature review.  The findings 
from this research were then further analysed and validated in the context of the South  
African situation, as outlined below.  
 
Semi-standardised interview:  To triangulate and add rigour to the research process, key 
individuals and organisations, including small, medium and large telecoms users in the 
telecoms industry, were interviewed to incorporate the user experiences from a number of 
perspectives.  The semi-standardised interview involved the implementation of a number 
of predetermined questions and/or special topics.  While the questions were asked in a 
systematic order, the interviewer was given the freedom to digress, thus enabling her to 
investigate more fully the interviewees’ perceptions about the issue being investigated.  
This method also gave the interviewer flexibility to adapt the “research instrument to the 
level of comprehension and articulacy of the respondent” and allowed subjects to 
volunteer information so that a fuller picture of the market dynamics could be gauged. 
(Fielding, 1993:136)   
 
Telecoms is often considered to be a key strategic advantage by most businesses.  As a 
result interviewees were reluctant to divulge commercially sensitive information in a 
structured manner.  Exploring topics, ideas and engaging in conversation was more likely 
to reveal information without threatening the interviewee.  Aspects that were delved into 
included understanding the importance of telecoms to businesses, their propensity to 
switch, pricing dynamics between service providers, the range of services purchased and 
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quality-of-service issues.  In reporting the results of these interviews, the respondents’ 
names, titles and organisation will not be disclosed because of confidentiality concerns. 
 
The Focus Group Interview:  As Everatt and Samuels (1995:25) explain, focus groups 
aim, through semi-structured discussions with selected groups, to discover how 
participants feel about the subject(s) being discussed.  Berg (1995:69) points to the 
dynamism of properly administered focus groups and notes, “interactions among and 
between group members stimulate discussions in which one group member reacts to 
comments made by another”.  When testing new concepts or products it is difficult to 
gauge understanding and reaction on a one-on-one basis.  As a result of this process of 
interaction among the interviewees, more ideas, issues, topics and sometimes — 
increased understanding are generated than through individual conversations.  As with 
the semi-structured interviews, focus group sessions were used to probe the responses of 
respondents on their perceptions of telecoms services in South Africa.   
2.2 Data-gathering methodology 
The research approach combined data-gathering activities into qualitative methods which 
included interviews, policy analysis and focus groups with data analysis which examined 
industry data like market shares, connectivity, revenues, profitability and price in order to 
draw conclusions about the current levels of competition and the structure of the market.  
The figure below unpacks the triangulated data-gathering approach and includes primary 
and secondary sources such as policy-makers, investors, service providers and users.  
This method is utilised to ensure that a holistic picture of the South African market is 
analysed.   
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Figure 1 — Data-gathering approach 
 
Adapted from Pyramid Research, 2001:IX 
Throughout the data-gathering process, the analysis framework outlined in earlier 
chapters will be used to guide the relevant issues and supporting data.   
 
Quantitative data collection consisted of a process of collecting already available 
secondary data that has been published by reliable sources.  The use of secondary 
research sources was chosen as the sources below were believed to provide the most 
accurate data available.  It would have been impossible to conduct primary data 
collection within this study, given the time and resource constraints, as well as the 
commercial sensitivity of the information.  The key data sources for the quantitative 
aspect of the study were: 
- SA technology market research reports from BMI Technologies, Media Africa, 
SAtoZ, Stats SA, Company Annual Reports, Nedlac, Analyst Reports; 
- Policy and regulatory information from government gazettes, Icasa, media reports; 
- Technology market research company reports, i.e. International Data Corporation, 
Pyramid Research (Economist Intelligence Unit), Media Africa, BMI Technologies, 
etc; 
- International data indicators from the ITU, OECD, World Bank, IMF; 
- Website market indicators from international regulators; and 
- Proprietary research to which the researcher had access. 
• BMI, Media Africa, 
SAtoZ 
• Stats SA, Annual 
Reports, Icasa  
• IDC, OECD, ITU 
• World Bank 
• Inter’l market reviews 
• Interviews  
• Focus Groups 
Investors 
Policy-makers 
Service 
Providers, Users 
PRIMARY 
SECONDARY 
“TRIANGULATED” DATA GATHERING 
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2.3 Research design, sampling and data collection 
A sample of potential respondents for interviewing was selected on a non-probability, 
judgemental basis, informed by years of experience working in the field, and based on the 
researcher’s knowledge of the various players actively involved in the telecoms sector in 
South Africa.  The size of the sample was based on the need to ensure a cross-section of 
experts, current customers, key industry players and potential private-sector investors.  
The complexity of the research topic implies that the number of experts involved in this 
field in South Africa is small.  The choice of sample size was driven largely by data 
availability and the time available for the study.  
Semi-standardised interview sampling 
In-depth face-to-face interviews were held with key individuals from leading companies 
in South Africa over a two-year period.  Interviews were initially held with a sample of 
10 individuals in July 2001, followed up by a sample of seven individuals in July 2002.  
Interview participants were selected on the basis that they were responsible for making 
key decisions in running large IT networks that were highly dependent on Telkom for 
service.  Given the seniority of their positions and availability, it was not possible to get 
these individuals to attend focus group sessions.  One-on-one sessions were also assumed 
to be able to provide more in-depth information.  These individuals served a key IT 
function in senior management positions and were responsible for running IT networks 
and making key purchasing decisions on telecoms suppliers.  They were selected because 
they were said to have a strategic view of the telecoms needs of their companies as well 
as the day-to-day operational requirements.  They also interacted with key telecoms 
suppliers like Telkom, MTN, Vodacom and value-added networks services (VANs) 
players as customers and could thus comment on key telecoms issues affecting their 
business.   
 
Two sets of interviews were held because of the delays in the licensing process of the 
second network operator (SNO).  Initial interviews were held on the basis of the policy 
outline, in an attempt to understand the current market.  Following the invitation to apply 
for a second network operator licence in 2002, subsequent interviews were held to assess 
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the changing dynamics of the market.  A good spread of industry sectors was aimed for: 
financial services, retail, fast-moving consumer goods, leisure, healthcare, internet 
service provision and VANs sectors.  These industries are all reliant on fast, efficient 
telecoms services and are thus regarded as large users of telecoms services.  Interview 
respondents were fairly sophisticated in their understanding of the telecoms requirements 
of their businesses.  This was surprising, given that South Africa has been a monopoly 
market and a closed environment for many years.  Customers in these markets have been 
regarded as having fairly simple requirements, such as reliable access to basic voice 
services.  The interviews were held in Johannesburg because the majority of the head 
offices of large corporates are situated in this city and also for convenience (time and cost 
constraints) because the researcher is based there.  In addition, a number of informal 
meetings were held throughout the course of the research period with key individuals 
from the regulator and in the industry.   
 
Appendix One contains the questionnaire guide used for the study.  The questionnaire 
served as a discussion guide only and thus includes a broad array of topics that attempt to 
probe the issues outlined above.  In all instances, the entire questionnaire was not used 
because of time, knowledge and confidentiality constraints, but rather provided a useful 
guide to the broad overview of relevant issues.   
Focus group sampling 
Eight core focus groups were set up in the three major metropolitan areas of South 
Africa:  Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban.  These three cities were chosen because 
they are key areas of economic activity in South Africa and the majority of the core 
business users require high-quality services both within and between these cities.  Groups 
were divided into three segments (large/medium businesses, small or home offices, and 
consumers, segmented into high-spend and medium-spend).  This was done as these user 
groups have distinct issues and requirements for telecoms services.  Similar to the 
individual interview sampling, focus group participants were also decision-makers in 
their respective company’s.  The responsibility for dealing with telecoms issues was part 
of their jobs.  Thus, they also interacted with key telecoms suppliers on a regular basis 
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and were familiar with the issues facing their company.  The table below provides an 
overview of the focus group sample: 
 
Table 1 — Focus group sampling 
Group Location Participants 
1 Johannesburg Large/medium businesses 
2 Durban Large/medium businesses 
3 Cape Town Large/medium businesses 
Groups 1, 2 and 3 were large/medium businesses.  Each group consisted of eight individuals from a mix 
of industry sectors including retail, engineering, leisure, finance and fast-moving consumer goods. 
4 Johannesburg Small offices/home offices 
5 Durban Small offices/home offices 
6 Cape Town Small offices/home offices 
Groups 4, 5 and 6 were SoHo/small businesses.  Each group consisted of eight individuals and 
represented industry sectors including retail, shipping, consultants and professionals. 
7 Johannesburg Consumer – high LSM1 grouping  
8 Johannesburg Consumer – medium LSM grouping 
Two consumer focus groups were held — one that consisted of high-income earners with the potential 
to spend more on telecoms services, the second consisting of medium-income earners. In both 
instances, members had to be decision-makers in the family and be able to purchase services. 
 
Appendix Two and Three contains detailed discussion guides for the business and 
consumer focus groups respectively.  The following specific areas of study were delved 
into: 
• Current telecoms services and usage of them; 
• Benefits and frustrations experienced with current service providers, including 
pricing, service levels and products; 
• Perceptions of Telkom — positives and negatives; 
• View of competition and alternative providers;  
• Introduction of new products and services e.g. fixed-mobile. 
                                                
1 Living standard measure – a demographic and psychographic classification of the South African 
population categorised according to household income and living standards ranging from 1-10.  1 is the 
poorest households with a largely rural base while 8 is the most affluent, largely urban population. 
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2.4 Data analysis 
Data analysis was done in conjunction with the literature review.  Key issues arising from 
the literature review were highlighted, e.g. key indicators of competition, policy and 
regulatory structures, market structure, technology choices, etc, and used as the 
benchmark against which to compare the South African market and to identify key areas 
of misalignment and discrepancy.  Countries for the international literature review were 
chosen because they are generally regarded in the developing world, as leaders in 
telecoms growth and market liberalisation.  In selecting developing countries, level of 
growth and innovative ideas served as indicators for their inclusion in the study.  Key 
areas of discrepancy and misalignment were identified from international best practice 
and benchmarked against South African indicators.  In some cases, these justified the 
reasons for departure from international experience in view of the unique South African 
condition.  In others, they highlighted problem areas and potential future problems. 
 
Data gathered from the interviews and focus groups was used to summarise the 
perspectives of the various stakeholders, particularly in attempting to characterise and 
understand the South African market.  The data was documented using interview notes 
and tapes from transcripts from the focus groups, then analysed in terms of key 
competition indicators such as of price perception, service, network reliability, regulatory 
and impact on business.  In the analysis, the researcher tried to prioritise and rank some 
of the key issues of concern raised as well as draw out common views and threads 
emerging from the various phases of analysis. 
 
For the quantitative analysis, South Africa was benchmarked against a range of countries 
which are not only similar to South Africa in terms of population size, income dispersion, 
geographical dispersion of population but also considered to be leaders in telecoms 
services.  In order to understand South Africa’s telecoms performance, a range of 
countries were selected to benchmark against South Africa, with key telecoms indicators 
being connectivity, telecoms investment, revenue, price and quality of service.  Peer-
group countries in sub-Saharan Africa, other middle-income countries like Turkey and 
Morocco, and finally, developed countries like the United Kingdom and the United 
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States, were selected to provide a broad range of indicators.  Data for these indicators was 
collected from key sources such as ITU, BMI and some proprietary data, then tabulated 
and analysed to identify trends.  Finally, in order to understand company performance in 
South Africa, a range of internationally renowned telecoms companies’ financial and 
operational indicators was benchmarked against the incumbents (fixed and mobile) in 
South Africa.  The table below provides data on key indicators against which South 
Africa can be compared. 
 
Table 2 — Key indicators for benchmark countries 
Group Country Population  
GDP per 
capita (US$) 
Population 
density per sq 
km 
Gini 
coefficient
2
 
Namibia 2,011,000 7,300 2 70 
Botswana 1,795,000 9,200 2.5 63 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
South Africa 45,214,000 11,100 37.1 59.3 
Brazil 180,655,008 8,100 20.9 58.5 
Morocco 29,900,000 4,200 67.5 39.5 
Turkey 72,320,000 7,400 85.11 40 
Peer group 
India 1,081,229,056 3,100 358 32.5 
Korea 48,082,160 19,200 485.3 31.6 
UK 59,428,000 29,600 244.7 36 Best practice 
US 297,043,008 40,100 31.8 40.8 
Source: Worldbank, Nationmaster.com. CIA world factbook 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter explained the manner in which the research was designed and conducted.  
Straight-forward market-structure analysis based on structure-conduct-performance 
reduces the issues far too simplistically and is thus unable to provide depth to the 
analysis.  Therefore, a holistic approach that attempts to understand the broader social 
and political context, the business environment driving sector reform and the underlying 
market dynamics was taken to explore key policy and regulatory levers that shape 
markets in the transition from a monopoly to a competitive arena. 
                                                
2 A measure of inequality of income distribution.  The higher the number the more unequal the income 
distribution of a country.   
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3 Key issues in telecoms network markets 
Introduction 
This section reviews basic industrial organisation theory within the context of telecoms 
network markets and its applicability to telecoms network markets.  It examines the 
theoretical issues around market structure, company conduct and sector performance 
within the changing dynamics of telecoms network markets that are driving market 
reform and competition.  It also examines the conditions conducive to effective 
competition in telecoms network markets.  As such, this research uses industrial 
organisation as the basic framework of analysis to evaluate the evolution of the South 
African telecoms network market structure.  The study also takes cognisance of the 
complexity of relationships between structure, conduct and performance and its inter-
relations by including an analysis of the environment within which the market operates, 
influences and is influenced by.  The theoretical model identified in this chapter will 
serve as the basis for analysing the structure and configuration of the South African 
market. 
3.1 Overview of market structure analysis 
Basic industrial organisation theory relates market structure to the behaviour of the 
economic agents that operate in a market and to the performance these relationships 
generate (Clarke, 1985:10).  Market structure examines the number of competitors 
operating in a relevant market and the distribution of market shares, barriers to entry, 
product differentiation and substitutes, vertical integration and degree of risk.  Conduct 
seeks to determine company behaviour under certain circumstances, including the 
respective role of price and non-price strategies, the level of co-operation established 
between players, strategies of differentiation and diversification.  Finally, through the 
examination of performance which deals with the allocation of resources, attempts to 
understand competition in the market are made.  (Jacquemin, 2000:5)  It is important to 
recognise that one-way causations running from structure to conduct to performance can 
be simplistic as a theoretical framework.  There is an ongoing debate centred mainly on 
the existence and direction of causality in the structure-conduct-performance model.  It is 
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not the intention of this study to discuss the relevance of the structure-conduct-debate but 
rather to utilise elements of this framework to analyse the market structure and 
competitive environment in the South African telecoms network market.  The structure-
conduct-performance paradigm attracts increasing criticism.  Some of these include: (a) 
market structure is not independently determined and is often affected by performance 
and conduct; (b) market performance is a multi-dimensional concept; and, (c) the 
underlying assumptions of information symmetries and companies keeping perfect 
information records leads to the conclusion that perfect competition is the ideal market 
structure.  These observations have led to a rejection of the structure-conduct-
performance approach in favour of newer, revised models.   
3.2 Key issues affecting telecoms network market structure 
3.2.1 From monopoly to competitive markets 
The fundamental assumption underlying the market system approach is that society 
requires efficient performance from producers of goods and services that does not result 
in wastage of scarce resources, creates products that are responsive to consumer demand, 
has operations that are progressive and technologically innovative, and facilitates stable, 
full employment of resources and equitable distribution of income.  Monopoly markets 
are characterised by a single manufacturer, with no substitutes for the product, which 
impedes the entry of other participants.  A monopolistic market is often associated with 
excessively high product prices, reduced supply levels or other behaviour that reduces 
consumer welfare.  On the other end of the spectrum, “in a competitive market, 
individual suppliers lack ‘market power’ and cannot dictate the market terms, but must 
respond to the rivalry of their competitors in order to stay in business.”  (Trebing, 1997:5)   
 
Trebing defines effective competition in telecoms as a situation in which “there are at 
least five or six comparable rivals with no significant barriers to entry and no single firm 
exercises dominance.  In addition, demand conditions are assumed to be essentially 
elastic across the board.” (1997:27)  Internationally, few telecoms network markets 
display these characteristics and are more likely to show oligopolistic tendencies rather 
than competitive ones.  Still, telecoms network markets cannot be regarded as truly 
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contestable markets.  For a market to be fully contestable, companies must be able to 
avoid large sunk costs.  The new entrant must be able to make a one-way bet, winning if 
profits are good, but losing little should it decide to retreat (The Economist, 1998).  The 
massive up-front infrastructure investment required to compete with an incumbent goes 
against this theory and implies that a proactive stance is required in creating incentives 
for new companies to invest and compete in the telecoms network arena, to prevent the 
incumbent from restricting output and raising prices.   
 
Falch identifies the notion of perfect competition as characterising an unregulated market 
“where the forces of competition drive down prices to the level of production costs and 
both price and production develop in such a way that the societal welfare is optimised.” 
(1997:101)  Well-functioning markets are characterised by the ease of market entry and 
exit, absence of significant monopoly power, widespread availability of information, 
absence of market externalities, achievement of public interest objectives and sufficiently 
large numbers of independent suppliers. 
 
Table 3 — Differences between monopoly and competition 
Monopoly Competition 
• Economies of scale 
• Full control over technical network 
• Low interconnection costs 
• Ability to achieve public interest 
objectives 
• No unnecessary duplication of 
infrastructure 
• Organisational efficiency 
• Downward price pressure 
• Product and service development 
• Enhances and encourages innovation 
• Enables customer choice 
• Alternative network infrastructure 
(options for redundancy) 
Source:  Falch, 1997:102 
In a competitive market, there would be little or no reason for government intervention or 
regulation, as the market would regulate itself.  While no markets are perfectly 
competitive, telecoms in particular is vulnerable to monopoly abuse of power, as it has 
developed in a monopoly environment, often protected by the state, with high barriers to 
entry.  Historically, the telecoms sector has been treated as an exception to industry in 
general and in most countries supplied by a state monopoly.  The changes in 
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technologies, services and markets have prompted governments to seek a competitive 
industry model for the future.   
 
It should be noted that, in most major economies, even after years of liberalisation, 
effective competition (five or six competitors) has not emerged.  These markets display 
the characteristics of oligopolistic markets, with three or four firms often controlling over 
60% of the market with significant entry barriers prevailing, e.g. the UK and the USA.  
The sector remains under continuous regulatory intervention to ensure that the market is 
able to function fairly and competitively.  Although the immediate cost benefits are 
clearer to conceptualise and quantify, the potential net benefit from liberalised markets is 
difficult to quantify for several reasons inter alia the concept of measurability is difficult 
to define as a benefit.  Such benefits are often intangible and rest on broader economic 
and social goals, i.e. improved resource allocation, increased productivity, innovation and 
consumer choice.  Internationally, there has been pressure towards more liberalised 
telecoms markets.  Following global trends and international pressure, governments have 
moved away from monopoly providers towards more competitive markets.  This took the 
form of licensing additional operators – both service- and infrastructure-based, splitting 
services that are non-essential for the telecoms operator, e.g. value-added network 
services and managed services and allowing open entry into certain sectors such as 
customer premises equipment. 
 
International trends highlight the move towards privatisation and increased separation of 
regulatory from operating functions.  The figures below highlight this trend. 
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Figure 2 — Separation of regulatory and operational functions internationally 
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Source: ITU regulatory database, 2005 
Sector activity has increased considerably since the early Nineties.  To date, there are 126 
separate regulatory bodies internationally.  The increased sector activity has forced the 
move towards increased privatisation initiatives, including separation of regulatory and 
operational functions. 
 
Figure 3 — Level of competition in basic services by region (2004) 
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Source: ITU regulatory database, 2003/2004 
Europe generally leads the way in more liberalised and competitive telecoms markets.  
By 2004, approximately 54% of countries internationally had opened up basic telecoms 
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services to competition.  Further, competition to the European incumbents is the norm 
with 77% of basic services open to other operators.  While Africa’s figures on the level of 
competition is not largely different from the America’s, the operational reality is vastly 
different and this is evident from the penetration levels and the number of services 
available. 
 
Figure 4 — Level of competition in mobile services by region (2004) 
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Source: ITU regulatory database, 2003/2004 
 
Africa compares particularly well to developed countries in introducing competition in 
mobile.  Although competition in mobile is comparable, penetration in Africa is still 
remarkably low.  The reasons for this is identified and discussed in subsequent chapters. 
 
In an early white paper on competitiveness, the European Commission highlighted the 
importance of moving towards the information society as one of the key elements for 
achieving growth, competitiveness and employment (CEC, 1993C).  The paper argued 
that competitive telecoms markets would provide incentives for growth, greater freedom 
of entry and impose significant limitations on the power of existing monopoly 
incumbents.  “The flexibility achieved in an open market environment is therefore all the 
more essential in the context of the information society because companies must be 
allowed the freedom to try out alternative routes towards new applications and markets, 
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and test out a variety of different technologies. (Curwen, 1997:10).  Since then the 
Commission has continued along the policy path of increased telecoms liberalisation as a 
foundation for information society development.  The Lisbon Manifesto which sets an 
agenda for economic and social renewal for Europe identifies the ICT sector as important 
to this strategy.  (EU, 2000) 
3.3 Telecoms network markets — Local industries with global influence 
The next sections detail the specific characteristics of the telecoms network markets, 
including the changing dynamics of the sector which challenge the traditional notions of 
static analysis of market structure.  The rapidly changing demand characteristics of the 
telecoms network market fundamentally influence the market structure of the industry 
and challenge the notion of market structure as a static variable.   
 
Telecoms are increasingly becoming an integral part of national and global 
infrastructures as they provide platforms for promoting growth in national economies.  
The information intensity of the global economy has increased vastly over the past few 
years, so the importance of telecoms has been emphasised by the increasingly globalised 
and competitive nature of the global economy.  The future economy will be built on an 
efficient telecoms network that is accessible to everyone.  Telecoms services are 
increasingly becoming critical to other economic activity.  A study undertaken by the US 
Chamber of Commerce found that the current state of the telecoms industry has cost the 
US more than 380,000 jobs.  The study found that the telecoms sector had not recovered 
along with the rest of the economy.  This had a direct impact on jobs and would affect the 
country’s ability to remain internationally competitive if not reversed.  (Rutledge, Hazlett 
and Hewiit, 2004).  The Internet and high-speed digital communications networks create 
a new environment for information production and have changed the relationship of the 
factors of production in the economy.  Services-based activity reliant on efficient 
telecoms networks is increasingly becoming a key contributor to GDP, particularly in 
developed countries.  In the information society, the positive social benefits associated 
with information flows imply a strategic importance in expanding service provision.  For 
  46 
this reason, information society initiatives have been instituted by governments 
internationally to take advantage of opportunities in the global economy.   
 
Telecoms is a complex industry that involves complex technological choices and massive 
upfront investment in infrastructure, but it is also a necessary social good that requires 
policy intervention to ensure a balance between achieving social and political objectives 
while also developing a dynamic sector.  Traditionally, because of economies of scale, 
telecoms has developed in a monopoly environment, often funded and protected by 
government.  In the knowledge economy, there has been a global push to introduce 
market dynamics, which includes the privatisation of previously state-owned assets and 
liberalisation within the value chain.  Policy and regulation have attempted to intervene in 
these markets by creating market structures to facilitate competition and introduce 
regulation to monitor the behaviour of the incumbent. 
3.3.1 Evolving demand factors 
While technological progress in telecoms equipment has reduced the importance of scale 
economies for most components of the network, technological progress has also created 
heterogeneous demand among customers, for example, mobility and large volumes of 
data transmission, with significant differences to fixed voice transmission.  These 
differences in demand also create demand for differentiated services, often in areas in 
which the telecoms operator lacks expertise so is better left to specialised professionals.  
“Whereas a single network can offer all qualitative features to all customers, the practical 
reality is that many uses, especially for large businesses, are most efficiently provided by 
a separate network that is designed to satisfy specialised demands, but that is also 
connected to other networks to permit simpler forms of communication between them.” 
(Noll, 1999:25)  Apart from technological innovation, consumers are demanding greater 
flexibility in products, increased services and lower costs.   
 
Prior to the 1940s, voice transmission was the central focus of telecoms and dominated 
customer demand.  Innovations in technology have enabled the development of new 
facilities and services, thus creating differentiated demand.  The distinctive characteristics 
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of each new technology have created new opportunities, even new markets for 
specialised service offerings.  The advent of television created a new market for long-
distance video transmission via high-capacity coaxial cable and microwave technology.  
Satellite transmission — commonly used in television, large private networks and value-
added networks for specialised business services — is well suited for point-to-multipoint 
applications and international services.  Microwave technology, which suits point-to-
point services in rugged terrain or between two points, and is often used in large urban 
markets, has lowered barriers to entry in the inter-exchange market, especially the 
private-line segment for business customers.  Thus, the growth of computer-data has also 
increased demand for networks capable of data transmission and created new markets.  
“Demand for new services, coupled with the invention of new technology capable of 
meeting this demand, created ideal conditions for competitive entry into long-distance 
markets.” (Wilson, 2000:118)   
 
Demand characteristics for telecoms services have changed considerably over the past 
decade.  Telecoms services represent quite distinct patterns of demand for business and 
residential customers, each with very different demand profiles.  While the residential 
market is fairly homogeneous in demand characteristics, new technology to enable new 
business data services presents growing and diffuse segmentation between different 
business groupings in terms of markets, services and interests, with different demand and 
cost structures for each customer group.  The table below, adapted from Falch 
(1997:110), presents a broad overview of the differentiated demand characteristics for 
residential and business customers: 
Table 4 — Differentiated customer demand characteristics  
Residential Market Business Market  
• Homogeneous market 
• Multiple small customers 
• Typical 1-2 lines per customer 
• Predictable and limited traffic per line 
• Limited use of advanced services 
• Relatively low demand for sophisticated services 
• Heterogeneous market - mix of large and small 
customers 
• Fewer customers, often with many lines 
• More traffic per line 
• Demand for a wide range of services 
• Require solutions rather than one service 
Source: Falch, 1997:100 
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The long-term investment characteristics of telecoms networks require careful demand 
forecasting of services that will allow an acceptable return on investment.  But, growth 
rates and service demand to date have been difficult to forecast, particularly in the 
business market.  The major proportion of total investment costs lie in the access 
network.  “In the OECD area, high growth rates in revenue in the mid-1980s have been 
followed by more moderate growth rates in the 1990s.” (Falch, 1997:107)  While an 
increased array of services has been added in the decade, particularly data and mobile, 
these are sufficiently heterogeneous in demand to make network service forecasting 
particularly difficult.   
3.3.2 Rapidly changing supply conditions 
Technological improvements allow newer networks to be highly flexible and scaleable at 
a much lower cost than older network technologies.  Newer networks are able to provide 
greater capacity, are more sophisticated and offer better quality of service.  Technological 
innovation also allows new entrants to offer services at a much lower marginal cost.  New 
networks can be designed for limited, highly profitable market segments, with the initial 
investment closer to private-sector appetites than the older networks required.  The 
following sections detail the significant changes in the cost structures that have driven 
changes in supply conditions.  
Lower equipment costs 
Copper wire and limited capacity coaxial cable have provided the backbone of telecoms 
networks.  Innovations in microwave, satellite, coaxial cable and optical fibre (more 
recently spectrum applications such as wi-fi and wi-max) have introduced new 
transmission media of greater capacity and functional capability, thus reducing costs 
dramatically and increasing efficiency.  Apart from the high-speed transmission, optical 
fibre cables are more resilient and can be installed at relatively low cost along the right-
of-way of existing power and rail networks, reducing the cost of deployment.  More than 
a decade ago, “innovations both in the technology for manufacturing optical fibre and in 
transmission equipment have steadily reduced the cost of optical fibre systems at about 
70% annually.” (Saunders, Warford and Wellenius, 1994:39)  This rapid pace of 
technological improvement of fibre has continued to the present day.  Microwave relays 
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with very high frequencies can transmit communications signals between line-of-sight 
antennas.  These were deployed both in the long-distance networks and more recently in 
outlying areas.  Satellite transmission is used in the long-distance and international 
networks.  In developed countries, these transmission media were initially deployed over 
medium and long-distance, but, the costs of fibre have decreased dramatically and it is 
standard practice to utilise fibre-optics in the deployment of new networks.  Total 
network cost reductions were a result of both reduced equipment costs and the capacity to 
handle higher bandwidth requirements.   
Increased capacity and reduced space requirements 
Traditional switching equipment was either electro-mechanical or electric analogue, but 
digital soft switches have now become the industry standard.  Not only has the cost of the 
hardware declined but soft switches have also reduced the need for large switching 
centres and personnel to manage these systems.  Costs of switching equipment were 
approximately $300-$400 per connected line in the 1970s to approximately $10 per 
connected line today.   
 
Electronic switching technologies reduced the cost of end-user equipment and central 
office switching.  Innovations in microelectronics and manufacturing technology also 
undermined the traditional economies of manufacturing scale associated with switching.  
This lowered the entry barriers to certain segments of the equipment market, thus making 
it possible for a relatively small business to assemble a telephone or PBX from easily 
available components at comparable costs to a large manufacturer. (Vietor, 1994:189)   
Improved reliability 
Modern digital networks require less human intervention than older analogue 
technologies.  “Digitalisation has virtually eliminated the traditional boundary between 
switching and transmission, reduced the interface costs, and enabled more efficient and 
flexible use of equipment.” (Saunders et al., 1994:44)  Digital technologies also mean 
there is greater control of the network, including the ability to monitor and guarantee 
system uptime.  As a result of these increased efficiencies, operating costs have been 
reduced. 
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Telecoms networks are complex systems of supply that have become an integral part of 
national, regional and global infrastructures in the information economy.  Increasing 
technological innovation and decreasing costs have significantly affected the supply of 
products and services and driven demand.  Proper employment of telecoms networks and 
systems can serve as platforms for promoting growth, enhancing national infrastructure 
and facilitating access to the knowledge economy.  However, success in achieving this is 
highly complex and requires balancing intensive, highly technical networks, complex 
geographical characteristics and varying consumer requirements.  In a monopoly 
industry, ownership and control of the infrastructure also become of vital importance in 
supply-side dynamics and thus telecoms is heavily dependent on technology and public 
policy.   
3.3.3 Economies of scale and technology  
Fixed network costs are significant in telecoms and thus economies of scale are a 
significant factor influencing the entry and number of players in telecoms network 
markets.  Capacity increases can be gained at a less than proportional rise in total cost.  
High fixed costs at the network level are a major driver of economies of scale.   
 
This does not necessarily mean there are automatic economies of scale in telecoms 
network markets.  Economies of scale exist over some range of output and not others.  
“At high levels of output, management might not be able to oversee closely all the 
operations of the firm, giving rise to inefficiencies that can dominate any technological 
cost advantages of large scale operation.”  (Intven, Oliver and Sepulveda, 2000:b-4)  
Given the size and complexity of large, multiplant firms, decision-making is often slower 
and the remoteness of executives from the day-to-day operations often impairs the quality 
of the decision.  “How well companies cope with the managerial problems of size 
appears to depend upon the complexity of production and marketing challenges and the 
abilities of a firms guiding individuals.  A few firms are fortunate to secure leaders with 
sufficient organisational genius to sustain superior profitability despite what might 
otherwise be debilitating scale.” (Scherer and Ross, 1990:106)  The realisation of 
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economies of scale is also subject to diminishing returns at some point.  Learning curves 
flatten out as very large cumulative volumes are attained and set-up costs start to become 
insignificant.   
 
Economies of scope exist if two or more products can be produced by one operator at a 
lower cost than if each product was produced separately by different operators.  This 
often arises if common equipment and facilities are required to produce these products.  
In telecoms, a single network is required to produce most of the products, as the 
intelligence for network management lies at the central switching area.  For example, 
most public service telecoms operators have local-loop networks to their residential 
customers so adding national long distance and international services is at an incremental 
cost to the network.  Weak demand conditions for a single-service often cannot justify the 
provision of a single service and thus provides incentive for the provision of multiple 
services.  Traditionally, incumbents have produced all services, but technological 
advancements, particularly internet-protocol-based technology allow for separate 
providers of particular services, e.g. VANs.  There has been considerable disagreement 
on the extent of economies of scale in the telecoms services industry.  This study accepts 
the premise that the significant technological and market changes have undercut the 
economies of scale justification of natural monopoly. 
 
The introduction of digital technologies accelerated the pace of development, particularly 
in the application of computing and networking technologies.  These new technologies 
allowed the introduction of new services that were able to respond to pressing customer 
demand.  “It is the computer control of the telephone switching, and the telephone 
network capability to switch and transmit computer signals, that is causing the two fields 
to grow together.” (Vietor, 1994:189)  While local loop costs continue to be expensive 
and allow the incumbent operator the last frontier of domination, new technological 
innovation will continue to challenge this.  These innovations have fundamentally 
changed the architecture and economics of the network.  
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Figure 5 — Telecoms cost characteristics 
Long distance capital 
cost per message mile
Cost per message 
of switching
Investment cost per 
average local service
Introduction of 
electronic switching
1962 1990
Changing cost characteristics in telecommunications
 
The graph above is illustrative of the dramatically changing cost characteristics of the 
fixed-line network.  The costs of fibre have since steadily declined further and the 
introduction of mobile at significantly lower costs also impact the cost dynamics.  It has 
been estimated that a mobile network costs 50 percent less per connection than fixed lines 
and can be rolled out much faster.  The cost advantages of mobile phones consist not only 
of lower costs per subscriber but also the smaller scale economies that can be achieved.  
(Waverman, Meschi and Fuss, 2005)  Further, alternative technologies to address the 
residential customer have brought down the cost per subscriber, e.g. wireless local loop, 
wi-fi, wi-max, CDMA, etc.  Both capital expenditure and operational expenditure have 
significantly decreased.  As a result, it is now possible to profitably service even 
subscribers with a very low marginal income.  Increasing innovation in wireless and 
GSM technologies could also mean that these could provide similar levels of broadband 
connectivity to fixed services. 
 
Network costs in certain segments (e.g. access) of the network do indicate some 
economies of scale, but, these are not significant enough to make competition 
unworkable.  A large proportion of the cost structures have developed under monopoly 
Source: Graph adapted from (Vietor, 1994:19) 
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conditions and it is arguable whether the same cost structures would emerge under 
different market and technological conditions (Falch, 1997:111).  This study argues that 
the significant technological changes do not justify the economies-of-scale argument. 
3.3.4 Entry barriers 
While a policy of free entry in most industries is not an issue and is most often 
determined by market opportunities, this is problematic in telecoms.  Inherent industry 
conditions like elements of natural monopoly, economies of scale in some parts of the 
network, high upfront investment, long return on investment, etc, all present a case for 
structured and managed entry, but the benefits of competition in  product and technology 
innovation, low prices and cost reductions argue strongly for free market entry.  The 
specific nature and characteristics of telecoms network markets make free entry and open 
competition difficult to achieve.  Natural monopoly conditions in certain parts of the 
network and a history of a dominant and integrated, often state-owned, incumbent have 
created complex vertical structures.  This also is often a deterrent to investment in the 
industry.  In addition, the public-interest nature of telecoms networks, including access to 
rights of way and spectrum, combined with managing efficiency and consumer benefit, 
call for government intervention to ensure a balance between supply and demand.  The 
multi-product nature of the industry, non-storability of output, time variance and random 
demand characteristics, high sunk costs, capacity constraints, network externalities 
between users, elements of natural monopoly in some parts of the network and complex 
vertical structures create multiple entry barriers. 
 
The benefits of competition must be weighed against the possibility that too many 
companies may enter, so infrastructure roll-out cannot be managed in any way. This 
could lead to unnecessary and expensive infrastructure duplication and thus inefficient 
allocation of scarce public resources.  Some analysts fear that free entry may also lead to 
“cherry-picking” or “cream-skimming”, i.e. entrants entering only profitable market 
segments without corresponding obligations to service non-profitable segments or fulfil 
their network roll-out obligations.  Incumbents may then struggle to bear the costs of 
delivering to all market segments and financing the rest of their operations, e.g. regulated 
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tariffs will constrain the ability to utilise segments/services to finance unprofitable parts 
of the network.   
 
“The more prone markets are to a breakdown of competitive supply conditions, either 
because scale economies limit the number of suppliers or because buyer and seller are 
locked together in complex coordinating relationships, the stronger is the buyers 
incentive to protect itself by integrating upstream.” (Scherer and Ross, 1990:110)  The 
provision of telecoms components, materials and services requires compelling economies 
of scale in itself, thus adding another important dimension to the choice between 
integration and disintegration.  Scale economies can result in limited suppliers, creating 
monopolistic pricing of components.  Buyers are aware of being held hostage to elevated 
prices, even if a supplier chooses not to exercise its power.  “To avoid actual or feared 
monopolistic exploitation, users of high-scale economy materials or components often 
decide to undertake internal production, even though they may incur a cost penalty in 
doing so.” (Scherer and Ross, 1990:110)  In some instances, these factors have led to the 
development of large, unwieldy telecoms companies. 
 
There is no doubt there has been a fundamental shift in the structure of the telecoms 
market globally.  While there have been many proponents of telecoms as a natural 
monopoly because of the high upfront investment costs combined with a long return on 
investment, this study argues that due to the rapid changes in telecoms development, 
these monopoly institutions cannot effectively respond to the changes in the economic, 
political and social environments.  They serve to entrench monopoly power, stifle 
innovation and block competition.  Melody argues that “monopolies operating in a 
protected, stable environment are not well-suited to adapt to a new and increasingly 
diversified and dynamic market place.” (1997:3)  It must also be noted, that not all 
liberalisation processes necessarily result in competitive market structures or immediate 
benefits for the consumer.  The OECD has identified certain negative aspects of 
liberalisation of services and deregulation as experienced in other countries, including 
increased local rates, initial customer confusion and, to some extent, inconvenience 
(1988:60).  The intention of this study is to provide recommendations to increase market 
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forces that will create efficient allocation of resources and a socially acceptable 
distribution of income.   
 
The inter-connected and inter-networked nature of the industry requires that these 
changes are filtered globally so that both countries and companies are able to compete.  
The factors outlined above illustrate that the issues of market intervention and regulation 
cannot be simplified to a choice between free-market solutions, i.e. allowing the free 
reign of markets as the most efficient means to allocate resources, or monopoly, where 
the market is regarded as unable to satisfy service requirements sufficiently.  Imperfect 
markets, dynamic industry structures and social and political realities suggest the 
emergence of market structures which balance competing social and economic objectives 
and which reflect characteristics of the two ideal structures  (OECD, 1988:53).  This 
study argues that market structure in telecoms is highly dependent on the rapidly 
changing and evolving technological and political environment.  The fluid impact of the 
market structure must therefore be considered in any analysis. 
3.4 Conduct — Company dynamics in a newly competitive environment 
Telecoms networks are dependent on public infrastructure and resources.  It is a wires 
industry reliant on rights of way.  As a result, historically, co-ordination of supply and 
demand for public utilities was achieved through centralised structures – either public 
enterprises or private monopolies — which were then often subjected to price and 
earnings regulation.  Yet success to date, in managing these complex systems to ensure 
the efficient employment of resources has been dubious.  Monopoly operators have been 
characterised by poor management, inflexibility in responding to consumer demand 
because of rapid changes in technology, limited innovation in products and services, high 
prices and over-capitalisation of the network that did not match demand.  As a result, 
they were unable to respond to the changes in the economic, technological and social 
environments.  In a newly competitive market, where incumbents display significant 
market power and new entrants are highly dependent on incumbents to provide services, 
significant potential for abuse of monopoly power exists.  The behaviour of incumbents 
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regarding pricing, product innovation and legal tactics employed to stall the new operator 
become increasing important.   
 
Vertically integrated monopolies “create the incentive and opportunity for anti-
competitive behaviour.” (Armstrong et al., 1994:136)  The likelihood of an incumbent 
abusing its position in a liberalised market is particularly high because the pressure to 
increase profitability from private-sector investors is also high.  While elements of 
telecoms services are potentially competitive, e.g. long-distance, VANs, effective 
competition is impossible without access to essential related facilities like the local loop, 
ducts and interconnection.  Incumbent networks generally have full control of these 
facilities and often refuse to provide access to competitor networks.  Terms and 
conditions of access, price of access and terms for interconnection become the central 
pillars of conduct regulation.  The potential for incumbents to deny new entrants access 
to the network, especially with vertical integration, is very high.  Competition alone 
cannot be relied upon to contain the market power of the incumbent firm.  Effective 
regulation is therefore necessary to curb the incumbent’s power and create conditions for 
fair competition.  “Unless the monitoring of anti-competitive behaviour is very effective, 
it may also be desirable to help new entrants into network operation while they build their 
sunk costs networks to develop an effective competitive challenge to a dominant 
incumbent.” (Armstrong et al., 1994:290)  
Market power 
Telecoms have primarily developed in a monopoly environment internationally and, as a 
result, incumbent operators exercise significant market power.  Typically, incumbent 
operators have control over essential facilities.  In the absence of regulation, monopoly 
firms have no limitations on pricing, except what the market can bear and consumer 
willingness to pay for products.   
 
A legacy of market failures, especially natural monopoly cost conditions in parts of the 
industry and a history of actual monopoly over nearly all of the industry, provides the 
underlying reason for policy intervention (Armstrong et al, 1994:195).  Telecoms 
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customers are unaccustomed to competition in this sector.  As a result, there is a high 
degree of customer inertia.  New entrants find it difficult to persuade customers to switch 
from the incumbent’s network, particularly if this entails changing phone numbers, 
dialling extra digits, dealing with two phone bills, etc.  Regulation that promotes 
competition without unfairly handicapping the incumbent should be in place.   
 
Incumbent operators were allowed to build their networks in a monopoly environment, 
the majority of them with the protection of government funds.  It is almost impossible to 
expect new entrants to replicate the ubiquitous network of wires and switches that blanket 
countries in a competitive environment.  If competition is to gain a foothold, it will be 
built in markets that are related to the core network industries and must be built on the 
basis of sharing the bottleneck facilities and services provided by those networks.  “The 
fiction of facilities-based competition should not be allowed to destroy the competition in 
applications, content and services that ride on underlying telecommunications facilities.”  
(Cooper, 2002:35) 
Pricing 
Incumbents have developed in a protected, monopoly environment, often without any 
regulation on prices.  Unregulated monopolies have thus set prices which result in 
inefficient resource allocation.  Ideally, in a well-functioning, fully competitive 
marketplace, prices are equal to marginal cost. “To maximise social welfare, departures 
from marginal costs should be set to minimise total surplus losses while allowing the 
supplier to break even.” (Intven et al., 2000:B6)  Demand elasticities for most telecoms 
services and customer classes, particularly in the business sector, are relatively low.  As a 
result, unregulated monopolies can charge prices that often lead to “a dramatically 
inefficient allocation of resources.” (Armstrong et al., 1994:13)  Theoretically, in a fully 
competitive marketplace, prices approximate marginal cost because of the intense 
competition. 
 
Internationally, in a liberalised market, incumbent operators have failed to charge 
competitive prices.  In keeping with traditional economic theory, competitive, well-
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functioning markets lead to efficient prices that maximise society’s welfare.  But for a 
market to be competitive, the market must meet a number of conditions, i.e. several 
buyers and sellers, with none so large that it can affect prices; no one must be dominant 
with no significant externalities and with free entry to or exit from the market.  As 
outlined above, this description of competitive markets is not applicable to the telecoms 
sector for a number of reasons.  Thus, given the nature of the industry and a history of an 
inability to function efficiently, internationally, price regulation for network markets has 
been imposed by regulators.   
 
In a competitive environment, two groups of pricing are particularly important, namely, 
prices for consumers of telecoms services and prices for connecting to the incumbent 
network (interconnection).  Cost-based methods of determining prices have been found to 
be particularly onerous on regulators because the informational requirements are 
particularly intensive.  They entail a detailed understanding of the costs of providing each 
individual service and its related elasticities.  They also assume that operators have a 
detailed understanding of the costs and elasticities of each service and, if they do, would 
be willing to pass this information to regulators.  Often, telecoms operators have been 
integrated public monopolies with very little understanding of their costs.  In a privatised, 
dynamic environment, the natural inclination is to obscure the facts to the regulator so as 
to gain the best possible pricing to retain monopoly profits.   
 
Significant technological changes in the telecoms industry are driving convergence of 
technology and products with significant implications for operator costs and product 
pricing.  As digital voice, data and multimedia applications are increasingly being carried 
across the same network infrastructure, the related cost of carriage for each service is 
falling.  The actual path travelled by data or voice need not be related to the distance 
between the calling parties.  As a result, a cost-based justification for differential pricing 
for different services is rapidly disappearing.  The implication arising from this 
convergence trend is the huge increase in available capacity.  This effectively means that 
the marginal cost of the network capacity that is required to provide carriage services is 
insignificant and may even be approaching zero.  At the same time, large capital 
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investment in network facilities is required to meet ever-increasing demand for services.  
Against this background, network infrastructure is increasingly being characterised as a 
fixed cost.  The underlying network expenditure required to provide communications 
services are becoming more fixed than variable in nature.  The implications of these 
trends on the global telecoms industry is that networked business models will be 
increasingly based on services supplied and cost, rather than price.  The move to new 
digital IP networks makes the reasonable identification of constituent cost elements more 
difficult.  This phenomenon is already illustrated in the international data market which, 
although highly competitive, currently accounts for 50% of global telecoms traffic, yet 
only generates 34% of industry revenues.   
 
It is not the intention of this study to examine the various methodologies or the pros and 
cons of price regulation but rather to examine the impact of pricing.  This will include 
analysis of the impact on pricing in the South African market, as benchmarked against 
other markets. 
3.5 Sector performance 
Established network operators enjoy major advantages over new entrants.  Incumbent 
operators own and control essential facilities such as rights-of-way, local loops, 
numbering and spectrum.  Duplication of these facilities is often economically inefficient 
or technically difficult for new entrants to replicate, and to offer telecoms services new 
entrants require access to these facilities.  Historically, abuse over control of these 
essential facilities in the absence of regulation has been common – incumbents often 
deny new entrants access to facilities, charge high prices that make the competitor’s costs 
unfeasible, or provide inferior quality of service to new entrants.  Monopoly markets 
mean that incumbents typically have access to and control the entire telecoms value-
chain.  For example, they operate international long-distance networks, national long-
distance networks and local-access networks, in addition to providing the newer value-
added services.  Apart from the obvious cost advantages to owning all parts of the 
network, it is also easier and less expensive to co-ordinate provisioning and management 
within a single firm as opposed to arm’s length negotiations and transactions. 
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Performance of the telecoms sector is a key indicator of the progress of telecoms reform.  
Melody identifies four key areas that illustrate demonstrable progress: (1) market 
unbundling, (2) development of competition, (3) reduced prices and improved service 
and (4) expansion of universal service.  In developing countries, increased investment 
infrastructure is also an important indicator.  Despite concerted efforts by governments to 
introduce competition, newly liberalised countries have found that private monopolies 
can be as effective as public monopolies at inhibiting competition and hindering the entry 
of new players.  New entrants typically do not have the range of services or the deep 
pockets of incumbents with which to compete effectively.  Market unbundling of major 
services such as VANs will ensure that incumbents maintain a stranglehold on the 
industry and hinder the development of the Internet and data-services market.  Combined 
with regulatory unbundling of non-core services, a wholesale regime that encourages fair 
competition is vital to developing the services sector. 
 
Government intervention in ensuring the proper functioning of markets is applied at both 
a structural level and at a conduct/behavioural level.  Through regulation, governments 
and regulatory agencies seek to modify company behaviour.  Introducing competition in 
telecoms is particularly difficult for regulators, especially in the transition from a 
monopoly operator to a newly liberalised market.  There is often tension between 
protecting new entrants, introducing competition and balancing the interests of the 
consumer while not inadvertently disadvantaging the incumbent unfairly.  
 
Developing competition and imposing regulation is a long-term process requiring careful 
thought, clear vision, planning and commitment to the process.  Melody identifies 
defining institutional structures that clearly separate policy-making from regulation, with 
distinct roles for these bodies, as particularly important to sector development and 
investor confidence (1997:18).  While policy-making is focused on defining the long-
term social objectives and providing overall direction for the sector, regulation’s core 
task is to implement policy, ensure performance accountability by operators, especially 
incumbents, facilitate dispute resolution, monitor industry developments and act in an 
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advisory capacity to sector policy development.  “The effectiveness by which this 
fundamental separation of basic functions is achieved will have a significant impact upon 
the growth of the sector.  The more effective the separation, the better will be the climate 
to attract financing and undertake investment.” (1997:19)  The regulator must have 
standards of reporting and accountability to the government, industry and the public.  
Independence of the regulator coupled with a strong, capable regulator is vital to the 
proper functioning of the sector.  Melody reiterates this:  “It is absolutely essential that 
the ‘competition’ among the major industry players be moved from the arena of politics 
and bureaucracy to the marketplace, and to achieving the industry performance objectives 
of government policy.” (1997:22) 
 
The ability of regulators to implement and enforce regulation is undermined by the lack 
of technical knowledge and allows incumbents to manipulate arguments by citing 
“technical reasons”.  Regulatory authorities often lack the capacity and knowledge to 
further interrogate and challenge these arguments.  It is therefore essential that regulatory 
authorities possess the skills and capacity to prevent incumbents from manipulating 
information in an effort to hinder the development of competition. 
 
In conjunction with the changing dynamics of the telecoms industry, the role of 
regulation has changed from concentrating on consumer disputes, universal service issues 
and price-setting to a much broader role of regulating the sector to enable competition.  
Responsibilities include dealing with interconnection, operator disputes, wholesale tariffs 
(including access charges), and keeping up with new products and services. 
 
In the transition from monopoly to competition, focus and skills required of a regulator 
vary widely, from managing relationships between operators and government (licensing) 
to relationships between operators (interconnection) to relationships between operators 
and customers (prices, complaints).  
 
In dealing with the issues likely to arise in the transition from monopoly to competition, 
regulatory authorities generally require substantial professional cadres, capable of 
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handling complex regulatory concepts and processes.  Although, it is not critical for the 
regulatory authority to possess all the special skills and competencies itself, it is essential 
that it has adequate funding to employ high-calibre professional staff and consultants if it 
is to implement regulatory objectives, in the face of the substantial technical and financial 
resources that can be brought to bear by the operators.  Without such funding, regulation 
is unlikely to be effective. 
3.5.1 Improving the performance of imperfect markets in telecoms 
Over the years, regulatory provisions that enable competition have been identified.  In a 
study for the European Commission on market-entry issues in the EU, the USA, Norway, 
the Czech Republic, Poland and New Zealand, industry consultants Teligen (2000), 
identified the following barriers to market development, and made recommendations to 
facilitate the development of competitive markets.  This study will analyse market 
performance against these competition-enabling provisions and also look at any further 
regulatory inhibitors. 
• Separation of means and ends   
To deliver the anticipated benefits of competition, the regulatory framework should set 
out the ground rules for competition and not attempt to manipulate the market.  
Regulatory intervention to deliver ends rather than means creates concern among 
investors and acts as a deterrent because they perceive the playing field as being tilted 
against them.  This is often a significant barrier to entry and a disincentive to invest. 
• Inconsistent regulation and application of regulation 
Regulation is key to the telecoms industry.  Investors require a level of certainty that the 
regulatory environment is independent and consistent.  If companies expect that it will 
take long for their business to develop a positive cash flow or that the regulatory 
environment is likely to change significantly, they are less inclined to invest. 
• Access bottlenecks 
Access to the customer is key.  Bottlenecks in the local loop or in the mobile networks 
are making it harder to access customers.  The ability of non-incumbent networks to limit 
the use of their network by service providers is a barrier to development for service 
providers. 
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• Incumbent behaviour 
Incumbents own and control significant areas of the network.  New entrants are 
dependent on the incumbent for critical elements of the services, e.g. leased lines, 
interconnection.  Unclear and poor processes for supply of these services imply that the 
new entrants take longer to get products to market, placing them at a competitive 
disadvantage.  This situation is exacerbated by weak regulation, under-resourced 
regulators and political agendas.  Although regulators should let the primacy of 
commercial negotiations prevail, the supply of certain service elements should be ensured 
to enable equal negotiation between incumbent and new entrants. 
• Price ceiling 
Cost-oriented retail price regulation can act as a barrier to entry, as it puts artificial 
downward pressure on prices.  As a result, new entrants have little space for movement 
against an incumbent’s decreasing prices.  Companies see limited profit potential in these 
price-regulated services, especially in the local loop. 
• Slow implementation of enablers of competition 
In many instances, governments and regulatory authorities have been slow to implement 
the key enablers of competition, i.e. number portability, carrier pre-selection, unbundled 
local-loop.  The lack of these regulatory instruments has made it difficult for new entrants 
to compete with incumbent operators. 
3.6 Enhancing the structure-conduct-performance model  
The information and communications industry is complex with many specialist areas of 
research, often examined in single studies, e.g. the potential of new technologies, 
implications of policy and regulation, implementation of accounting separation and many 
more.  Many perspectives can be taken when covering an industry as complex as the ICT 
industry.  Often studies have therefore focused on the diverse specialised aspects of the 
industry in isolation.  In addition, following market liberalisation and increased 
technological improvements, the convergence of information technology, telecoms and 
broadcasting has blurred the traditional boundaries between previously distinct 
technologies and applications, thus yielding new service possibilities.  Convergence has 
driven supply-side phenomena such as technological innovation of products and services.  
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This has in turn led to demand side phenomena, such as the rapid absorption of new 
services.  These factors have become the principal driving force behind industry 
transformation.  This research, as a result, assumes a holistic relationship between the 
various elements of the model rather than a direct link of causality, as assumed by 
traditional industrial organisation theory.  Thus a broad market-centred approach to the 
analysis is adopted to understand the various dynamics driving the industry.  This 
research supplements the basic structure-conduct-performance model with a model 
adapted from an international research and consultancy company, Pyramid Research, by 
including an analysis of the business and political environment.   
 
This research views the market as the central arena which drives the overall industry 
dynamics – the place where competition, customers, regulation and technology interact.  
It is within this market arena that change, growth and trends are propelled.  As such, the 
following model, adapted from Pyramid Research (2001:8), illustrates the number of 
inter-related factors that influence market performance and attempts to provide a 
balanced view with which to comprehend industry dynamics and thus make 
recommendations.  Pyramid Research is an internationally renowned consulting company 
specialising in market research analysis, particularly in developing countries.  The model 
utilises an underlying model of industrial organisation theory.  This research has been 
enhanced through the addition of comprehensive analysis for the business, telecoms, 
social and political environment, which is also seen as influencing the development of the 
market.   
 
Recent research on institutions highlight that institutions are an important factor 
determining and shaping economic growth.  The level of sophistication and maturity of 
institutions supporting technological advancement, physical capital formation and the 
efficiency of the economy and the resource allocation process are all important 
determinants of the outcomes of overall economic growth.  “Institutions influence or 
define, the ways in which economic actors get things done, in contexts involving human 
interaction.  They do this by making certain kinds of transactions, or interactions more 
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generally, attractive or easy, and others difficult or costly.”  (Nelson and Sampant, 
2001:39) 
 
Levy and Spiller (1996) in their study of telecoms regulation outlined that the credibility 
and effectiveness of a regulatory framework and thus its ability to facilitate private sector 
investment varies with a countries’ political and social institutions.  For this model of 
regulation to work, certain conditions are required: a strong administrative tradition, the 
ability to undertake commitments that endure from one government to the next, and a 
judiciary that is impartial, immune to government and political pressures and able to 
make enforceable decisions.  Developing countries tend to display few of these 
characteristics.  Thus, given South Africa’s developing country status, these factors have 
been taken into consideration in order to determine market outcomes more clearly. 
 
The intent of this model is to illustrate the variety of inter-related factors that influence 
the performance of the market.  The results from this model are often utilised by potential 
private-sector investors seeking to enter new markets in order to understand the 
opportunities that exist within the market, and by existing operators who need to 
understand the market dynamics in order to operate.  This model is designed to analyse 
each of these areas simultaneously as well as the relationships between them in order to 
comprehend industry dynamics.  This holistic approach to market analysis is intended to 
provide a more comprehensive framework of the key drivers affecting markets, an 
understanding of the role of policy and regulation, and determine future 
recommendations.  While the Pyramid model provides an intense focus on the market 
opportunity, ie the return potential for investors, this research has focussed on the entire 
environment, particularly the business and political environment in order to understand 
market outcomes.  While, the Pyramid model intends to provide a business case prior to 
investment, this research further analyses company performance, post investment in order 
to make conclusions on the market environment.  This research is more policy and 
regulatory focused to analyse market performance.  
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Figure 6 — Research approach 
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Source: Adapted from Pyramid Research, 2001:IX 
Business Environment — The African business environment is significantly different 
from most developed markets.  An analysis of the business environment attempts to 
examine general factors influencing South Africa’s telecoms market, including macro-
economic factors such as conditions for attracting investment, strategies to develop 
infrastructure, country demographics, and broader government and social objectives.  
This provides a holistic picture of the key drivers of reform, and the overall ability to 
attract investment.  It is also pertinent to highlight the key macro-economic drivers for 
reform.   
Telecoms Environment — The existing telecoms environment and the level of 
investment is an important indicator to both government and investors about the level of 
reform required to be able to attract significant investment.  Policy and reform are 
important components of the overall industry and determine the ability to attract 
investment.  In a highly monopolistic industry like telecoms, it determines the nature of 
competition.  An analysis of the telecoms environment refers to basic characteristics of 
the environment that govern supply and demand within the relevant market, examines 
technology trends, policy and regulation.  
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Markets — Key data indicators to highlight the size and illustrate activity within the 
sector are important for understanding the dynamics within the sector.  The indicators are 
gathered from a range of stakeholders including existing players, incumbents, potential 
investors and most importantly consumers.  An analysis of the market as a whole will 
illustrate market performance, including the relative bargaining power of buyers and 
sellers, identification of substitutes and complementary products, pricing dynamics, 
market size and growth and industry trends. 
Firms — This looks at the conduct of key industry players, their strategies, and the level 
of success currently achieved.  Financial data from key South African telecoms network 
operators are benchmarked against international peers to compare the performance of 
South African companies with other jurisdictions internationally. 
 
A pyramid structure was chosen to represent the methodology because it assumes that the 
fundamentals of the business and communications environment are important for driving 
markets.  This in turn drives company strategy.  In addition, the base levels of the 
pyramid represent fundamental macro-economic factors necessary for setting the broader 
perspective.  The upper tiers of the pyramid represent micro-economic functions. 
3.7 Conclusion 
Managing sector reform and ensuring the development of competition is a complex issue, 
complicated by a dynamic, changing industry.  Internationally, there has been a 
fundamental shift in the structure of the telecoms market.  The digitisation and 
improvement in interconnection protocols have made possible the unbundling of services 
from facilities.  This in turn has generated new services industries like value-added 
network services and mobile services.  This has also created the basis for competitive 
licensing.  As the telecoms network market becomes increasingly competitive and 
dynamic, industrial organisation research focusing on the telecoms network market must 
start to incorporate further analysis, including the increasing importance of strategic 
behaviour by firms, and the effect of external impacts in the business and political 
environments.   Market structure is affected by a variety of factors so that it cannot be 
simply assumed to be either exogenously or endogenously determined.  The findings 
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from other country experiences will be utilised as the basic framework of analysis in 
attempting to understand the changing configuration and structure of the South African 
market at the transition from monopoly to competition.  The experiences analysed are 
primarily based on first world research, models and experience that have been underway 
for more than two decades and secondarily on that for developing countries where the 
experience is more limited.  This research seeks to link the appropriate findings and 
lessons within the African environment. 
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4 Changing role of the market in telecoms policy development 
Introduction 
This section will provide a brief background to global trends in telecommunications by 
examining trends in the transition from monopoly to competitive markets, including the 
initial decisions on market structure and the subsequent impact on the market.  It 
examines the structural components of reform, in particular, a detailed examination of 
two international case studies of developed countries which are often regarded as leaders 
in market reform – the United Kingdom and the United States.  It focuses on the 
underlying rationale for the decisions taken by these countries and the resulting market 
structure to provide a framework to examine the implications for policy.  It is important 
to highlight that, while the dynamics of these markets are vastly different, the underlying 
rationale and strategies employed can be useful as indicators for introducing competition 
in other countries. 
4.1 Structural components of international reform 
Although telecoms policy issues and options facing governments internationally are fairly 
universal, there has been no specific model followed to date.  Each model is highly 
country specific.  While the underlying principles have not differed, there has been 
debate around the structure, co-ordination and implementation of liberalising these 
markets.  Change can be broadly categorised in both developed and developing countries 
along the following lines: 
• Commercialising operations and separating operational functions from government 
State-owned entities have been reorganised to perform like commercial enterprises, with 
separate boards of directors and independent reporting structures.  While some countries 
have completely privatised telecoms utilities, others have opted for state-ownership with 
increased commercial goals. 
• Shifting government focus from ownership and management to policy and regulation 
Governments are increasingly focusing effort on developing broader sector objectives, 
and national and regional development goals to ensure market efficiency.  To facilitate 
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this, operations are separated from the functions of policy and regulation with 
independent boards of directors.  In some instances, government officials occupy limited 
positions, while in others this is completely separate.  “Irrespective of the particular 
sector and ownership structures adopted, regulation is needed to enhance economic 
efficiency of markets, contain monopoly power, and create market rules to encourage 
investor and consumer confidence.” (Saunders et al., 1994:5) 
• Increasing the participation of private enterprise and capital 
Increased private sector involvement can attract new sources of capital, management and 
technology to the sector.  In addition, innovations in technology have made it possible to 
deliver services similar to those of full national monopoly providers at a much lower 
investment.  The level of investment required is closer to private sector appetites and thus 
attracts increased capital.  Increased activity in telecoms has also allowed for greater rates 
of return on investment, particularly in mobile.   
• Containing monopolies, developing competition and diversifying supply of services 
Monopoly providers are increasingly finding it difficult to meet diverse and changing 
market demands.  The number of separate providers of telecoms networks and services is 
increasing.  Competition or the threat of competition is likely to spur established 
organisations to improve services, reduce costs, lower prices and, in some instances, 
expand their network.  Diversifying supply can attract new sources of capital and 
management to the sector, develop rivalry among service providers over performance and 
price, and generate cost benchmarks to guide pricing of monopoly supplies.   
 
Commercialising operations, separating operational functions from government, shifting 
government focus to policy and regulation, increasing private sector participation and 
developing competition are the broad parameters governments have embarked on to 
institute sector reform and enable greater market performance.  Details of how this is 
done and what assumes significance varies widely from country to country.  Converging 
trends such as increased information intensity in the information society, globalisation of 
economies and increasing technological innovation have thus driven changes in sector 
policy reforms.  Key attributes of this are illustrated below: 
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Figure 7 — Driving forces of reform in the telecoms sector
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4.2 International benchmarks 
Given the huge differences in implementation and the country-specific objectives, it is 
difficult to pinpoint best practice in liberalising telecoms markets and to introduce 
competition.  Some lessons from the early-adopters in industrialised countries and the 
continual struggles to introduce competition and break the stranglehold of the incumbent 
can provide important indicators for late starters. 
 
Designing a liberalised sector is difficult for policy-makers as it requires a complex array 
of interrelated factors.  Policy decisions are influenced by the optimal market structure to 
adopt, the degree of boundary between monopoly and competitive services, and the 
timeframe for maintaining entry restrictions.  Added to this, regulatory safeguards and 
structures must be put in place prior to liberalisation to guarantee fair practice and ensure 
competitiveness.  Experience has shown that policy-makers also have to consider 
                                                
3 Adapted from Saunders, R., Warford, J. and Wellenius, B. (1994:306) Telecommunications and Economic 
Development, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore. 
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operational issues that are likely to impact the market structure such as cross-
subsidisation, tariff rebalancing and abuse of dominant market power.  The challenge for 
regulators has been to balance often conflicting objectives.   
 
The United Kingdom and the United States of America were among the front-runners in 
the process towards more open telecoms markets.  British Telecom (BT) was the first 
large incumbent to be privatised in the early 1980s.  Competition started in the UK a lot 
earlier than in most European countries and to date has the most companies competing in 
the market.  Despite early privatisation and liberalisation processes in the UK, however, 
competition has developed gradually.  BT still has significant market share compared 
with the new entrants, particularly in voice telephony.  The two case studies below 
illustrate the complexity of dealing with liberalisation and introducing competition.  The 
section that follows attempts to provide a brief outline of the key elements of policy and 
regulatory reform and the market impact to date.  
4.2.1 United Kingdom 
As in most countries, BT under the Post Office was the monopoly supplier of telephone 
services in the United Kingdom until 1981.  Changes in technology and a mass move to 
more liberalised markets started the deregulation process.  The London Business School, 
led by Michael Beesley, was commissioned by Parliament in 1980 to investigate the 
implications of competition, particularly resale. (Beesley, 1981)  The study concluded 
that the consumer benefits outweighed BT’s loss of revenue from lifting restrictions on 
services to the home market.  It recommended that there should be no restrictions on 
services to the home market.  Customers should be free to lease these at appropriate 
prices irrespective of the purpose of their use but leased-circuit pricing for home use 
should continue to be decided independently.  BT should also be free to engage in 
competition in a non-voice market, subject to regulation.  These conclusions were drawn 
under the impression that resale of services would encourage innovation and competition 
in the industry.  Despite the study’s conclusions and the associated consumer benefit, the 
government chose not to liberalise by permitting resale.  (Beesley, 1981; Beesley, 
Laidlaw and Gist, 1987) 
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The liberalisation process began with the British Telecommunications Act in 1981 which 
split BT from the Post Office, and established BT as a public corporation responsible for 
telecoms services with some competition in terminal equipment.  This retained 
exclusivity granted BT the ability to regulate the industry.  A second-network operator 
was granted a licence in 1982 to run and operate a telecoms network in competition to 
BT.  Mercury, a subsidiary of Cable and Wireless, was awarded a five-year exclusive 
licence.  The licence conditions were not as stringent as BT but it did require Mercury to 
provide services in stipulated areas.  In 1982, the government announced plans to 
privatise BT.  The duopoly policy was announced a year later, thus guaranteeing both BT 
and Mercury seven-year exclusivity for national fixed-line networks.  The rationale was 
to protect Mercury from competition while it constructed its network.   
 
Mercury never envisioned itself becoming a total competitor to BT.  Its services were 
aimed at the point-to-point corporate leased-line market.  Residential voice was only 
introduced in 1987.  Mercury concentrated on the high-value-added parts of the network 
and on the profitable long-distance and international markets.   
 
The 1984 Telecommunications Act established the basic framework for competition and 
regulation in the industry and abolished BT’s statutory involvement in regulation.  The 
Act also created a telecoms regulatory body, Oftel.  This completed the process of 
separating regulatory and operational functions begun in 1981.  In 1984, BT was 
privatised with 50.2% of its shares sold through public listing.  In 1991, 23.8% was sold 
and the remainder in 1993.  Mobile services were launched in 1985, with two operators 
awarded licences – Cellnet and Vodafone.   
 
As a result of the limited benefits derived from the gradual introduction of competition as 
well as increased moves towards a services-based economy, a new policy was needed to 
encourage new telecoms operators to enter the market and allowed existing operators to 
offer a wider range of services.  This would include allowing new operators to fund 
“fixed link” networks in the UK, allowing cable companies to provide telecoms services 
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in their own right rather than as agents for BT or Mercury, licensing simple resale on 
international routes where the far-end was also liberalised, and extending the scope of 
class licences to the provision of a number of additional networks and services.  As a 
result of this, a number of new national PTOs were licensed, and new operators continue 
to be licensed. (Ypsilanti, 2002:13) 
 
New entrants have typically concentrated on the more profitable segments and 
competition is still limited to these segments, with BT very strong in the residential 
sector.  “Resale of spare capacity is standard practice and is growing with the creation of 
new networks.  This appears to be providing significant benefits for larger businesses, 
although the appearance of Mercury was sufficient of itself to promote competition in 
Mercury’s targeted markets so the additional gain has not necessarily been all that large.” 
(Curwen, 1997:130)   
 
Since the privatisation of British Telecom in 1984, the UK telecoms market has 
experienced unprecedented expansion in terms of both, the overall volume of business 
and the range of services on offer.  According to a 2005 study by Ofcom, total telecoms 
revenue increased from £7.5 billion in 1984 to over £40 billion currently.  Prior to 
liberalisation, consumers were totally reliant on one state-owned monopoly provider to 
meet all their telecoms needs.  They now have a choice at every level of the telecoms 
value-chain.  Liberalisation and competition have been key to price reductions and 
increased consumer choice.  Market data reveals that BT still largely dominant in the UK, 
particularly in voice.  Revenue growth has been mainly in newer services such as mobile 
and Internet.  Interconnect revenues have increased as a result of increased competition.  
Growth in fixed-call volumes has been driven by the Internet.  Mobile has enjoyed 
phenomenal growth; in 2000, the number of mobile subscribers exceeded the number of 
fixed lines for the first time – 34,766 fixed lines compared to 43,452 mobile subscribers.  
(Ofcom, 2005).  Ofcom frequently undertakes market and customer reviews in an 
ongoing effort to introduce competition.  One of the results of this approach has been the 
replacement of the licensing regime for services that were highly stratified and limiting 
with a general authorisation regime.  The general authorisation regime requires voluntary 
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notification of service provision to Ofcom by the service provider.  This approach has 
created a host of companies involved in network and service provision with limited 
bureaucratic hurdles.  The level of liberalisation in the UK, the growing complexity of 
suppliers in the telecoms value chain and the increasing blurring of divisions between 
broadcasting and telecoms makes the process of measuring the sector difficult.  Broadly, 
the table below provides an overview of some types of players in the telecoms sector and 
illustrates how the sector is dominated by a few large players but includes many smaller 
companies, thus encouraging innovation and optimal use of existing infrastructure.   
 
Table 5 — UK telecoms market players 
Type Examples No of Players
BT
Cable ntl, Telewest 1
Corporate alt-nets Cable & wireless, Energis 2
Other alt-nets Easynet c 20
Mobile networks Vodafone, O2, Orange, TM, 3 5
Major service providers Centrica, Virgin, AOL, Wanadoo c 20
Niche service providers several 100's  
Source: Ofcom, 2005 
The emergence of increased network competition has resulted in a large proportion of 
total market revenues that are actually interconnect, i.e. simply inter-industry transfer.  
The figure below splits the revenues into retail and wholesale.  These wholesale revenues 
account for interconnect but retail is a truer reflection of actual activity in the market.  
Ofcom estimates wholesale activity to be in the region of 19% of total industry revenues.  
Removing wholesale activity from the total revenue figure reveals that the total end-user 
spending on telecoms services in the UK has increased by 5% since 2003. 
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Figure 8 — UK telecoms industry turnover 
Source: Ofcom, 2005 
Mobile and data are the main growth drivers of the sector; significant fixed mobile 
substitution has followed the decline in the total number of fixed lines.  There has been 
an increase in the number of internet connections and broadband services.  The 
differential in pricing is evident from the fact that mobile contributes a higher proportion 
of revenues than volumes.  The next table provides a breakdown of the main growth 
drivers in the telecoms sector, and highlights that new customers are the single largest 
driver of growth.  It also illustrates that customer growth is a key driver.  All other 
services, products and innovations depend on customer growth.  This growth is unlikely 
to be achieved in monopoly markets where incumbents seek to maximise profits by 
charging the highest prices to the smallest segment of the population. 
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Telecoms is a significant contributor to the UK economy with a 2,8% contribution to 
GDP in 2005 with steady growth over the years.  The figure below illustrates telecoms 
contribution to the UK GDP. 
 
Figure 10 — Telecoms contribution to UK GDP 
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Source: Ofcom, 2005 
Despite years of market reform and a concerted effort by the regulator to decrease the 
power of BT and introduce further competition in the telecoms market, BT remains the 
Figure 9 — Key drivers of growth in UK economy 
Source: Ofcom, 2005 
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single biggest player in the UK telecoms sector, even though its market share has 
declined to just over 41%.   
Figure 11 — Share of UK telecoms industry revenues 
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Source: Ofcom, 2005 
Responsibilities of the Regulator 
In keeping with the increasing convergence of telecoms, information technology and 
broadcasting, five regulatory bodies in the communications sector — the Broadcasting 
Standards Commission, the Independent Television Commission, Oftel, the Radio 
Authority and the Radiocommunications Agency — were merged in December 2003 to 
create the Office of Communications (Ofcom) with wide-ranging responsibilities across 
the countrys’ communications markets. 
 
Ofcom's statutory duties under the Communications Act of 2003 included the aims of 
furthering consumer interests in communications in relevant markets, where appropriate, 
by promoting competition to ensure a wide range of electronic communications services, 
including high-speed data services, would be available throughout the UK.  Although, 
Ofcom's regulatory principles show bias against intervention, in instances of market 
failure, it does have a willingness to intervene firmly as required.  Continuous market 
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evaluation and research is also a core principle.  This approach allows Ofcom to keep 
track of the market on an annual basis and intervene if necessary. 
 
A recent OECD review on regulatory reform in the UK identified the following strengths 
and weaknesses of the current policy and regulatory system (2002:62). 
 
Table 6 — Strengths and weaknesses of the UK policy and regulatory system 
Strengths 
• Mature regulatory body with structures 
to ensure technologically neutral and 
consistent sector regulation  
• Early implementation of pro-
competitive regulatory measures 
• Rapid development of fixed and mobile 
sectors 
• Price competition resulting in relatively 
low prices for consumers 
• Low access charges for narrowband 
Internet services  
• Well-developed interconnection or 
wholesale regime 
Weaknesses 
• Slow introduction of local-loop 
unbundling and full carrier pre-
selection 
• Lack of alternative fixed infrastructures 
in the local loop for a relatively large 
part of the country (approximately 45% 
of the population) 
• Relatively high retail prices for short-
leased lines 
• Poor roll-out of broadband 
• Lack of fining powers for Oftel 
 
Source: OECD, 2002:62 
Ofcom’s continual attempts to understand the market dynamics through strategic and 
policy reviews have assisted in ensuring that market development is not significantly 
constrained.  To expand market development and foster competition, Ofcom undertook a 
strategic review of the communications sector, including telecoms and broadcasting, in 
2004, and is contemplating full deregulation of the market through a number of options 
including the introduction of spectrum trading and liberalisation of spectrum 
management.  The new approach promises a more liberal regime and will hopefully 
promote better use of scarce resources, enable increased innovation and increase the 
number of players providing services.  Actual implementation of spectrum liberalisation 
may prove challenging, however. 
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Key lessons from the UK experience 
• The consumer benefits from competition outweigh the incumbent operators loss of 
revenue; 
• Resale of services encourages innovation and competition in the industry; 
• Duopoly policies are unlikely to significantly stimulate competition or massive 
infrastructure investment; 
• The introduction of privatisation and increased competition has increased overall 
industry revenues, sector contribution to GDP and increased consumer benefits – 
including price reductions and increased choice. 
• Frequent market reviews to understand market development and the need for 
regulatory intervention where required; 
• Allowing market forces to enable convergence of services by liberalising the 
licensing regime; 
• Increased customers drive market growth by a variety of means – increased service 
providers, increased interconnect revenues and sector activity; 
• Even after many years of privatisation and liberalisation, the incumbent operator is 
still strong.  Thus, it will take many years to reduce the power of the incumbent. 
• The continual attempt to understand market dynamics and assess the level of 
competition within various levels of the value chain.  As a result, it has a dominant 
incumbent operator with a significantly smaller market share than most incumbents 
internationally.  
Concluding comments 
Some critics have claimed that consumers were denied the benefits of competition 
because the duopoly policy protected BT from the full rigours of a competitive market 
and gave Mercury a false sense of security, causing it to be conservative in its network 
and service development.  Armstrong et al (1994) describe the period of liberalisation in 
UK telecommunications as a decade of lost opportunities.  Although, at the time, the 
privatisation and liberalisation decisions were radical and started an international trend 
towards more liberalised markets, the liberalisation policy itself ensured a soft transition 
for BT to a more competitive market.  To a large extent, BT was shielded from 
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competition and only had to face real changes in the 1990s.  Although competition has 
not developed as fast as desired or predicted, consumers have been able to benefit from 
lower prices and increased choice.  However, BT is still dominant in the residential 
market and competitors continue to have difficulty accessing the local loop.  Oftel’s 
policy of promoting infrastructure competition at the expense of service competition has 
been criticised.  A strong argument in favour of the conservative approach to market 
restructuring decisions has been that the UK was a front-runner in an untested 
marketplace.  But because technology, political, social and economic circumstances have 
changed radically in the past twenty years, the validity of this model being replicated in 
developing countries is arguable.   
4.2.2 The American telecoms market 
The US market makes an interesting case study, primarily because it developed 
differently from the national publicly owned networks, and is often used as a benchmark 
for liberalising markets.  Until 1934 AT&T was the dominant national telephone 
monopoly, under the guise of providing universal service.  The pressures of technological 
change and monopoly cross-subsidies grew in the 1960s when regulatory reform was 
pushed by a number of factors: rapid technological innovation, ambitious entrepreneurs, 
changing economic conditions, political norms and regulatory failure.  This period also 
saw the emergence of computing services.  Computers were beginning to run 
communications networks, as substitute services for traditional public service telecoms 
networks.  These services were highly competitive, efficient and innovative with low 
barriers to entry.  They were also simultaneously substitute services for traditional 
regulated services but were also dependent on the underlying communications network.  
Seeing the potential of these new services, the telephone companies also wanted to 
provide these services and thus became a competitor as well as a service provider.   
 
Despite its domination and monopoly position in most markets, however, AT&T 
increasingly faced competition from other value-added carriers, local, long-distance, 
satellite, mobile and equipment providers.  Technological innovation, including the 
convergence of computing and telecoms and increased pressure from the computer 
  82 
manufacturing companies, sounded the death knell for the AT&T monopoly.  Services 
such as ISDN demonstrated the simultaneous switching and transmission of voice and 
data.  The possibilities for integration with computer and data processing technologies 
pressured the market for more open terminal equipment markets.  As the number of 
computers in the United States grew from 250 in 1955 to 69 000 in 1968, demand for 
high-quality, high-speed data transmission grew.  Under pressure from the computer 
industry and the need to introduce new services, the US Department of Justice was forced 
to consider competition in telecoms services.   
 
As a result of the increasing importance of computers and the convergence of telecoms 
and computing services, the FCC launched an Inquiry to examine the issues of 
convergence and transformation in telecoms and draw boundary lines between regulated 
and unregulated services.  The Computer Inquiries initiated by the FCC have become 
historic in its approach to deregulation.  In 1986, the Commission stated:  
The regulatory issues spawned by the technical confluence of regulated communications 
services and unregulated [computer networks] have been among the most important 
matters this Commission has dealt with over 20 years.  Indeed, during this period, we 
have continuous basis, as we have sought to revise and refine our regulatory approach in 
light of rapidly changing technological and marketplace developments.4 
The key issue facing the Commission in the sixties was the issue of “convergence” of 
computing and telephony.  The Commission outlined the task before them in Computer 
Inquiry I as follows:   
(a) [t]he nature and extent of the regulatory jurisdiction to be applied to data processing 
services; and  
(b) [w]hether, under what circumstances, and subject to what conditions or safeguards, 
common carriers should be permitted to engage in data processing.5 
The FCC attempted to deal with this issue by segregating services as “pure 
communications” and “pure data processing” and created four categories of service — 
                                                
4 Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules and Regs. (Third Computer Inquiry), Report and 
Order, 104 F.C.C2d 958, para. 9, 60 Rad. Reg.2d (P&F) 603 (1986) 
5 Computer I Tentative Decision, supra note 5, para. 14. 
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traditional communications services; hybrid communications services (telecoms making 
use of computing techniques); computing services; and hybrid computing services 
(computing services making use of telecoms techniques) (Carpentier et al., 1992:17).   
 
These categories were vague enough to make implementation of the regulations difficult.  
The Commission recognised the problem with the vague definition of hybrids and 
attempted to resolve the classification of these services on an ad-hoc, case-by-case basis.  
This eventually became too cumbersome and combined with the pace of change in 
computing, particularly the increasing popularity of micro-computing, forced a second 
inquiry.  The key failing of Computer Inquiry I was that it attempted to determine 
differences between technologies and regulate accordingly.  Computer Inquiry II 
attempted to examine the differences between services experienced by users.  The main 
consequence of this was to change the classification of services into the following 
categories: 
• Basic services (including voice and data transmission) classified as essential services 
that remained regulated.  Basic service is defined as the provisioned transmission 
service “regardless of whether subscribers use it for voice, data, video, facsimile, or 
other forms of transmission.”6 
• Value-added services encompassing all those services specifically tailored for a use, 
e.g. message systems, transactions.  CPE was also deregulated.  AT&T was not 
allowed to offer the unregulated service. 
 
Instead of attempting to segregate processing capabilities as in the old definition, the 
Commission decided to make the classification dependent on the nature of the activity 
involved, thus, transforming the analysis from an examination of technology to service 
provisioned.  Further, given the unique position of incumbent providers, the Commission 
was also concerned about the potential for abuse.  In 1987, the Federal District Court for 
Washington, D.C. stated: 
                                                
6 Computer II Final Decision, supra note 15, para. 83. 
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That the ability for abuse exists as does the incentive, of that there can also be no doubt.  
As stated above, information services are fragile, and because of their fragility, time-
sensitivity, and their negative reactions to even small degradations in transmission quality 
and speed, they are most easily subject to destruction by those who control their 
transmission.  Among the more obvious means of anticompetitive action in this regard 
are increases in the rates for those switched and private line services upon which 
Regional Company competitors depend while lower rates are maintained for Regional 
Company network services; manipulation of the quality of access lines; impairment of the 
speed, quality, and information services to take advantage of planned, but not yet publicly 
known, changes in the underlying network; and use for Regional Company benefit of the 
knowledge of the design, nature, geographic coverage, and traffic patterns of competitive 
information service providers.7 
To protect abuse of dominant positions, the Commission imposed structural separation of 
services on all carriers with sufficient market size to be able to abuse their position.  
Large carriers were required to have separate subsidiaries in the provision of enhanced 
services. 
 
AT&T’s response to the onset of competition, including its regulatory tactics and product 
policy, led to its eventual dissolution.  “By controlling entry, price, facilities and product 
offerings, regulation shaped the industry’s structure and defined the boundaries of 
telecommunications markets.” (Vietor, 1994:167)  Its tactics were subsequently listed 
among the anti-trust charges against it.  AT&T responded with products and services 
designed to pre-empt the competition, e.g. Telpak.  The lucrative private-line market, 
which comprises many large US corporate clients was growing, so in response to 
competitors entering the market, AT&T developed four packages aimed at this segment.  
Its new rates offered huge discounts over existing rates (in some instances up to 85%),  
which it justified as “value-of-service” pricing unrelated to cost structures or technology, 
which its competitors were unable to match. (Vietor, 1994:203) 
 
                                                
7 United States vs Western Electric Company, 673 F.Supp.525,566 (D.D.C 1987). 
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AT&T’s anti-trust trial opened in January 1981 and the settlement was announced a year 
later.  The case was based on AT&T’s vertical integration of regulated and unregulated 
activities being inherently anti-competitive and conducive to predatory behaviour (Vietor, 
1994:210).  Ownership in the equipment market facilitated monopolisation; ownership in 
local exchange companies allowed for the cross-subsidisation and facilitated 
monopolisation of long-distance markets. 
 
The AT&T break-up in 1984 was the forerunner of more liberal markets.  AT&T had 
been the dominant national carrier, with activities spanning all areas of the telecoms 
value-chain.  Local network services were provided by the Bell operating companies, all 
subsidiaries of AT&T.  Each of the 22 subsidiaries held a local monopoly in its region.  
AT&T carried 96% of long-distance traffic, including acting as the common carrier for 
the Bell operating companies.  Equipment manufacturing was done by a group 
subsidiary, Western Electric, which supplied the entire group.  “It sold 90% of its product 
internally and made up two-thirds of the manufacturing activity in the American telecoms 
industry.” (Carpentier, Farnoux-Toporkoff and Garric, 1992:10)  AT&T also ran the 
largest private research organisation in the world through Bell Laboratories.   
 
In 1984, the US Department of Justice announced the break-up of AT&T, which was 
ordered to relinquish interests in local services and divest itself of its 22 Bell operating 
companies as well as equipment manufacturing.  The divestiture has been described as 
the biggest, most complex restructuring in the history of business.  AT&T’s assets went 
from $155 billion to $35 billion.  It was allowed to develop outside telecoms, which also 
included computing and international.  The 22 Bell operating companies were grouped 
into seven regional operating companies, each of similar financial strength.  Long-
distance services were covered by the scaled-down AT&T and any other companies that 
wished to participate.  The value-added network sector was now open to competition.  
“The creation of eight separate companies, each with assets of at least $16 billion, 
dramatically interrupted the evolutionary course of deregulation, network engineering, 
market structure, competitive relationships, and political interests were recast.” (Vietor, 
1994:211) 
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To keep up with a rapidly changing and evolving industry, a third computer inquiry was 
launched in 1985 to establish “new deregulation rules”.  The outcome was a move 
towards open-network architecture.  Its main aim was to break the network down into 
components to which any value-added services user could connect at any point and thus 
allow non-discriminatory access by all users of these services.  “The open network 
architecture therefore strives to allow the network to evolve so that new value-added 
services can be created by providers other than the telephone companies without the need 
to conform to any particular restrictions or to incur unwarranted costs.” (Carpentier et al., 
1992:32) 
 
Cannon comments that the Computer Inquiries “is not a history of technologically biased 
regulation, segregating one computer from another based on the technology employed.  
Rather, this is a market policy, segregating competitive markets from non-competitive.” 
(2001:169)  Broadly, the conceptual framework of the FCC ruling follows a layered 
model of regulation, as illustrated in the diagram below: 
TELECOM
ATM Frame Relay Circuit Switched
TCP/IP
APPLICATIONS
HTML HTTP e -mail Chat Voice
Enhanced Services
Basic Services
Figure 12 — Layered model of regulation 
Source: Cannon (2001:1) 
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These separate layers permitted separate markets to develop.  Today there are over 7000 
ISP’s in the United States with a choice of more than 7 ISP’s for most Americans. High-
speed data transmission, innovative and cheap prices are common for consumers.  
However, it must be noted that this model of regulation was not immediately apparent.  
Many lawsuits and industry consultation led to this deregulated model. 
 
The 1996 Telecommunications Act brought about the next wave of radical change in the 
United States.  The Act aggressively pursued a more competitive market structure.  It 
removed the barriers that previously separated the telephone and cable industries.  It 
allowed the cable industry to enter the local telephone-services market and telephone 
companies to enter the broadcast-video market.  It also reintroduced vertical integration, 
so that companies could again combine equipment manufacturing, long-distance services, 
enhanced services and local services.  Regional operating companies were allowed to 
participate in the equipment manufacturing and long-distance markets outside of their 
defined territories, but only on the following conditions: 
• The FCC would determine whether the company had complied with the opening of its 
networks to local competition (checked against an FCC checklist). 
• The operating company would have to secure a binding contract with a competitor for 
an interconnected service, including the provision of unbundled local network 
functions, if requested.   
• If these conditions were met, the FCC would grant the company a licence to provide 
competitive long-distance services through a structurally separate affiliate. 
 
Since the 1996 Act, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of carriers, in the 
services offered by them, and in the overall traffic carried on networks.  Prices also 
declined substantially.  AT&T, although still America’s largest long-distance and 
international carrier lost more than a third of its market share since the introduction of 
competition.  From a 100% market share in the long-distance market prior to deregulation 
in the Eighties to less than 50% market share in the enterprise market and about 70% 
market share in the consumer market.  Increased competition, also forced AT&T to 
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become more efficient.  The company now has higher gross revenues and profits than it 
did prior to the introduction of competition.   
 
Following aggressive liberalisation policies, a number of telecoms companies were 
started.  Telecoms liberalisation was a key factor that drove the productivity boom in the 
US and other parts of the developed world in the late 1990’s.  Ineffective monitoring of 
powerful incumbents and inadequate regulatory provisions in introducing competition 
were some of the factors that also led to many companies failing, for example, ICG 
Communications, Iridium, Northpoint Communications, Winstar Communications and 
Worldcom, whose effects were felt globally.  As Cooper (2002:35) points out, “the FCC 
should give much more weight in its consideration of long distance entry to the 
mountains of evidence provided by competitors that the incumbents have not really 
opened their local markets.  It should ensure that the lucrative area of advanced telecoms 
services, including high speed Internet, is open to all competitors on a non-discriminatory 
basis”.  Large incumbents still dominate the industry and the failure of large long-
distance suppliers like Worldcom to penetrate the market effectively and challenge the 
incumbent need to be examined in light of new technologies and changes to supply and 
demand factors. 
 
The ex-chairman of the FCC who oversaw the 1996 Act, Reed Hundt has, however, 
commented that these failures are not directly attributable to policy failure alone.  “Some 
companies have managed their investments poorly and over-invested, but now there are 
countless miles of fibre that have been laid, and tower sites on hills, and satellites up in 
the sky that will be useful assets for decades.  The US telecommunications market is the 
biggest, best and most competitive telecoms market in the world.  We are connecting 
through more means and passing more information more efficiently than ever before, and 
it’s only getting better.” (Koselka, 2001)  He added that communications companies have 
to face the challenges of a competitive market.  “It’s a brand new experience for 
communications companies, which have been protected from downside risk as well as 
denied the upside of growing markets and rewards for innovation.”  The introduction of 
competition has been good for introducing investment into the sector and for the country 
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as a whole.  As a result of the introduction of competition and the advent of newer, 
cheaper, more efficient technology, the US information sector has doubled its share of the 
total US economy from 1992-2000, even after the dot-com bubble burst. 
Key lessons from the US experience 
• Competition was significantly hampered in the US for many decades as a result of 
exclusionary licensing policies driven by the unnecessary duplication of infrastructure 
policy; protected monopoly status for incumbents under the guise of universal service 
and guaranteed revenues and returns for regulated utilities through the regulation of 
rates. 
• The effect of dominant operators like AT&T that control all aspects of the value-
chain are still evident many years after liberalisation ; 
• Technological change and entrepreneurial innovation forced policy changes;  
• The Computer Inquiries resulted in adoption of a layered model of regulation in the 
conceptual framework which allowed for regulation of markets.  The different layers 
notably, (1) physical network layer, (2) logical network layer (3) applications and 
services layer and (4) content, demarcate natural boundaries between markets.  “Thus, 
by conceptualising the policy as layers, the analyst is enabled to identify markets, 
clarify issues, create boundary regulations that are effective, and in so doing, target 
solutions where issues reside without interfering with other industries and 
opportunities.” (Cannon, 2003:195) 
• The underlying philosophies of the Inquiries i.e. concern for anti-competitive 
behaviour, maintaining an open communications plan and allowing for innovative 
development of technology stimulated competition and market development 
• Creating open communications platforms where innovation can occur, independent of 
dominant communications players by avoiding imposing legacy regulation to new 
services. 
• Complicated implementation regimes can hamper progress and allow incumbents 
time to ward of competition. 
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4.3 Conclusion 
Key lessons from the US and UK experience 
Policy and Regulatory 
• Markets develop differently and at a different pace.  Thus, frequent market reviews 
are necessary to understand market development and the need for regulatory 
intervention where required; 
• Competition was often significantly hampered as a direct result of policy decisions to 
protect incumbent operators often under the guise of universal service or the need for 
infrastructure-based competition; 
• Dominant operators that control all aspects of the value-chain are likely to engage in 
anti-competitive practices.  This can happen even after many years of privatisation 
and liberalisation.  Regulation to curb the dominant power of the incumbent is often 
required in order to protect smaller entrants and stimulate competition.   
• Technological change and entrepreneurial innovation flourishes in an open market 
environment.  Creating open communications platforms where innovation can occur, 
independent of dominant communications players by avoiding imposing legacy 
regulation to new services; 
• Complicated implementation regimes can hamper progress and allow incumbents 
time to ward of competition; 
• Duopoly policies are unlikely to significantly stimulate competition or massive 
infrastructure investment; and  
• Regulation that allows for the analysis of markets rather than specific technologies, 
enables market development and identifies problem areas.   
Market Competition 
• Resale of services encourages innovation and competition in the industry; 
• The introduction of privatisation and increased competition has increased overall 
industry revenues, sector contribution to GDP and increased consumer benefits – 
including price reductions and increased choice.  These benefits outweigh the 
incumbent operators loss of revenue; 
  91 
• Liberalising the licensing regime will allow market forces to enable convergence of 
services and thus stimulate market competition and innovation; 
• Increased customers drive market growth by a variety of means – increased service 
providers, increased interconnect revenues and sector activity. 
 
Both these markets have demonstrated that the rapid pace of technological change forced 
regulators and policy-makers into introducing competition.  Market demand, often led by 
technological change, also impacted on regulation.  Even though the incumbent had 
significant monopoly power and exercised this in the markets in which they operated and 
through their influence in the policy and regulatory arena, they were unable to slow 
market innovation and growth.  While the UK and the US have been the forerunners in 
introducing competition, policy-makers and regulators were forced into concessions by 
increasing political pressure combined with significant changes in technology that could 
not be ignored.  These processes have not been proactive in creating new market 
structures to enable competition, but have rather served to protect the incumbent and only 
allowed competition at the fringes of the network.  “One of the most important 
conclusions that can be drawn from observing these experiences in industrial countries is 
that the process is complex and there is no single model or design.  This is because of the 
multitude of factors, conflicting interests, and interrelated events that are involved.” 
(Saunders et al., 1994:10) 
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5 The African business environment 
Introduction  
The African business environment is substantially different from most developed 
countries.  The issues driving telecoms reform in developing countries are largely 
different from those of most developed countries.  Developed economies often have a 
well-run, profitable incumbent with high-quality infrastructure that covers the majority of 
the country.  Thus, tariffs, customer service, consumer choice and curbing monopoly 
power are some of the primary issues driving sector reform.  But, for developing 
economies, critical infrastructure shortages, low-income profiles, scarce skills, generally 
poorly run state operations and the lack of competitive market conditions are some of the 
issues that characterise telecoms reform.  These issues are often further complicated by 
varying political, social and economic imperatives.  Uncritical implementation of 
developing country’s reform initiatives as outlined in the previous chapter are almost 
certain to fail.  “Models must be critically examined in light of the distinct circumstances 
in each developing country, and shaped, extended, restructured or displaced by a model 
of reform that best serves each country’s development objectives.”  (Sanatan and Melody, 
1997:324) 
5.1 Background 
The 1990s is generally regarded as a period of market reform for countries around the 
world, especially in developing and transitional economies, which underwent massive 
structural changes that included market liberalisation, unbundling of state-owned 
enterprises and the introduction of new laws and regulations to facilitate competition.  
Market reform was motivated by the need for increased state revenue, and so policy-
makers tried to maximise revenues by granting temporary periods of exclusivity to 
privatised entities.  Despite major structural changes in economies that embraced open-
market policies, the reform process in developing countries has not been simple or 
straightforward and, in some instances, has often become mired in controversy.  A 
combination of the need to balance conflicting objectives, political constraints and biased 
advice has resulted in many conflicts between governments, regulators and private sector 
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investors, often to the detriment of the development of the sector.  As mentioned by 
Wallsten, et al, “regulations, regulators, regulated industries, and politics interact in 
complicated ways that affect the development of the industry as well as the rest of the 
economy.” (2004:2)  Telecom reforms in developing countries were often part of a much 
larger fiscal restructuring process.   
 
Wellenius (1997) notes that, although the primary purpose of reform is to give consumers 
more, better, newer, and less costly services, pressure from interest groups – incumbents 
that want ongoing protection, new entrants seeking special deals, treasury officials 
expecting licensing revenues to reduce budget deficits, financial advisors earning success 
fees tied to transaction prices – have significantly affected the reform process.  Given the 
nature of the telecoms industry, unlike other corporate deals, privatisation of a large 
telecoms monopoly creates a private firm capable of exercising significant market power.  
“The investor is not simply buying a firm’s assets, but also the right to operate in a 
particular way in a particular market.  The details of the privatisation often implicitly 
define the market that the investors are bidding to serve and simply moving a monopoly 
from the public to the private sphere will not necessarily result in competitive behaviour.”  
(Wallsten, 2003:3) Thus, the privatisation process and the resulting details are 
particularly pertinent as they often determine the resulting market structure and the 
outcomes.  “When markets are contestable and competitive entry is fairly easy the details 
of how the firm is privatised may not have many implications for the market as a whole.” 
(Wallsten, 2003:13)  The reform process, including the resulting regulatory environment, 
is fundamental in determining the development of a competitive market environment.  
“Institutional reform in telecoms usually takes three forms: organisational reform of the 
incumbent operator, the introduction of competition, and the establishment of 
regulation.” (Samarajiva, 2000)  Although, these three components are irreducible, they 
are intimately connected and their interaction will fundamentally determine the ultimate 
market structure.   
 
The focus of policy and regulation for developed markets in the late Eighties and Nineties 
remained on introducing competition in the historically monopoly, fixed markets, 
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particularly through the introduction of value-added network services that required an 
underlying fixed infrastructure.  With the introduction of new wireless technology, 
combined with inadequate fixed incumbents unable to deliver services in developing 
countries, mobile services became particularly attractive and, in some instances, the de 
facto voice provider.  Mobile services were able to fulfil the void left by incumbent 
operators for the provision of voice services.  The higher growth potential of mobile, 
lower incremental investment costs over fixed infrastructure and increased opportunities 
to compete with the often inefficient incumbents have attracted private-sector investors.  
In the early nineties, as mobile began to gain increasing popularity internationally, 
government’s decided to embark on private sector licensing for mobile for a number of 
reasons.  Firstly, mobile at the time was never anticipated to become a major competitor 
to fixed services, secondly, governments were not keen to take on additional funding for 
what was then a potentially risky investment and thirdly, the ability of incumbents to 
deliver the service was questionable.  In the South African example the new coalition 
government had explored the option of licensing just Telkom to provide a mobile service.  
But Telkom representations to government had failed to convince government that it 
could deliver mobile services.  Telkom’s inherited debt situation and inability to borrow 
doomed its chances.  At the time, Telkom could only raise R600 million for a capital 
investment that was estimated to be R3 billion.  (Horwitz, 2001:200).  This situation is 
true for most developing countries.  
 
Figure 13 — World telephone subscribers, global fixed versus mobile connectivity 
Source: ITU World Indicators Database 
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This does not mean, however, that the fixed sector can be ignored, because “fixed line 
services are important for economic development – businesses rely heavily on them for 
critical applications.  Economies of countries with underdeveloped fixed sectors may 
suffer in international trade, and underachieve in terms of attracting foreign investment.” 
(Analysys, 2003:12)  Unprecedented subscriber growth and large mobile networks have 
made mobile operators similar to the large fixed incumbents in developing countries, 
posing a challenge for policy and regulation.   
 
As new technologies are constantly introduced, such as broadband penetration via 
mobile, serious policy and regulatory issues are raised.  After taking initial liberalisation 
decisions, and making reforms, developing countries are faced with somewhat different 
dilemmas, depending on the path of reform they have chosen.   
5.2 Mobile — An overview of some successes  
Mobile telecoms have far exceeded expectations and have overtaken the number of fixed 
subscribers in most developing countries, particularly Africa, because of ease of roll-out 
to highly mobile populations.  Mobile is the main means of voice communication in 
Africa today.  It is estimated that there is still significant untapped mobile-market 
potential in Africa, driven by slowly growing or stagnant fixed-line network roll-outs.  
Forecasts by communications experts expect mobile penetration on the African continent 
to reach 18% by 2009, from approximately 9% today (fixed line: 3%), illustrating 
continued strong growth in the mobile sector in developing countries.   
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Figure 14 — Current state of and forecasts for mobile penetration on the continent 
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Source:  EMC, Figures as December of each year 
As mobile operators have become the new incumbents and state-owned fixed operators 
struggle to compete with the private sector, important questions for policy and regulation 
are raised.  While mobile technologies do represent a solution for Africa, the key question 
remains that of implementation of licenses, to ensure access at affordable prices.  Further, 
broadband internet penetration remains particularly low with almost no competition in 
internet services, despite competition in most markets.  While mobile can fill the voice 
void, it is unlikely to be able to provide the high-speed data communications required for 
corporates to operate, at least in the short to medium term. 
 
As a result, although no blueprint for developing-country reform exists, it is recognised 
that telecoms reform is critical to overall development.  African governments have 
therefore put reform policies on their agendas, together with broader ICT strategies.  To 
date, there has been mixed success in attracting private-sector investment.  The ITU 
regional forum for Africa has identified the high costs of infrastructure, the inadequacy of 
qualified human resources, and the non-existence of an attractive environment 
(regulatory, administrative, fiscal and political) as impediments to sector development.  
In addition, it recognised that political will was often not aggressive enough to make ICT 
serve as a development lever.  Creating an environment conducive to investments in ICT 
and a strong political will to turn ICT into a development lever were identified by the 
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ITU forum as key factors for growing the sector.  Although there is an underlying 
acknowledgement about the role of ICTs, the competitive dynamics, culture, politics and 
geography of each country are unique, making market reform difficult for policy-makers.  
The following sections examine some of the challenges of the reform process facing 
developing-country policy-makers and regulators. 
5.3 The African telecoms environment 
5.3.1 Network development and infrastructure investment issues 
Network infrastructure is often critically under-developed but governments often lack the 
skills and ability to raise the substantial funding required for large-scale infrastructure 
upgrade and roll-out, or have the appetite to take on additional funding risks when there 
are more pressing basic social development needs such as housing, water provision and 
electricity.  “Massive investment, at the level of tens of millions of US dollars world-
wide, is required to combat low telephone densities and poor service quality to take 
advantage of modern technologies.  Such investments are far beyond the reach of many 
governments that have other social and development programs in urgent need of 
funding.” (Pisciotta, 1997:333)  Newly elected governments, often also moving towards 
more market-driven economies, are usually keen to attract foreign direct investment into 
the country.  As a result of these constraints, strategic equity partners are sought.  In 
addition to sharing the investment risk, strategic equity partners are perceived to be able 
to bring much-needed managerial, operational and technical expertise to the sector.  
 
In principle, opening markets to competition will ensure enhanced and possibly faster 
roll-out, but there is also the risk that strategic equity partners will focus on high-value 
urban areas where it is easier to recoup investments and cheaper to roll-out a network, but 
ignore the social objectives of government such as universal service.  This approach runs 
the risks of infrastructure duplication and over-investment in certain areas, leaving others 
unserviced.  Given the limited amount of investment capital, particularly in developing 
countries, appropriate policy and regulatory measures are critical to ensure that the 
benefits of competition and infrastructure roll-out in both rural and urban areas can be 
met.  In an attempt to maximise profits and recoup investments as quickly as possible, 
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strategic equity partners are often prone to monopoly practices, i.e. high tariffs, refusal of 
services to potential competitors, limited service innovation, low levels of customer 
service.  Adequate policy and regulatory instruments capable of both expanding 
infrastructure and addressing government’s objectives are therefore particularly 
important.  This requires long-term sector management once the initial policy framework 
is in place. 
5.3.2 Political commitment to competition 
One of the strongest arguments to emerge from developing-country reform processes, and 
one that significantly influences investment decisions, is the need for political will and 
commitment to competition.  (Ramanadham, 1994; Abdala, 2000; Makhaya, 2002) 
Conflicting objectives from governments over privatisation, infrastructure expansion and 
the need to maximise returns from state-owned enterprises, together with the need to 
lower input costs and increase market competition, make reform decisions particularly 
difficult.  Strong alliances — for example, with labour unions, or making deals with 
strategic equity partners — give rise to policy and regulatory trade-offs that ultimately 
inhibit competition.  Even though there maybe structurally separate ministries and 
regulatory agencies, the regulatory agencies are often held to ransom by the need to 
preserve and drive revenues in the incumbent because of existing government 
shareholding and/or simultaneous privatisation processes.  (Bitran and Serra, 1998)  It is 
not uncommon for separate government departments to handle privatisation processes 
and sector reform, hence the need to maximise cash from the sale of state-owned 
companies is a stronger inducement than enabling the best market structure for the sector, 
as the objectives are vastly different.  
 
In addition, through the privatisation processes, strategic equity partners are often 
incumbents from developed countries with significantly more experience and resources in 
policy and regulation than developing-country policy-makers and regulators, and are 
therefore able to influence policy-making to the detriment of the government’s social and 
development objectives. 
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A scarcity of skills in the telecoms arena throughout the value-chain, from policy-making 
to regulation, may result in inadequate policy and policing of the incumbent, which may 
indulge in monopolistic practices and anti-competitive behaviour.  To exacerbate the 
problem further, because governments are unable to afford private sector salaries, quality 
staff are often lost to the private sector, along with the investment in their training. 
5.4 Telecoms and investment risk for the private sector  
Doing business in Africa presents many risks and challenges to investors and operators, 
ranging from financial, economic, political, legal and regulatory and operational risks.  
Crime, corruption and untested political regimes make investors particularly nervous 
about investing in major infrastructure on the continent.  In some African countries, the 
transition to democracy is incomplete, following many years of military rule.  In some 
countries, a fragile peace exists and the threat of religious and ethnic violence erupting is 
not uncommon.  Economic policies are often inextricably linked to the country’s political 
future and new governments are notorious for changing policies.  Economic policies are 
often also still new and untested, along with the relative inexperience of policy-makers 
and administrators in developing and implementing long-term macro-economic policies.   
5.4.1 Financial and economic risk 
As with most infrastructure projects, telecoms requires large, upfront funding with a long 
pay-back period.  As a result, investors are particularly stringent when looking at funding 
these types of projects.  In risky markets like Africa, raising funding for telecoms can be 
challenging and expensive for operators.  When MTN invested in Nigeria, the following 
comments were made:  “Arranging a loan package can take up to a year in Africa – 
during which MTN will remain at risk.  Some domestic debt is an option, as the project 
will generate revenues in Naira.  Because of the size of the project (most of the 
infrastructure equipment will be imported from the US or Europe), only a small portion 
of the total package can be provided in naira and substantial currency risk will remain 
with the project.  High interest rates are also a problem.” (Financial Mail, South Africa, 
2001)   
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In most free-market exchange-rate systems, movement of the exchange rate broadly 
follows a pattern linked to the differential in inflation rates and interest rates (Brady and 
Jenkins, 2001).  But, in narrowly based Third-World economies highly dependent on 
single products or sectors, with relatively few buyers and sellers of the currency, 
significant swings in exchange-rate movement may result.  For investors, this increases 
their risks for tariffs and revenues, as these are based on local currency, while the project 
funding is dollar denominated.  This was experienced by the Egyptian mobile operators 
in 2000, when the Egyptian pound significantly devalued against the US dollar.  As a 
result, capital expenditure was limited to servicing the most lucrative segments of the 
population.  To date, Egypt has a mere 14% penetration in mobile services, with a 
population of 70 million.  Although the long-term effects can be mitigated, currency 
fluctuations are more likely to have short-term effects and could lead to cash-flow 
problems.   
 
Theoretically, currency risk can be managed by raising the bulk of the funding in the 
local currency, but local markets are usually not big enough to absorb the amounts 
required so equipment must often be purchased in US dollars.  Operators looking to 
invest therefore have to find First World funders.  Because of the risk associated with 
emerging markets, and in line with First-World market expectations, telecoms investors 
and funders usually want a higher dollar return.   
5.4.2 Operational risks 
Ideally, Governments tend to prefer to licence operators to equity investors as they bring 
in skills and expertise in running operations and often have a better chance of succeeding.  
For operators, particularly newer operators, international growth requires significant 
resources in both cash and human capital, as each new licence calls for highly skilled 
technical staff in network construction and operations such as marketing, administration, 
customer service, information technology and billing.  The technological nature of the 
telecoms industry demands specialised skills, especially in the start-up phase.  These 
skills are often not readily available in the local market, creating the need for expensive 
expatriate resources, particularly in the initial start-up phase. 
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In the case of privatisation of state-owned enterprises, this process often requires 
significant skills to turn the operation around and match world-class standards.  Thus, 
only after significant outlays have been made in network construction and operations 
management – known as peak funding – will the company start to generate a return.  The 
mobile market has been highly successful, generating far quicker returns in excess of 
expectations, largely as a result of pent-up demand and the nature of the mobile 
investment.8  The fixed line sector does, however, pose significantly more risk as the bulk 
of the investment is made upfront prior to any revenue generation.  Internationally, fixed-
line voice revenues are under pressure and regulatory constraints limit the aggressive 
growth of the monopoly era.  It is therefore easier to find funders and operators for 
mobile licences than for fixed services. 
5.4.3 Infrastructure constraints 
Operating in Africa requires telecoms firms to create their own infrastructure, from 
building individual base-station grids to separate transmission and telecoms facilities and 
services.  The lack of basic infrastructure like electricity and roads increases the cost of 
doing business while also posing significant business challenges at the operational level.  
In Nigeria, as a result of the poor fixed-line services, MTN9 had to construct its own 
optical-fibre backbone network at an investment of $120m, install power supplies and 
other infrastructure to be able to run the network.  This is highly unusual for GSM 
operators in First-World countries.  Building fixed-line networks is even more complex 
                                                
8Incremental network build is possible and thus revenue generation can begin faster.  The pay-back period 
on the investment is often quicker. 
9 MTN is a South African mobile operator that is regarded as the largest on the continent by a number of 
measures including revenues and subscribers.  It is listed on the Johannesburg stock exchange.  M-Cell was 
the holding company for the MTN Group until its unbundling in 2002 and subsequent renaming to the The 
MTN Group.  The company is 10 years old and has grown from an operator with a single mobile license in 
South Africa to operating in 11 countries across the African continent.  It is known for investing in risky 
political environments eg Nigeria, CongoBrazzaville, Rwanda, and more recently Iran and Afghanistan.  
MTN’s investment strategy and underlying philosophy is important in understanding private sector 
investment in developing markets. 
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as the terrain is often rough and in harsh climates over large geographical areas.  As a 
result of these factors, together with often high licence fees and onerous obligations, 
network development becomes expensive. 
5.4.4 Market perceptions 
Investing in emerging markets requires a non-traditional approach to business.  Official 
GDP/capita figures are often low and do not consider the informal sector, which accounts 
for a large proportion of GDP.10  These are also often cash-based societies, making any 
estimates on potential spend difficult.   
 
Even though there are potentially high rewards for investors in telecoms in Africa, 
financial markets are sceptical of risky infrastructure investment in Africa and even 
entrepreneurial operators are cautious when investing on the continent.  MTN’s share 
price lost forty-five cents after announcing winning the licence bid to operate a mobile 
network in Nigeria.  According to one analyst, even though the cost of the licence on 
offer was paltry compared to what is being paid in Europe for third-generation licences, it 
still amounted to substantial investment, particularly given the high risks.  In addition, M-
Cell was also expected to pay $500-$600m to establish the infrastructure on top of 
onerous licence conditions (Financial Mail, South Africa, 2001).   
5.5 Conclusion 
There is no doubt that the African telecoms environment presents unique challenges to 
both policy-makers and investors.  To attract investment, policy and regulatory 
interventions must consider the multiple facets of medium to long-term sector strategy for 
the country, overall macro-economic fundamentals, the appetite of financial markets for 
large infrastructure investment as well as general availability of supporting infrastructure.  
Contextualising the difficulty of attracting private-sector investment in Africa to a certain 
extent justifies regulatory protection and the limited introduction of competition, but 
recent global and regional developments have challenged this notion.  Africa does not 
                                                
10 The Economist estimates Nigeria’s informal sector to account for 78% of GDP 
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function as a uniquely autonomous continent and is subject to the trends, dynamics and 
policies of more developed countries.  Despite a global downturn in the telecoms 
environments, rapidly growing African markets with low penetration, and thus significant 
potential for growth and new revenues, have attracted the attention of global investors 
looking for superior returns to shareholders.  They are prepared to pay a premium, e.g. 
Vodafone recently acquired a 15% stake in Vodacom for R16-billion, increasing its 
shareholding from 35% to 50%, thus giving it joint control of the operator.  This values 
the whole of Vodacom at R106 billion. (Business Times, 2005)  This price works out to 
roughly US$924 per subscriber.  Following the events of 9 September 2001, cash-flush 
Middle Eastern investors and operators are also looking for new investment opportunities 
outside of the developed world and are increasingly bidding for operations and licences 
in Africa, at significantly higher prices, e.g. MTC recently acquired Celtel International 
for US$3,4 billion.  The price paid for Celtel’s 5 million subscribers at the end of 2004 
works out at roughly US$680 per subscriber.  Prior to the sale, analysts estimated Celtel’s 
value at closer to US$2 billion if it had undertaken the IPO. (Telecom Africa Online 
News, 2005)  South Africa struggled to attract any credible investor for the second fixed 
network operator licence five years ago. While the policy and regulatory environment did 
not favour investment, a downturn in the global telecoms environment also affected 
South Africa’s ability to attract investment. 
 
These new developments highlight that capital will follow superior returns.  Even though 
policy and regulation in Africa struggles to police large incumbents, private capital is 
prepared to take financial risks that can guarantee superior returns.  Allowing mobile to 
develop with relatively little regulatory interference has allowed for superior returns.  
Thus, this research argues that, although creating a stable policy and regulatory 
environment to attract investment is important, it should not be the only driving factor.  
Market conditions, coupled with the prevailing economy of the time, are a significant 
determinant of infrastructure investment.  Good policy and regulation must ultimately 
deliver on the identified long-term sector objectives for the country. 
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6 Changing role of the market in telecoms policy development.  
Developing markets case studies 
Introduction 
This chapter attempts to provide a brief overview on the policy and regulatory choices 
that selected developing countries have taken in the transition from monopoly to full 
liberalisation and highlights some of their successes and failures.  It is important to note 
that telecoms reforms are often part of a much larger macro-economic reform process and 
thus requires a broader strategic policy vision and political commitment if the reform 
process is to be successful.  Although the countries chosen by no means exhibit best 
practice in terms of market liberalisation, however, increased subscriber growth, 
investment in infrastructure and, in some instances, lower tariffs, warrant further 
investigation towards understanding the factors driving the success.   
 
India’s stagnating subscriber growth, limited infrastructure investment and numerous 
licensing debacles and court challenges are often cited to show how poor policy and 
regulation can lead to investor uncertainty.  Recent decisions by the Indian government to 
change the status quo by introducing unified licenses, new policies and tariff structures as 
well as rejuvenating the regulator have fuelled unprecedented subscriber growth.  This 
highlights the merits of committing to a degree of competition and more open-market 
policies by making policy and regulatory changes.  In Morocco the introduction of an 
independent regulator and competition in mobile made it a leader on the African 
continent and fuelled telecoms growth in the country.  Lastly Sri Lanka has also 
committed to introducing competition and market reform, which has been rewarded by 
exceptional telecoms growth.  While all of these countries embarked on different 
liberalisation processes, all had to re-evaluate and re-assess their initial strategy, because 
of the market development and technological changes.   
 
The country experiences below highlight how market reform leads to market 
development and restructuring.  The efforts of regulators to increase penetration and 
encourage subscriber growth are also described.  These sections show the routes followed 
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to market reform as well as the ongoing challenges posed by the reform process.  Some 
of the case study material for Uganda, Nigeria and Morocco utilises research and 
information from ITU case studies.  (2004, 2001) 
6.1 Uganda 
Uganda has enjoyed rapid development in its telecoms sector after implementing private 
sector participation, innovative licensing and approaches to promoting access in rural 
areas.  The transformation of the sector began with economic reforms in 1987.  The first 
mobile operator was licensed in 1993 to supplement the services of the fixed-line 
operator.  Telecoms sector reforms began in earnest in 1996 with the publication of the 
Telecoms Policy.  At the outset, objectives and goals for the sector were clearly outlined 
so that policy-makers, regulators and consumers understood the goals.  Goals and 
objectives were identifiable and achievable.  The overarching objective of the policy 
framework was to increase telecoms penetration and availability at affordable prices.  
Other objectives included increasing geographic coverage and ensuring access to 
telecoms services in rural areas.  The policy statement also defined an implementation 
strategy which entailed the privatisation of the incumbent, establishing an enabling 
regulatory framework, with an independent regulatory authority and the introduction of 
competition.   
 
In 2001, the Uganda communications commission issued a rural communications 
development policy.  It provided for expansion of access to telecoms infrastructure and 
services, promoted the use of Internet and ICTs and established a rural communications 
development fund. 
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Figure 15 — Fixed and mobile subscribers 
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Source: ITU World telecoms indicators database, 2005 
Initially, Uganda adopted limited competition as its key strategy for achieving telecoms 
policy objectives.  Licensing was the key instrument for putting an appropriate market 
structure in place.  There are three major operators and several minor operators.  
Regulatory oversight of the market has ensured the benefits of competition.  
 
Uganda’s success in introducing competition was the result of adopting clear policies and 
an appropriate regulatory framework at an early stage in the reform process.  Another key 
driver was an innovative and flexible licensing approach towards implementing limited 
competition and liberalisation.  Government soon realized, however, that privatisation of 
Uganda Telecom was not proceeding as planned, in 1998, so licensed a second national 
operator (SNO).  Their choice of an investor was also an important factor because not all 
countries have enjoyed the same success, despite similar strategies.  Significant 
subscriber growth started after the introduction of the SNO.  This was spurred by the 
privatisation of Uganda Telecom in 2000.  Current teledensity is 3.5, surpassing the target 
penetration of two by 2005 anticipated by the Telecoms policy of 1996.   
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Uganda was among the first African countries to license an SNO with a mobile licence 
and privatise the incumbent.  It also has a well-conceived rural access policy, now in 
advanced stages of implementation.  To reach its universal-access objectives, the 
regulator, Uganda Communications Commission (UCC) asked the two licensed national 
operators to declare the sub-counties in which they would be able to achieve the target 
level by mid-2002.  Their declarations showed that they would be unable to achieve the 
target level in 154 sub-counties.  In terms of their licences, they had to give up their right 
of exclusivity.  Accordingly, the UCC opened the sub-counties to competitive entry, 
offering subsidies through a “reverse auction” towards the net cost of providing services.  
The UCC established specific subsidy caps and will award a licence to the bidder 
requiring the least subsidy. 
 
The regulator is currently reviewing its telecom policy and market structure.  As in South 
Africa, while initial market-entry decisions have lain a solid foundation, implementing 
further reforms and liberalising the market becomes complex and difficult with newly 
entrenched incumbents (both fixed and mobile) and powerful private sector interests. 
Key lessons from the Uganda experience 
• Immediately introducing limited competition in all services by licensing a full service 
second network operator, that also included mobile.  Together with Uganda Telecom, 
the new operator assisted in increasing teledensity and fostering competition; 
• Specifying rules prior to licensing of operators.  Licences were prepared for both the 
second network operator and the incumbent prior to invitations to tender being invited 
from interested applicants.  These licences specified important elements of the 
regulatory regime and reduced the regulatory uncertainty for investors;  (Private 
Sector, 1999) 
• Establishing interconnection rules upfront so that it did not become an area of 
contention; and  
• Insisting on obligations that demand investments that are not commercially viable, 
risks forcing companies to undertake bad investment and could create the need for 
renegotiation of special privileges.  For example, in South Africa, the new public 
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commercial television broadcaster was given onerous local content obligations that it 
struggled to meet and was forced to renegotiate the terms.  Adopting a market-based 
approach to universal service ensures that the best qualified operator is licensed to 
provide the service.  
6.2 Botswana 
Botswana undertook sector reform in the 1990s with a commitment to the process from 
the highest levels of government.  It empowered an effective and independent regulatory 
body to establish a regulatory framework conducive to competition and innovation, with 
full licensing authority, financial independence from government, and based on strong 
legal processes.  The results can be seen in the vast improvement in teledensity. 
 
Botswana undertook liberalisation in stages by holding consultations across the country, 
devising policy that was supported by government.  This led to consistent and transparent 
legislation and established a strong regulatory authority charged with facilitating 
competition in the provision of telecoms services.  In addition to fixed competition, two 
mobile operators were licensed in 1998 and serve as an incentive to improve the 
incumbent’s performance.   
 
Figure 16 — Number of fixed lines and mobile subscribers in Botswana 
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Source: ITU world telecommunications database, 2005 
The sequence of the sector reform – preparing a policy, deriving legislation from the 
policy statement and establishing a regulatory authority with responsibility for facilitating 
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competition in the provision of telecoms services – all prior to authorising market entry 
by competitive players is important.  Clear policy and legislation enabled Botswana to 
attract quality investors willing to make long-term commitments.  Without these key 
legal instruments, Botswana would only have succeeded in attracting investors interested 
in quick, short-term gains.   
Key lessons from the Botswana experience 
• Proper sequencing of reform to signal government’s intention to investors; 
• Commitment to reform from all levels of government; 
• Clear policy and legislative regime. 
6.3 Morocco – introducing a strong and effective regulator 
In the late Nineties, Morocco was one of the poorest countries in North Africa, with one 
of the lowest teledensities.  To become globally competitive and to remain at the 
forefront of information and communications technologies, the Moroccan government 
embarked on a national strategy to make Morocco a player in the knowledge and 
information society.  ICT’s were at the forefront of its national socio-economic 
development plan.  Institutional reform followed, including a new national telecoms 
policy in 1997.  A national regulatory agency was created to govern and regulate the 
telecom sector, promote the rapid modernisation of the telecoms systems and services in 
Morocco and introduce competitive telecoms market policy.  “These reforms backed by 
the political will that has been evident in regard to their implementation and monitoring 
at the government level, have enabled Morocco to take its place on the international stage 
and gain a reputation as a stable country with clear rules and a high level of confidence.” 
(ITU, 2001)  The primary objective of the new Telecoms Act was to “establish a 
telecommunications market that: avoids domination by one or two key players; supports 
entrepreneurialism; encourages new entrants and competitors; and, that operates in the 
consumer interest.”  (Ibahrine, 2004)   
 
The new law provided for the splitting of the National Post Office and 
Telecommunication Agency into two independent public enterprises responsible for 
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telecoms services and postal services respectively; the setting up of an independent 
telecoms sector regulatory body; the establishment of private networks if the incumbent 
operator was not able to provide PSTN services; and the establishment of a second 
mobile network to compete with the incumbent.  The gradual opening up of the sector to 
competition with mobile telephony in 1999, and VSAT in 2000, full liberalisation of 
value-added services and selling of a partial stake in the incumbent operator in December 
2000 have ensured that the country’s teledensity has improved.   
 
A second fixed-line licence was awarded in July 2005 to a consortium including 
Telefonica and Portugal Telecom, each holding 32,18%, with the balance held by local 
Moroccan investors.  This ended the monopoly held by Maroc Telecom.  It is also 
envisaged that two 3G licences and a third fixed-line licence is expected to be awarded 
soon.  “The ending of this control is expected to see an opening up to competition in 
international calls, the national backbone and the local loop, improving services and, 
consumers hope, reducing call costs.  The move is also widely seen as necessary if the 
fixed-line system is to expand sufficiently to widen internet usage and boost call 
capacity.” (Oxford Business Group)  Morocco’s regulator expects the sector to be 
completely deregulated by 2008. 
 
Coupled with policy and legislative changes, Morocco also formulated a national strategy 
at the level of the Office of the Secretary of State to the Prime Minister responsible for 
postal services and telecommunication and information technologies.  This body plays a 
key role within government as the administrative unit is responsible for developing and 
implementing policies pertaining for new information technologies in the wider society, 
rather than in the narrow telecoms sector alone.   
 
These reforms are enabling digitisation of Morocco’s transmission network, growth in the 
number of both fixed and mobile subscribers, increased Internet access providers and 
major investments in telecoms and information technologies.  Particularly pertinent to 
this research is the total commitment towards the development of a sustainable 
competitive telecoms market.  Morocco’s example shows how an effective national 
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strategy can enhance a country’s information and communications sector and advance 
growth.  Through changes in the fundamental infrastructure sectors, it has enabled an 
additional focus on e-enabling technologies with which to enhance the use of technology, 
promote more efficient services and perhaps fuel overall growth through the use of e-
services. 
Key lessons from Morocco 
• Commitment to competition and development of ICT’s; 
• Licensing multiple operators to establish a competitive market that avoids domination 
by key players; 
• Strategies must be implemented effectively or else it will result in stagnation of 
market growth. 
6.4 Nigeria 
The implementation of reforms in Nigeria has transformed its telecoms market from one 
of the least developed on the African continent to one that is rapidly growing and will 
possibly become one of the largest African telecoms markets in the next few years.  The 
key enablers of this feat were a clear policy and a flexible regulatory framework that 
allowed the regulatory authority to employ innovative licensing approaches.   
 
Nigeria’s reform process began in 1992 with the passing of the Communications Act and 
the establishment of the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC).  The overriding 
objectives of the Act were to achieve the modernisation and rapid expansion of the 
telecoms network and services and thereby enhance social and economic development, 
allow Nigeria to participate in the global ICT environment, and make telecoms services 
efficient, affordable, reliable and available. 
 
The regulatory authority adopted a phased approach to the liberalisation of the telecoms 
sector, through different licence mechanisms and schemes.  Liberalisation began in the 
fixed-telephony market by licensing private-owned telecoms operators to compete with 
the state-owned monopoly operator in the provision of fixed services.  But these PTOs 
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were unable to compete with the incumbent because of a lack of access to infrastructure 
and capital.  Most of the licensees were small and medium enterprises.  The selection 
process had not considered the ability of licensees to meet the required roll-out of 
services.  The formulation of the National Telecoms Policy in 1998 therefore set specific 
targets for improving telephone penetration.  A second national carrier was licensed in 
2002, and fixed-wireless-access operators were licensed on a state-by-state basis.  
Despite these efforts to increase teledensity, the fixed operators have been unimpressive.  
To meet the objectives of the National Telecom Policy and its targets, three GSM 
operators were licensed through an auction process to provide mobile services.  The 
licensing of mobile services significantly changed the Nigerian telecoms market.   
 
Figure 17 — Number of fixed lines and mobile subscribers in Nigeria 
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Source: ITU world telecommunications database, 2005, NCC 
 
The pent-up demand for telephony services can be seen from the massive increase in 
subscribers after mobile services were introduced, despite very high prices at the 
inception of services.  Demand for mobile services has also resulted in a proliferation of 
smaller entrepreneurs selling single calls to that section of the general public who cannot 
afford a mobile service.  Nigeria’s single-call market, or “umbrella operators” as they are 
commonly known, significantly changed the boundaries of the call market by forcing 
operators to rethink their tariffs and introduce cheaper call rates to accommodate bulk 
operators. 
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Umbrella operators in Nigeria 
In markets where initial connection fees are high and pre-paid airtime rates are out of 
reach of most people, entrepreneurs arbitrate the market by purchasing either pre-paid or 
post-paid contracts from mobile operators and reselling this airtime at rates slightly above 
post-paid rates but lower than pre-paid rates.  For mobile operators, this approach 
increases network traffic and keeps the average revenue per user high..  In markets such 
as Nigeria and Cameroon, airtime resellers are estimated to account for 30% to 40% of 
the overall post-paid traffic (Pyramid, 2005).  For consumers, it expands the reach of 
mobile networks, provides an interim solution to affordability issues, especially to users 
who cannot afford the initial connection fees.  It also forces prices down because mobile 
operators are no longer in control of pricing.  Resellers are extremely sensitive to price 
but are valuable to operators as high value customers.  Operators therefore vie to keep 
these customers through lower pricing, thus forcing price-based competition which 
mobile operators are keen to avoid.  An added benefit is that it creates jobs in most 
markets, and in Nigeria this has become a viable sub-industry.  Although the legislation 
gives the regulator extensive powers over tariff regulation, the current level of 
competition allows a shift from specific approval of the tariffs of non-dominant operators 
to issuing guidelines and monitoring.   
 
The Nigerian experience shows that liberalising before privatising can be effective in 
achieving development goals if appropriate licence approaches are used.  In addition, the 
government was able to recoup potential revenue from the privatisation through the 
licence auctioning process as well as from forthcoming tax revenues from the highly 
successful mobile companies.  The GSM licences each sold for US$285m.  The Nigerian 
government granted a five-year tax holiday to new licensees, which attracted investors.  
Competition, a large market with pent-up demand, innovative licensing approaches and 
consumer vigilance combined to increase connectivity and access to ICTs and also drove 
down retail tariffs.  The Nigerian experience highlights the significant variances from 
developed country approaches and the success of innovative locally developed solutions 
for attracting investment and increasing access to telecoms services. 
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Key lessons from Nigeria 
• Licensing multiple operators in mobile early; four operators from the outset ensured 
that competition was instituted early.  Further, all these licensees were under pressure 
to build their network as fast possible in order to remain competitive; 
• The auction licensing process undertaken for the mobile licenses were particularly 
successful in generating revenues for government and assuming market-related prices 
for licences; 
• Consumer activism and entrepreneurship also play a significant role in allowing 
competition to develop and force lower prices; 
• Constant monitoring of incumbent operator behaviour including pricing, interconnect 
and quality of service by Parliament and the regulator; 
• Liberalising prior to privatisation forced competition on the incumbents; 
• Creating a package of incentives e.g. tax holiday, customs, etc made the country an 
attractive investment destination; and 
• Flexible regulatory framework e.g. wireless licensing created many competitors at the 
fringes; who are now challenging mainstream operators. 
6.5 India — embracing a commitment to market competition  
India began a process of market reform in the early Nineties by changing its historically 
socialist market policies.  Its new economic policy opened up many sectors previously 
under government to competition, including software and telecoms. As part of these 
macro-economic reforms, the government also initiated a liberalisation of the telecoms 
sector.  But a number of factors, including questionable commitment to reform and the 
state’s inability or unwillingness to give up control of these sectors, has led to the 
telecoms sector being unable to perform to its full potential.  The Indian telecoms 
environment has had a turbulent history, often mired in political, legal and regulatory 
challenges that have severely hampered the development of the market and impacted on 
subscriber growth.  The sector has been at the mercy of confused government policy and 
ineffective regulation, largely because state-owned companies and departments remain 
the biggest players in the sector.  This has resulted in policies that protect or further their 
interests.   
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A comparison with China, which has a similar population size, highlights the result of a 
policy vacuum in India, with the significant variant being the number of subscribers.  In 
January 2003, India had 11.2 million mobile subscribers against China’s 216 million.  In 
addition, China adds about five million new subscribers every month.  While geography11 
and culture could account for some of the difference, much of this variance can be 
attributed to the Indian policy and regulatory environment which can best be summarised 
as follows:   
The reform of the Indian telecom sector has been an amalgam of regulation, 
administrative intervention and political decision.  The interplay of forces has 
increased regulatory uncertainty, introduced political forms of competition, and 
favoured or disfavoured particular players.  That is not a good legacy if what is 
looked for is vigorous, fair competition unaffected by arbitrary official 
interference.  (Desai in Malik, 2003) 
 
Up until 1985, India had a typical state-owned PTT model, with the provision of telecoms 
services being the exclusive domain of the Department of Posts and Telegraph.  
Liberalisation started in 1984 with the opening up of the equipment manufacturing sector.  
In 1986, the Department of Telecoms was created, with an exclusive role in the telecoms 
sector.  Two companies were created: MTNL to provide services in two metropolitan 
cities (Bombay and Delhi), and VSNL for international services.  The government 
introduced competition in value-added services in 1992 but retained the lucrative 
international services under government monopoly.  There was little improvement in 
services, however, and significant power struggles between the three entities.   
 
Following widespread change in global telecoms practices and international pressure to 
speed up the liberalisation process, the Indian government instituted the National 
Telecom Policy of 1994 to open up the basic services sector, long-distance services in 
2000, and international telephony in 2002.  After the announcement of the new policy in 
December 1994, auctions for mobile licences were held in 20 states.  The first round of 
                                                
11 The concentration of economic activity in China’s eastern coastal region gives mobile operators 
economies of scale. 
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the basic-services auctions attracted 80 bids for 40 licences from 16 companies, but a 
fiasco involving unrealistically high licence fees, which the bidders were unable to pay, 
launched a new round of licensing, attracting only six new bids.  Finally, of the 21 circles 
up for auction, only six licences were issued.  Many foreign telecom companies 
participated in the auction because of the potential market size of an estimated 250 
million customers and a waiting list of more than three million.  Disillusioned by the 
government’s handling of the deregulation, several international telecom companies 
pulled out of India, blaming unfriendly telecom policies, high licence fees and the lack of 
a powerful regulator.  (Bagchi, 2000:28)   
 
Cellular services were not much different.  Even though the licences raised over $7 
billion in licence fees for the government, this did not translate into any improvement in 
consumer services.  Duopoly market structure was introduced with mobile services and 
42 licences were awarded in pre-defined circles.  The high licence fees led to high tariffs 
for consumers as it formed 50 percent of the roll-out cost.  “Given the high sunken cost of 
initial investment, the lower than expected subscriber base and the high licence fees, 
cellular operators in India, with the exception of those in Mumbai and New Delhi 
markets have been posting losses from the outset.”  (Bagchi, 2000:29)   
 
Both parliamentary politics and bureaucratic reluctance stalled the setting up of a 
regulatory authority, with the result that the Department of Telecoms retained both 
policy-making and regulatory authority in the process of introducing its competitors.  It 
was only in 1997 that an independent regulator, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of 
India (TRAI), was established.  TRAI was riddled with problems from the outset.  
Although the TRAI Act gave the regulator powers to resolve disputes between service 
providers, it had no jurisdiction over the Department of Telecoms, which was the most 
powerful force in the industry and the chief mischief-maker.  Faced with ever-increasing 
court challenges between TRAI, private-sector operators and the Department of 
Telecoms, together with a stagnating telecoms industry and an inability to attract further 
private sector investment, the government decided to introduce widespread changes with 
the introduction of a new telecoms policy in 1999.  This increased responsibilities for the 
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regulator, including prices, dispute resolution and increased consultations, while the role 
of the Department of Telecoms was to be minimised.   
 
The Indian government continued its liberalisation process by selling control of state-
owned VSNL, the sole provider of international voice services, to the Tata Group in 
February 2002.  It also launched a unified licensing regime that allows any operator the 
right to provide any access service using any technology.  This blurred the distinction 
between services.  The introduction of the unified licence profoundly affected the 
investment decisions of India’s operators, and the focus of investment shifted from fixed 
to mobile.  “This extraordinary transition to more efficient mobile access cannot happen 
in a country that licences discrete services and, more importantly, separates landline from 
the mobile operators.”  The cost efficiencies enabled by the unified license allows Indian 
operators to deploy networks based on the most efficient technology rather than with 
technology determined by the regulator.  The number of licences and the types of 
licences issued also means that the basis for competition has been set.   To remain 
competitive, operators must reduce tariffs and introduce new services. (Shosteck Group, 
2004:25)  
 
While not inherent in the concept, the unified licensing approach in India has stimulated 
competition and is driving network convergence by broadening the services operators can 
offer.  Sharing network elements and sub-systems and converging networks also enable 
such efficiencies.  Competition among operators has forced tariffs down to among the 
lowest in the world, leading to continued subscriber growth.  These market outcomes 
highlight the value of deregulation, open markets and competition as mechanisms of 
public policy to enable increased investment, broaden access and reduce prices.  
(Shosteck Group, 2004:31)   
 
In this new environment, tariffs have declined, so operators are focusing on converged 
services and networks to maximise cost efficiencies.  Prior to this, Indian telecoms 
reform was on the verge of disaster – the regulatory environment was adhoc and lacked a 
clear strategy for market entry.  The resultant market structure was unable to deliver the 
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benefits of competition.  Operators were therefore unable to predict market and 
subscriber growth, and thus plan network roll-out investments or new products and 
services.   
 
Easing regulation has stimulated operators to expand services and to reduce tariffs as a 
means of doing so.  Operator consolidation is increasing and this would provide greater 
purchasing power and economies of scale, allowing the surviving operators to compete 
more effectively as well as providing easier access to capital.  Unified licences have also 
speeded up the transition to more efficient mobile access and landline connections have 
slowed.  This does not, however, signal the end of landline, rather the deployment of 
landline where it makes economic sense.  Also as part of the new regulatory framework, 
TRAI introduced new competition by issuing additional mobile licences, awarding 
wireless local loop (WLL) licences in 2002 and introducing a call-party-pays regime. 
 
Figure 18 — Indian Regulatory Reform 
Effect of Indian regulatory reform on mobile penetration & price
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Source:  (Samarajiva, 2000) 
While the Indian market is currently experiencing unprecedented growth and increased 
competition, it will be interesting to watch the reforms unfold.  “An important 
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observation on the infrastructure reforms in India is that irrespective of the sector the 
incumbent has slowed down reform, as reform would lead to an annulment of their 
arbitrary powers.  So much so, the inherited strength of the incumbent coupled with the 
powers residing with it can impinge on the process of liberalisation.  Until a clear policy 
on competition is put in place economic growth and consumer welfare will remain 
hostage to incumbent’s control.” (Malik, 2004:27)   
Key lessons from the Indian experience 
• Lack of commitment to reform from the government will often strengthen incumbents 
and hamper competition; 
• High licence fees may increase government coffers, but is often unlikely to result in 
increased spending by newly licensed operators.  It is most likely to lead to high 
tariffs as investors attempt to recoup investments; 
• Competition at the fringes influenced/forced major policy changes in mainstream 
markets e.g. wireless local loop and mobile.  It also led to a unified licensing regime; 
• Clear separation of powers between government departments, regulators and 
operators are necessary to ensure competition; 
• Strong incumbents, whether government-owned or privately-owned, have enough 
incentive to hamper growth; 
• Unclear policy and regulatory environment creates uncertainty in the market, 
particularly for potential investors; 
• Technological and market changes sometimes demand new approaches to policy and 
regulation.  Once a reform path has been chosen, technological and market changes 
may demand new approaches; and 
• A strong administrative tradition backed by an independent judiciary influences the 
level and nature of competition. 
6.6 Sri Lanka — The benefits of competition 
Despite political turmoil, the Sri Lankan telecoms industry has been fuelled by 
progressive market reforms, economic liberalisation, a light-touch regulatory 
environment and pent-up consumer demand.   
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Sri Lanka’s pro-market policies are remarkable for a small country with a population of 
about 20 million people, and a GDP per capita of $874.  Sri Lanka ranks among the 
lower-income countries whose telecoms penetration rate is much higher than its average 
income suggests it should be.  “Competition since 1995-96 has done more to improve 
connectivity in Sri Lanka than a century of so-called public service.  Twice as many 
connections have been provided in the past five years than since the introduction of 
telephony to Sri Lanka in the 19th Century.” (Samarajiva, 2000)  
 
Figure 19 — Number of fixed-line subscribers in Sri Lanka 
Sri Lanka: Fixed-line subscribers per 100 inhabitants
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Source:  ITU database; Samarajiva, 2000 
Sri Lanka instituted liberalisation initiatives and sector reforms in the early 1990s with 
the promulgation of the Sri Lanka Telecoms Act.  At this stage, it had the option to 
reform and privatise the incumbent before introducing direct competition.  Instead, Sri 
Lanka chose to introduce competition and strengthen the regulatory agency before 
privatisation.  Both the South African and Indian experiences have shown that gaining 
compliance from a rejuvenated incumbent with a powerful strategic investor in a 
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monopoly culture makes the introduction of competition and strengthening regulation 
exceedingly difficult (Samarajiva, 2000).  There is no doubt that this approach has aided 
the development of competition in the country. 
The new Telecoms Act separated the policy and corporate responsibilities of the Ministry 
of Posts and Telecoms and created the incumbent, Sri Lanka Telecom, as a separate legal 
entity with the right to provide local and international voice traffic.  The Act’s main 
effects were to introduce a licensing framework that enabled the Minister to licence 
additional network operators, set up an independent regulator whose function it was to 
advise the Minister on licensing, police adherence to licence conditions and promote the 
public interest in telecoms.  It also converted the incumbent operator from a department 
within the ministry to a state-owned corporate entity.  In conjunction, a separate 
regulatory authority was created – the Office of the Director General of 
Telecommunications, which later became the Telecommunications Regulatory 
Commission (TRC). 
 
In 1996, two additional fixed-line licences were issued with local-loop licences to utilise 
wireless local-loop technology and compete directly with the incumbent operator.  Even 
though competition was introduced through different technology, it affected the 
incumbent operator.  “The new regulatory framework and subsequent competition for 
fixed lines has led to rapid growth in Sri Lanka’s access opportunities.”  (OECD, 
2004:18)  Despite these changes, Sri Lanka Telecom continues to dominate in the fixed-
line sector as it owns the majority of fibre capacity in the country.  The two private WLL 
operators are largely confined to the cities and towns.  Until recently, international 
services remained the exclusive domain of the incumbent, but a recent decision to open 
international services to unlimited licensees will lower the price of international services. 
 
As opposed to the fixed market, competition in the mobile sector is fierce, with four 
operators.  Mobile has become the de facto service for voice telephony to the majority of 
the population, given the inability of the incumbent to deliver fixed services.  In addition, 
operators are allowed to introduce new services and products, including ISDN, pre-paid 
fixed and mobile access services, per-second billing, among others.   
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“The Sri Lankan experience shows that competition not only yields good sector 
performance but, perhaps even more importantly, energises organisational reform of the 
incumbent and contributes to consolidating and legitimating the regulatory process.  
Without the external impetus provided by competition, internal reform of incumbents and 
efforts to create modern regulatory agencies are likely to succumb to the inertial forces 
that have held back telecoms development in the first place.”  (Samarajiva, 2000) 
Key lessons from the Sri Lankan experience 
• Competition, once introduced, is difficult to roll back; 
• Introducing competition prior to privatisation of the incumbent can be useful.  
Privatised incumbents are often more powerful and open to abuse of market power. 
6.7 Conclusion 
Key lessons from developing markets experience 
Policy and regulatory  
• Competition, once introduced, is difficult to roll back.  Thus, licensing multiple 
operators early in the reform process will accelerate the onset of competition.  
Liberalising prior to privatisation dilutes the power of the incumbent operator and 
forces competition; 
• Constant monitoring of incumbent operator behaviour by Parliament and the 
regulator; 
• High licence fees may increase government coffers, but is often unlikely to result in 
increased spending by newly licensed operators.  It is most likely to lead to high 
tariffs as investors attempt to recoup investments; 
• A strong administrative tradition backed by an independent judiciary influences the 
level and nature of competition.  Clear separation of powers between government 
departments, regulators and operators assist in enabling a competitive market, 
particularly in country’s lacking a strong administrative tradition; 
• Technological and market changes sometimes demand new approaches to policy and 
regulation.  Once a reform path has been chosen, technological and market changes 
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may demand new approaches.  Thus, a flexible regulatory framework is required to 
allow for new technologies e.g. wi-max; wi-fi; cdma; 
• Reform is most successful when backed by overall macro-economic reform, 
including a more liberal tax regime, lower customs and excise duties, currency 
stability etc;  
• Commitment to reform from all levels of government.  A clear policy and legislative 
regime, backed up with proper implementation of objectives and strategies will 
determine the level and nature of competition.  Specifying rules prior to the licensing 
of operators and establishing interconnection rules upfront so that it does not become 
an area of contention; 
• Keep operator’s obligations reasonable.  Insisting on obligations that demand 
investments that are not commercially viable, risks forcing companies to undertake 
bad investment and could create the need for renegotiation of special privileges.   
 
Market 
• Consumer activism and entrepreneurship also play a significant role in allowing 
competition to develop at the fringes and force lower prices; 
• An unclear policy and regulatory environment creates uncertainty in the market, 
particularly for potential investors. 
 
The countries analysed have chosen different routes for the introduction of competition to 
enable telecoms reform.  The development of competition in India was hampered for a 
number of reasons and at a number of levels — lack of political will, a strong regulatory 
regime at institutional level and a lack of clear commitment to pro-competitive market 
principles at the political level (Malik, 2004:3).  Any attempts to maximise state 
revenues, strengthen the national fiscus or fund incumbent infrastructure is likely to be at 
the expense of the development of the entire sector.  In addition, an unclear political and 
regulatory environment is likely to ward off private investors despite the market 
potential.  It is also important to highlight that, once a particular liberalisation path has 
been chosen, it is not necessary to continue along this path at the expense of the 
development of the sector.  Technology changes and market development demand 
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flexibility in policy and regulatory approaches e.g. wireless local loop (WLL) licensing, 
unified licensing and calling party pays (CPP) regimes, as in the case of India.  Nigeria’s 
experience with licensing multiple operators has made the market particularly efficient in 
regulating prices, more so than any other regulatory intervention, and has created viable 
opportunities for entrepreneurs.  Uganda’s clear objectives outlined in its policy 
framework, coupled with innovative universal service policies, has benefited the country.  
All stakeholders have also been made aware of the policy and regulatory environments 
and any planned interventions. 
 
Finally, often competition or the threat of competition, whether by conventional or 
unconventional means, as in the case of Sri Lanka’s WLL operators, is enough to 
stimulate the market, particularly the incumbent, to deliver services.  It is clear that 
“competition is developed gradually, but it is difficult to roll back.  Not only that, it 
prevents other institutional reforms being rolled back too.  The existence of viable 
operators who have something to lose from the re-imposition of monopoly practices is 
the best guarantee of consolidating institutional reform.”  (Samarajiva, 2000) 
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7 Overview of South African policy and regulatory environment  
Introduction 
The literature review and analysis of policy, regulation and market development provided 
background on both developed and developing countries.  This chapter uses the analyses 
from the earlier chapters to contextualise and evaluate the South African policy and 
regulatory framework within the broader international policy environment.  Key debates 
arising from the policy review process, including submissions to the Department of 
Communications, the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee, interviews with investors, 
media commentary and the researcher’s personal experience working with a potential 
investor, will inform the discussion in this chapter. 
7.1 History and overview 
It is impossible to analyse the South African telecoms environment without some 
understanding of the impact of apartheid on the country’s infrastructure.  Prior to the 
1994 elections, South Africa’s infrastructure investment was concentrated in the 
historically “white” suburbs, while large areas of the country were left under-serviced.  
The historic democratic elections heralded South Africa’s re-entry into global markets.  
Decades of sanctions, civil unrest and spiralling debt demanded serious macro-economic 
reforms.  In addition, significant investment in infrastructure was required if South Africa 
was to be able to compete globally.   
 
The newly elected government’s election mandate lay in addressing the huge backlog in 
the provision of basic services, i.e. housing, electricity, telephones, water, schools, etc, 
particularly in previously under-serviced areas.  At the same time, government lacked the 
capital to invest in infrastructure that would enable it to address the infrastructure 
backlog.  In the early 1990s, government debt as a percentage of GDP was nearly 50% 
and the main budget deficit was 8.3% in 1993 (Financial Mail, South Africa, 2005).  
South Africa’s financial crisis is illustrated in the graphics below: 
  126 
Figure 20 — Key financial indicators for South Africa  
Annual GDP growth
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Source:  Financial Mail, South Africa, February 2005 
While privatisation was seen as the best vehicle for attracting foreign revenue that would 
pay for the infrastructure upgrades, it was not popular with the trade union movement, 
COSATU, and the South African Communist Party (SACP), which between them 
represented a significant proportion of the ruling-party electorate.  In addition, state-
owned enterprises had historically built up huge inefficiencies because they had served as 
a job-reservation programme for the conservative Afrikaner minority.  Thus, the threat of 
job losses fuelled the anti-privatisation debate among both left- and right-wing 
politicians. 
 
Government’s chief concern was that, if state-owned utility monopolies were 
immediately privatised, the new owners would focus solely on maximising profits.  Low-
income earners, particularly in previously disadvantaged areas, would therefore be at a 
disadvantage because the focus would not be on rolling out new infrastructure in what 
would be regarded as high-risk areas for investment capital.  As a compromise position, 
the government adopted a policy of managed liberalisation — to privatise the state-
owned utility companies slowly over several years and gradually introduce competition.  
The policy of managed liberalisation essentially had two contradictory underlying 
objectives.  Managed liberalisation acknowledged that the state was unable to own and 
operate telecoms infrastructure and thus should be opened up to the private sector.  
Telecoms infrastructure was seen as the key to developing previously disadvantaged 
areas but the private sector could not be trusted to deliver.  The public sector needed to 
maintain some control over infrastructure to ensure that these goals were met.   
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Key among liberalisation goals was increasing access to communications infrastructure 
through boosting investment in the sector, addressing the imbalance of infrastructure 
provision and improving efficiency.  The provision of basic services to under-serviced 
areas, lower costs and increased black economic empowerment remains a politically and 
socially strategic issue for government.   
7.2 Managed liberalisation 
 
 
 
The South African telecommunications sector began liberalising in the early 1990s — the 
VANs sector opened in 1993, followed by customer-premises equipment (1993) and 
mobile (1994).  Key elements of the telecoms sector framework were initially outlined in 
the Telecommunications Act 103 of 1996.  Most notably, these were: 
- Three to five years of exclusivity for Telkom in PSTS services 
- Setting up of an independent regulator 
- Obligatory interconnection with Telkom 
- Rate regime for Telkom 
The five-year exclusivity on PSTS was intended to position the telecoms sector within 
the overall development objectives of government and raise the cash-value of the entity 
for eventual public listing.  To ensure that the new management fulfilled the goals of 
infrastructure provision and prepared Telkom for competition, licence conditions were 
1994 1996 1997 1999 2000 2002 2003 
Strategic services: 
Managed 
monopoly 
Semi-strategic 
services: 
Managed 
monopoly 
Two mobile operators 
licenced 
Telkom 
Privatisation:  
Stake sold to SEP  
Third mobile operator 
licenced 
Telkom monopoly 
ends 
VOIP legalised, PTOs, 
mobiles can self-
provide 
FULL COMPETITION 
SNO licensed 2005 
Convergence 
Legislation 
Telkom IPO 
Liberalisation timeline 
N -strategic 
services: 
Full competition 
  128 
imposed.  At the time, the capital investment for network expansion, digitisation and 
modernisation was estimated to be in the region of R50 billion rands.  In exchange for 
exclusivity, Telkom also committed to digitising the network, improving its service 
record, reducing the waiting period for installation and fault repairs, and reducing the 
number of faults.  The tables below outline Telkom’s line roll-out targets and the 
financial penalties that would be imposed for failure to reach these targets. 
 
Table 7 — Telkom line rollout targets  
97/98 98/99 99/00 2001 2002 Total
Total new access lines 
brought into service 340,000   435,000   575,000   675,000   665,000   2,690,000    
Underserviced areas 265,000   318,000   359,000   357,000   378,000   1,677,000    
Priority customers 3.240       3.845       4.055       5.060       4.046       20.246         
Villages served 510          610          610          800          644          3,174           
Payphones 20,000     25,000     25,000     25,000     25,000     120,000       
Replacement lines 20,000     13,000     65,000     551,000   603,000   1,252,000    
Source: Joint Economic Development Plans 
Table 8 — Telkom penalties 
First 100,000 lines 450.00R        additional R900 for every extra line missed
Priority customer targets 4,500.00R     per unit
Schools 900.00R        
Public payphones 2,250.00R     
Villages 1,125.00R     
Source: Joint Economic Development Plans 
 
The South African policy and regulatory environment, as envisaged by government, can 
be broadly categorised into three periods – monopoly, gradual competition and open, 
competitive market.   
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Figure 21 — Overview of the introduction of competition in South Africa 
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• Mobile duopoly licensed
 
The 1996 Telecoms Act was meant to allay fears and prepare the foundation of a vibrant 
infrastructure and the eventual privatisation of Telkom that could ultimately service the 
country’s demands for a sophisticated information society.  In parallel to this process, 
recognising that an SOE would find it difficult to generate the funds needed for extensive 
infrastructure development without private support, government opted to sell a 30% stake 
in Telkom to a strategic equity partner, comprising a consortium of SBC (60%) and 
Telekom Malaysia (40%).  SBC is an American company known for its aggressive 
approach in highly regulated markets.  This phase was marked by the absence of 
competition and the highly restrictive nature of the South African telecoms environment.  
VANs were limited to the provision of data services, excluding voice, resale, self-
provisioning, and VANs activity, was carefully policed and monitored by Telkom and the 
sector regulator, Icasa.  The Telecoms Act of 1996, the Thintana shareholders agreement 
and Telkom’s licence governed the sector until 2002.  The 2002 Amendment Act was an 
attempt to address these issues and attempt further liberalisation of the sector. 
 
Phase two can be broadly described as a period of gradual liberalisation and is the focus 
of this study.  The two conflicting objectives of liberalising the sector and privatising a 
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state-owned enterprise created a conflict of interest, resulting in a range of problems for 
policy and regulation.  The Department of Communications initiated the second phase of 
the reform process with a colloquium in early February 2001 in an attempt to gain 
stakeholder consensus on the process and find the ideal market structure.   
 
The policy process was mired in controversy, which caused delays.  An absence of a 
framework for the process, including timeframes, created a high level of uncertainty in 
the industry, for both existing and potential investors.  Policy directions with significant 
differences in the broad framework were released at least three times.  Key debates raised 
by some of the main stakeholders provide some understanding of the factors which 
shaped the outcomes of the Amendment Act.  COSATU,12 the Department of 
Communications,13 the Department of Trade and Industry,14 Eskom15 and Transtel,16 
Icasa, the Ministry of Public Enterprises,17 various bodies representing the VANs and ISP 
sectors, Thintana and various private sector investors were the primary players attempting 
to shape and influence the liberalisation debate.  Within government itself, various 
conflicting agendas were at play.  The Department of Trade and Industry advocated early 
and open deregulation to encourage foreign investment, the Department of Public 
Enterprises pushed for extending the monopoly to raise the value of Telkom’s IPO, and 
the Department of Communications was caught between the battle lines with the 
intention of fostering development and competition in the ICT sector while also 
attempting to raise the value of Telkom’s IPO.  Telkom and Cosatu pushed for slow 
deregulation and job security, through maintenance of Telkom's monopoly.  Private-
sector investors pushed for at least a limited period of exclusivity to guarantee their 
investment in infrastructure.  Icasa, the South African users, led mostly by the business 
community, which is a large user of telecoms services, and the VANs and ISP sectors 
                                                
12 The Congress of South African Trade Unions — a federation of organised labour movements. 
13 Responsible for advising the Minister of Communications. 
14 DTI — concerned with trade policy, foreign investment. 
15  State-owned electricity companies. 
16 State-owned transportation companies.  
17 Determines policy processes and is responsible for management of state-owned enterprises. 
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pushed for rapid deregulation of the sector.  The stakeholders were numerous and varied, 
so the policy was largely a reflection of compromises reached within these debates rather 
than a clear policy framework that attempted to provide vision and direction for the 
sector.  What ultimately resulted thus was a compromise policy that sought to pacify all 
of these competing interests, while not necessarily serving the best long-term interests of 
the country. 
 
The draft policy was officially published on March 23, 2001, and open for comment until 
May 2, 2001.  The telecoms policy announced in March of 2001 set out a plan to 
continue managed liberalisation by introducing a second national operator (SNO).  Then 
in July 2001, the Government succumbed to pressure from the business community and 
international leaders and considered appointing a third national operator.  Following 
pressure primarily from Telkom, it reverted to its original position, and allowed for the 
introduction of only one other competitor.  This vacillation by the Department of 
Communications on key policy directions contained in the Amendment Act highlighted 
the deep indecision, lack of professionalism and absence of appropriate industry 
consultation.  Even though the final outcome was in favour of private-sector investors, it 
illustrated the inability of the Department of Communications to handle major policy 
reviews, undermined the credibility of the Department and made present and potential 
investors nervous about the stability of the framework. 
 
The Telecommunications Amendment Bill was promulgated in 2001, setting out the 
framework for the managed liberalisation of the fixed-line market and paving the way for 
the licensing of an SNO and possibly further operators in the future.  In parallel to the 
policy process attempting to liberalise the market, an IPO further liberalising Telkom was 
also in process when the monopoly licence expired in 2002, a further 25% of 
Government’s shareholding in Telkom was sold on the Johannesburg and New York 
Stock Exchanges.  To date, government remains the largest single shareholder in Telkom.   
 
The managed-liberalisation process and implementation of competition in the fixed-line 
sector were intended to stimulate new investment and increased demand for 
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communications services through affordable prices and the offer of new and innovative 
products, thus enabling wider access to ICTs, particularly for disadvantaged communities 
living in under-serviced areas of South Africa.  Because of the high level of uncertainty 
in the South African regulatory environment, however, a policy process that changes 
frequently and unpredictably or is vague, will cause concern among investors.  The focus 
of the Amendment Act was on the introduction of a fixed operator and a competitor to 
Telkom, but lacked the vision to create a foundation for a competitive sector.  This would 
have entailed a fundamental rethinking of the process begun in 1996, amid market and 
technological changes, to create a policy and regulatory environment to manage these 
widespread changes.  The reform process for phase two, which envisioned the gradual 
introduction of competition, and its subsequent unfolding are analysed in the discussion 
below. 
7.3 Overview of key policy provisions and analysis of the policy 
In keeping with its managed-liberalisation policy, the Bill allowed the introduction of one 
new full-service operator and an additional international-service operator, awarded to the 
state enterprise, Sentech, with the potential for a service-based operator to be introduced 
in 2005, subject to a market study.  The Telecoms Amendment Act determined that the 
telecoms assets of Eskom and Transnet would be incorporated in the SNO with a 15% 
stake each, a further 19% was granted to a BEE consortium called Nexus Connexion, and 
51% to a strategic equity partner.   
Addressing the access gap 
In an attempt to increase access in rural areas, the Amendment Act made provision for 
the establishment of licences for under-serviced areas (USALs).  These were envisaged to 
be small regional monopolies operating where Telkom had reached less than 5% 
penetration, with special permission to establish infrastructure and use voice-over-data 
technology to deliver telecoms services.  To date, at least half a dozen of these USAL 
operators have been granted licences and a R15 million subsidy to assist with start-up 
operations granted by the universal-service agency.  Ideally, these regional telecoms 
operators would have utilised Telkom’s or the SNO’s backbone network while building 
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their own local networks in their region.  Lengthy delays and regulatory changes have 
significantly affected their business plans.  Most have teamed with the mobile operators 
to provide mobile services.  Although the USAL model was still a viable opportunity 
seven years ago, delays in promulgating and implementing the legislation, combined with 
the widespread availability of mobile services, have rendered these operators almost 
obsolete.  The major mobile networks cover almost 98% of the population between them 
and are constantly rolling out network where there is demand.  In addition, complicated 
interconnection arrangements, which need to be negotiated with each of the operators, 
and capital-intensive network requirements in a high-risk environment make the viability 
of these operations questionable.  The majority of the rural population lives on a marginal 
income that is barely able to sustain them.  Spending on telecoms is a luxury when basic 
needs have to be met.  Rural telephony models are unlikely to survive on market-based 
mechanisms alone and will require extensive state support in terms of both financial and 
operational assistance. 
 
During this phase, services such as self-provision, resale and VoIP were not liberalised 
but left to the discretion of the Minister of Communications.  From April 2003, carriers 
are to contribute 0.5% of their turnover to the Universal Service Fund, a fund managed 
by the Universal Service Agency, to ensure that infrastructure is implemented in areas 
currently without telecoms services.  An e-rate is to be introduced for government-funded 
schools whereby operators will give a 50% discount on calls made for Internet access.  
Public emergency communications centres are to be established, and accessed by means 
of a 112 number service. 
 
International best practice highlights that good policy-making is meant to develop broad 
overall objectives with which to create a framework and strategic direction.  The 
literature review in chapters three and four highlighted a number of factors that are key 
competition enablers.  The next table compares the results of the research from the 
literature review with South Africa’s compliance with international best practice in 
regard to the structural components of reform.  The table below highlights how, while 
South Africa has theoretically complied with international best practice, a commitment to 
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market reform has created significant gaps in the implementation, which have allowed 
the state-owned incumbent to entrench its position. 
 
Table 9 — Comparing structural components of international reform with SA 
 Best practice  South Africa 
Commercialising operations 
and separating operational 
functions from government 
State-owned enterprises re-
organised to perform more like 
commercial enterprises.  
Structural separation of 
operational functions from the 
policy-making role of 
government. 
Theoretical structural separation of 
Telkom, with significant influence in 
the overall policy development as a 
direct result of government’s 
shareholding.  Telkom privatised to 
powerful international private-sector 
player, accustomed to operating in 
monopoly environments.  
Shifting government focus 
from ownership to policy 
and regulation 
Internationally, government 
focus primarily on sector 
regulation and enhancing the 
economic efficiency of markets 
in the ICT sector. 
Confused focus in the SA policy and 
regulatory environment.  Government 
still unclear whether focus should be 
on sector management or maximising 
profits from state-owned interests in 
sector. 
Increasing participation of 
private enterprise and 
capital 
Total private-sector involvement 
in developed countries, while 
developing countries are moving 
in the direction of private-sector 
investment. 
SA has struggled to attract private-
sector investment.  Additional network 
investment from Telkom has been 
curtailed since the end of the 
exclusivity period and the absence of a 
competitor.  As a result, activity in the 
downstream equipment sectors has 
also slowed. 
Containing monopolies, 
developing competition and 
diversifying supply of 
services 
Increasingly aggressive anti-
competitive regulation aimed at 
breaking the monopoly power of 
incumbents. 
Unchecked anti-competitive behaviour 
by the incumbents, no diversification 
of supply of services in fixed and 
limited diversification in mobile. 
 
The table below compares the results of the research from the literature review highlights 
and analyses international best practice against South African policy. 
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Table 10 — SA policy analysis against international best practice 
Policy Best practice South Africa 
Separation of means 
and ends 
 
Market performance under constant 
review to analyse whether the market is 
able to deliver the benefits of competition 
to consumers and attract investment.  
Ongoing liberalisation in an attempt to 
deliver the benefits of competition to 
consumers and thus grow the ICT sector. 
Market structure manipulated to 
protect incumbent.  Regulatory 
intervention designed to deliver ends 
rather than means.  Market unable to 
deliver the benefits of competition to 
consumers.  As a result, significantly 
lower investment in sector. 
Inconsistent 
regulation and 
application of 
regulation 
Certain policy and regulatory 
environment consistently applied across 
the markets.  Little government 
intervention in the application of 
regulation. 
Uncertain, frequently changing, often 
to suit the state-owned incumbent. 
Government intervention in the 
application of regulation. 
Access bottlenecks Regulatory mandated access, with clear 
dates and times followed by rules and 
regulations. Constant monitoring by the 
regulator allows for access to key parts of 
the networks by smaller operators. 
Unclear regulation on access allows 
the incumbent to deny access to new 
operators.  Local-loop unbundling 
not clear.  Convergence regulation 
likely to create further confusion in 
access issues as there are no clear 
rules, especially for smaller 
operators. 
Incumbent behaviour Clear regulation and processes for supply 
of key services by incumbent or, 
alternatively, in the cases of a very poor 
incumbent, as in Nigeria, allowing new 
operators to provide their own facilities. 
Clear anti-competitive behaviour, 
particularly in VANs. Regulator 
unable to regulate.  Absence of 
economic regulation for anti-
competitive behaviour.  Principles 
enshrined in policy but require 
further detail to prohibit anti-
competitive behaviour and clear 
processes for proper regulation. 
Slow implementation 
of competition 
enablers 
Carrier pre-selection and number 
portability instituted in most markets. 
Delays in introducing carrier pre-
selection and number portability.  
Number portability is particularly 
important for the mobile sector to 
allow for further competition. 
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The section below analyses in detail some of the fundamental flaws in the South African 
Telecoms Act, 2001. 
7.3.1 Separating means and ends   
Although the Amendment Act clearly states the objectives and benefits of liberalisation, 
it fails to focus on developing a market structure within which this can be achieved.  
Instead, the state has cherry-picked lucrative segments of the market through the 
licensing of state-owned entities such as Sentech (international and multi-media), Telkom 
(fixed-mobile licence and access to 1800mhz spectrum) and increasing value for state-
owned entities through the prescribed equity set-aside for Transtel and Esi-tel, in return 
for the contribution of their respective assets in the SNO.   
 
It is unprecedented internationally to mandate shareholdings to two state-owned 
infrastructure providers from outside the telecoms sector as well provide for a foreign 
investor.  Where government has mandated this approach, it has included only one utility 
company – either rail or electricity.  At the parliamentary portfolio committee hearings 
(2001), Icasa questioned the validity of these licences:  “Licences cannot be granted to 
operators unless they apply for these and in compliance with the provisions of the 
Telecommunications Act.  The Authority is concerned that the policy directions attempt 
to grant licences to operators, in violation of the provisions of the Telecommunications 
Act and principles of transparency, just administrative action and the values of the 
Constitution.”  Icasa also questioned the “granting” of licences in law as this “would be 
contrary to the letter and spirit of the Telecommunications Act and the government’s 
commitment to transparency, public participation in the economy and liberalisation of the 
Telecommunications Sector.  Granting of licences in this manner is contrary to the 
international trend and undermining of the Government’s own rationale for the 
establishment of the regulator.”  (Icasa submission to Parliamentary Portfolio Committee 
on Communications, 2001)  The granting of a license to itself in policy is in 
contravention to South Africa’s world trade organisation’s (WTO) agreement.  Icasa is 
the telecoms regulatory body tasked with the administrative regulation of the sector. 
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The South African approach creates a number of problems.  The two entities will 
compete to provide services to the SNO.  The value of their contributions from their 
existing assets can only be done after a detailed due-diligence exercise.  The regulator 
will be unable to determine the role of the state-owned entities in the SNO until an 
invitation to apply for the licence is issued.  Mandating a shareholding in excess of their 
ability to contribute to the investment in the SNO will impact on the ability of the SNO to 
attract foreign investment or raise external finance.  Mandating equity stakes for all the 
state-interested players is akin to a “forced marriage”, thus making it difficult to attract 
any investment.  In addition, a mixture of shareholders forcibly thrown together by policy 
is likely to create numerous shareholder disputes, thus detracting from the management 
and operation of the business. 
 
The Act undermines existing licensed private-sector players by placing unfair and 
possibly unenforceable limitations on VANs licensees through the prohibition of voice 
over IP, resale and self-provision. “The Telecommunications policy has been inconsistent 
as the Government pursues ICT-enabled economic growth, but is unwilling to take the 
path that it requires.” (Bridges.org, 2001)  The failure to attract quality investors for the 
SNO twice is testament to the impaired policy and regulatory environment in South 
Africa.  There is no doubt that this is also severely affecting telecoms development in the 
country, even without considering other aspects of the business environment affected by 
high costs of telecoms.   
7.3.2 Fixed-mobile licence 
The Telecoms Amendment Act specifically created a fixed-mobile licence category that 
is unique to the South African environment.  In a world of rapidly changing technology 
that significantly affects the performance and the nature of investment, it is generally 
considered sensible to leave decisions regarding choice of technology to operators rather 
than to regulators.  The fixed-mobile licence is problematic because it creates the 
“potential for a two-tier licensing structure in fixed and mobile services.  At the higher 
tier will be fixed-mobile services licences, able to provide both types of services over a 
single, integrated network; at the lower tier will be PSTS and MCTS licences, limited in 
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the range of technologies open to them.” (Arup, 2001:2)  Levelling the playing field 
between fixed and mobile operators in a competitive environment will therefore be 
difficult.  The fixed-mobile licence is limited in that it limits the ability of the licence 
holder to provide full services. 
 
The justification for introducing a fixed-mobile licence category was to enable fixed 
operators to take advantage of mobile technology with which to provide infrastructure in 
previously disadvantaged areas and to allow for the integration of fixed and mobile 
infrastructures.  But neither of these aims justifies the creation of a new licence category.  
In fact, allowing commercial negotiation between operators is more likely to facilitate 
competition.  “The new fixed-mobile services licence seems expressly designed to ensure 
that Telkom acquires its own mobile-services licence.  That is a legitimate policy 
objective, but it is unfair to do so in a manner that creates an advantage for Telkom in 
both the fixed and mobile services markets.”  (Arup, 2001:2) 
 
It is unnecessary to licence specific technologies within an overall policy statement.  
Technologies change frequently and cannot be used to determine customer uptake.  What 
was necessary from a policy perspective was to provide access to spectrum and leave the 
operator to decide on the service, based on market analysis of cost and demand.  If a 
licence category such as fixed-mobile became necessary, it should be granted on the basis 
of a free, fair and open licensing process rather than given to predetermined operators, as 
the earlier analysis of India and Nigeria highlighted.  In both these countries, fixed-
wireless licences became particularly important for introducing competition.   
7.3.3 Infrastructure sharing 
The underlying rationale for licencing a second national network operator before opening 
up the market to competition was to create an alternative fixed infrastructure for Telkom.  
The exclusivity period was to ensure that prospective profits from market entry were used 
to stimulate network investment and give Telkom time to adjust.  But as international 
experience shows, it is arguable whether this is the best strategy, as was demonstrated in 
an earlier chapter on the UK’s approach to licensing one competitor to BT as an 
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alternative facilities-based operator.  The analysis in that chapter showed that the seven-
year exclusivity granted to Mercury did not bring about the benefits of competition, nor 
was Mercury a commercial success because of policy and regulation limitations, such as 
no duct sharing, no local-loop unbundling, no co-location at exchanges, no special rights 
to transmission facilities. 
 
The Act makes provision for the SNO to utilise Telkom's facilities on a resale basis for a 
period of two years after the date of being awarded the PSTS licence, in accordance with 
the terms and conditions of an agreement to be entered into between Telkom and the 
SNO.  To be able to offer the most cost-effective end-to-end services to consumers, 
infrastructure sharing between public switched telecoms service operators should be an 
ongoing feature dictated by the prevailing, relevant conditions of supply and demand in 
the market, and not limited to two years by legislative proscription.  Inadequate provision 
for infrastructure sharing would limit customer choice and competition in some areas, 
increase the cost of services to the consumer, lead to over-supply of facilities that are not 
matched by market demand, result in inefficient and wasteful duplication of 
infrastructure, and undermine the SNO’s ability to expand into new areas not already 
connected to Telkom’s network.  The two-year limitation on infrastructure sharing and 
facilities leasing is insufficient to enable competition.   
 
“Part of the liberalisation process in all developed countries has been to facilitate the use 
of existing infrastructures as an economic means of multiplying the number and variety 
of networks and forms of access to services.  This is a permanent shift, which produces as 
a consequence an unbundling of services and specialised markets in rights of access, 
rights of way and use of infrastructures.  All utility sectors, not just telecoms, benefit 
from these aspects of liberalisation.” (Arup, 2001:9)  The limitation of the use of 
Telkom's facilities to the two-year period would: 
• Conflict with internationally accepted principles relating to access to essential 
facilities incorporated in the Competition Act 89 of 1998;  
• Be practically unfeasible and likely to lead to inefficient and unnecessary duplication 
of infrastructure;  
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• Result in over-supply of facilities that are not matched by market demand; and could 
devalue the South African telecoms sector as a whole. 
 
As outlined below, infrastructure sharing would also require a number of additional 
policy and regulatory provisions to make an SNO viable:   
Leased Lines 
It is in the public interest for the SNO to have preferential terms for leasing lines from 
Telkom.  Wasteful duplication of infrastructure is unnecessary, so the SNO should be 
encouraged to build its own infrastructure only where it is commercially feasible.  New 
operators, including VANs, must have access to Telkom’s network at wholesale rates, 
preferably at cost.  Recent studies on pricing show that a key driver of the high cost of 
telecoms services is Telkom’s lack of a wholesale pricing structure.  Currently, there is 
no incentive, including regulatory imperative, to introduce a wholesale pricing structure.   
Local loop unbundling 
Unbundled access to the local loop allows new entrants to compete with the dominant 
operator, particularly in areas where the new entrant has not yet rolled out infrastructure.  
Internationally, local-loop unbundling is recognised as a means to establish competition 
in local networks quickly.  But, despite regulations to unbundle the local loop, this has 
not been particularly successful.  Internationally, particularly in Europe and America, 
alternative forms of infrastructure access are possible either through the cable networks 
or alternative operators as a result of market liberalisation.  These options do not exist for 
South Africa.  Without local-loop unbundling, the high cost of local-access infrastructure 
is likely to reduce the ability of the new entrant to compete with Telkom in this arena, 
and therefore restrict its ability to offer consumers an alternative at competitive prices.  
Although it would not be economically feasible for new entrants to duplicate the 
incumbent's local-access infrastructure in its entirety within a reasonable time, the Act 
prohibits unbundled access to Telkom’s local loop.  Ideally, the key elements of local-
loop unbundling that should have been included in the Act are to compel the incumbent 
to unbundle elements of service, starting from raw copper upwards, based on a timetable 
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for implementation in key markets, to determine rights of collocation with the incumbent 
operator and enable the regulator to determine a pricing structure based on costs. 
Rights of access to international transmission links 
Telkom is the signatory to and owner of the South African portion of the international 
communication links and therefore has a monopoly on international cable routes to and 
from South Africa, including landing rights.  It would be uneconomical for the SNO to 
install its own international transmission links to and from South Africa.  If Telkom was 
free to negotiate commercial terms with the SNO, it would extract monopoly rent.  The 
SNO should be entitled to lease spare capacity on existing international cables on 
indefeasible rights-of-use terms, which convey full rights for the lifetime of the cable.   
Controlling incumbent behaviour to avoid anti-competitive behaviour:   
The Act does not recognize the concept of economic dominance or the principle of 
significant market power, which is an important factor in regulating a dominant 
monopoly operator.  As a result of Telkom’s dominance, asymmetric regulation is 
required to facilitate competition and to level the playing field, particularly for new 
entrants.  Internationally, the focus of telecoms regulators and competition authorities has 
been on the introduction and development of competition, particularly the examination of 
individual market-operator positions with significant market power.  Apart from a policy 
and regulatory vacuum on competition-enabling legislation, South Africa has not focused 
any attention on establishing processes for the assessment of market competition.  
Particularly important is the absence of sufficient enforcement of anti-competitive 
conduct rules.  As a result, Telkom continues its dominance over the sector with 
unchecked anti-competitive behaviour. 
7.3.4 Interconnection:   
Internationally, experience has shown that the success or failure of new operators 
depends largely on the interconnect terms and conditions.  Because of the high 
dependency of new entrants on the incumbent operator for access to networks and the 
provision of facilities, interconnect agreements and rules for leased-line provision have to 
be developed that are fair and based on acceptable principles both technically and 
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commercially. The policy relating to interconnect agreements therefore needs to 
emphasise principles of cost-related tariffs and non-discrimination between operators.  
The SNO will require access to Telkom's infrastructure on stable, predictable and cost-
effective terms wherever necessary.  The separation of accounts and account reporting is 
important to control incumbent behaviour against abuse of its dominant position and to 
create clear timeframes for the rapid development of appropriate management accounting 
practices in Telkom.  Although COA/CAM18 regulations and timelines are in place for 
implementation, Icasa lacks the power and the skills to implement these. 
 
The interconnect pricing methodology should protect the SNO against predatory pricing 
by Telkom.  No interconnection terms and conditions are specified in the Act, it is 
assumed that regulations will be drawn up by Icasa or in the SNO licence agreement.  
This is not ideal as it leaves too much room for negotiation and creates uncertainty for 
investors. 
7.3.5 Implementation of competition enablers  
Carrier selection and carrier pre-selection 
The Act’s lack of key competition-enabling mechanisms, e.g. delayed introduction of 
carrier pre-selection, number portability, facilities leasing, interconnection and access to 
facilities, were a cause for major concern and made investment unattractive.  
Internationally, it is widely accepted that carrier selection19 and carrier pre-selection20 
play an important role in promoting competition.  A study conducted in the European 
Union in 2001 found that, in many instances in Europe, the “lack of … [such] regulatory 
                                                
18 Chart of Accounts and Cost Allocation Manual 
19 Call-by-call carrier selection is a service that enables fixed subscribers to select a carrier different from 
their local loop operator for the routing of a specific call by dialling a prefix or an access code which 
identifies the selected carrier's network. 
 
20 Enables fixed subscribers to select a carrier different from their local loop operator for the routing of 
outgoing national long distance, international long distance and local calls.  As subscriber's choices are 
programmed in advance, they do not need to dial the carrier-selection prefix unless they wish to override 
the pre-selection choice for any call. 
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instruments have made it difficult for new entrants to compete with incumbent 
operators.” (EU, July 2001)  
 
The policy makes provision for introducing number portability in 2004 and carrier 
selection and pre-selection in 2005, two years after the licensing of the SNO.  
Timeframes for the implementation of these enablers has fluctuated as a result of rigorous 
lobbying by various interest groups.  Ideally, these regulatory enablers should have been 
in place from day one.  Mobile number portability was finally introduced in November 
2006, the results of which are yet to be seen.  Carrier pre-selection has yet to be 
implemented. 
 
The early implementation of key competition enablers such as carrier pre-selection, 
carrier selection and number portability is important for enhancing customer choice and 
to allow for early competition.  Without these measures, it will not be possible for any 
consumer not directly connected to the SNO network to benefit from the competition 
brought about by the introduction of the SNO.  It would take several years before the 
SNO’s network could provide similar levels of local access to those of Telkom, even if 
financially feasible.  Accordingly, without the introduction of carrier selection and carrier 
pre-selection, a large portion of residential and small-business consumers will not benefit 
from competition for several years.   
 
International experience has shown that there is some correlation between the 
implementation of carrier pre-selection and lower incumbent market share.  “In Sweden 
and Austria, where CPS has been implemented, overall fixed-line penetration stood at 76 
percent and 63 percent respectively at the end of 2000, while in Switzerland, one of the 
earliest carrier pre-selection adopters, the operator’s share of international long-distance 
traffic has fallen to as low as 55 percent, and domestic long-distance traffic to 69 
percent.” (Toland, J, 2001 in M-Cell submission to Parliament, 2001)  In countries where 
the incumbent’s market share is the highest, carrier pre-selection has not yet been put into 
place.   
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Number portability 
Number portability has been recognised internationally as an enabler of competition.  It is 
not only a policy and regulatory issue, but is also complex in its implementation, 
technically, operationally and procedurally.  The Act simply states that number 
portability will be introduced, but it fails to distinguish between the various types of 
number portability that can be implemented: operator,21 location,22 and service,23  The 
biggest obstacle to local number portability implementation is in the adaptation of 
support systems such as customer databases and accounting systems, service 
management systems and network management systems.  Implementation will be 
particularly complex in South Africa because of its mix of analogue and digital 
infrastructure.   
 
“There is clear evidence that customers are reluctant to consider using alternative 
network operators if this means that they have to dial extra digits or change their phone 
number.  Absence of carrier pre-selection and number portability therefore gives the 
incumbent network operator a significant competitive advantage.”  (Arup, 2001:18) 
7.3.6 Independence of the regulator 
South Africa has had many difficulties in establishing credibility for an independent and 
transparent policy and regulatory structure.  Although the legislative framework within 
which the regulator operates is perceived to be independent as it is separate from the 
Ministry and does not report to the Minister, numerous licensing and regulatory issues 
demonstrate the contrary.  Icasa’s decisions have been challenged by the Minister.  The 
first telecoms regulator, Satra, was plagued by licensing debacles and regulatory issues. 
Its successor, the converged broadcasting and telecoms regulatory authority, Icasa, has 
also not had much success.  At the heart of these issues was joint jurisdiction between the 
Minister and the regulator over core regulatory and licensing functions.  Although Icasa 
theoretically complies with international best practice regarding the setting up of an 
                                                
21 Customers can change telecommunications network providers  and keep the same telephone number 
22 Customers can change address and keep the same number 
23 Customers can change types of service and keep the same number 
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independent regulator, there have been numerous questions raised about Icasa’s 
independence and ability to implement regulation.  These questions stem from the 
provision in the Act that give the Minister and Icasa joint jurisdiction over two key 
regulatory functions: the awarding of licences and the making of regulations.  The 
Minister awards the licence but Icasa is responsible for granting licences.  The minister is 
also responsible for final sign-off on all regulations.  As a result, discrepancies and 
differences in opinion have created licensing delays and the revocation of regulations by 
the Minister.   
 
The third mobile operator, Cell C, was licensed almost two years after the initial process 
began, after costly delays and lengthy legal battles.  The licensing process of the SNO 
was flawed from the outset.  The delays in issuing an invitation for applications, ill-
defined partners and a market wary of risky fixed investment resulted in a failure to 
attract credible bidders, despite initial interest from large operators.  In the first round, 
two poorly qualified groups made bids but neither was able to meet the bidding criteria 
and so both were rejected.  In the second round, after a period of stalemate and back-
room negotiating, the same two consortiums, somewhat better able to meet the criteria, 
once again made bids but once again neither qualified for large controlling stakes.  In the 
end, the Minister granted each consortium 13% and warehoused the remaining 25% until 
a strategic equity partner could be found.  The Tata Group, in the form of VSNL, 
emerged in 2005 as the strategic equity partner, but, the controlling stakes held by 
2Consortium and Communitel were reduced by half a percent each, which gave the Tata 
Group a controlling stake in the SNO.  After protracted negotiations between the parties, 
a shareholders agreement was finally signed in August 2005.  The licensing of both the 
third mobile and the SNO was marred by procedural flaws, leading to time-consuming 
and expensive court battles.  These brought to light many differences of opinion between 
the Minister and Icasa, and undermined South Africa’s credibility internationally. 
 
In terms of regulatory oversight, government’s dual responsibilities as a major 
shareholder in Telkom and as the overseer of sector development have suffered from this 
conflict of interest, to the detriment of the sector, resulting in ongoing regulatory 
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bottlenecks.  In 2002, Telkom filed a price-cap proposal at variance with the price cap 
proposed by Icasa.  This was referred to the Minister for approval but the delay in 
deciding on the Icasa proposal allowed Telkom to implement the new tariff.  The matter 
was challenged in court, but the Minister’s decision to settle for a slightly lower rate than 
that proposed by Telkom undermined Icasa’s independence.  Similarly, the Minister’s 
decision to withdraw the interconnection and facilities leasing guidelines only a month 
after they were issued was widely perceived as a result of pressure from Telkom.  More 
recently, this conflict of interest and constant questioning of the interpretation of current 
policy came to a head in the debacle about the Minister’s notice (Government Gazette 
No. 26763, 3 September 2004) to liberalise elements of the telecoms sector with effect 
from 1 February 2005, as follows: 
• Mobile operators and VANs may purchase leased lines from any operator including, 
but not limited to Telkom and the SNO; 
• Private telecoms operators can resell spare capacity and facilities;  
• Public payphone services are liberalised; 
• VANs may carry voice using any protocol; and 
• Public schools and education institutions are entitled to a 50% discount for Internet 
services. 
 
Icasa24 published its interpretation of the Minister’s announcement in late November 
2004, including that VANs licencees could self-provide, yet only a day before this was to 
come into effect, the Minister published a “clarification” explicitly stating that VANs 
would not be allowed to self-provide.  Although a “clarification” by the Minister has no 
force in law, because the Minister approves Icasa’s regulations, this means that its 
regulations cannot contradict the Minister. 
 
                                                
24 ICASA Media Release following the Minister's earlier announcement (22 November 2004), http://www.internet.org.za/icasa-
media-22112004.html 
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In a Gartner rating of telecoms regulators, Icasa was recognised as an independent, 
defined authority, though largely ineffective in managing the sector or stimulating 
competition within the sector. 
 
Figure 22 — Rating telecoms regulators 
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Source: Gartner in ITWeb, Brainstorm, September 2003 
 
In addition, Icasa suffers from a lack of skills at all levels of the organisation and is 
inadequately funded.  What is required is a clear separation of powers between the 
Ministry and Icasa, removing joint jurisdiction over the prescribing of regulations and the 
granting of licences for telecoms services.  Operators, especially Telkom, have exploited 
this situation by challenging Icasa decisions in court to delay any determinations by 
Icasa.  These tactics have hampered development of the industry.  By granting Icasa 
exclusive power to enforce rulings, even pending the outcome of court decisions, the risk 
of spurious lawsuits intended to frustrate liberalisation efforts would be removed.  
Investors want the regulator to deal expeditiously with the implementation of policy, 
regulations and industry disputes.  Precedent has shown that neither the Ministry nor the 
regulator are up to the challenge. 
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But Icasa’s problems are a combination of skills shortage, funding, and a weak 
administrative culture.  These institutions are fairly new and the politics of government 
heavily influence the outcome of any decision.   
7.4 Way forward — Attempts to reform the sector 
A new director general and deputy minister seem determined to rectify past mistakes and 
create a competitive environment through the introduction of a credible investor in the 
SNO, Tata, and the introduction of the Convergence Bill. (Government Gazette No. 
27294 of 16 February 2005)  Although not yet promulgated, this Bill and the new Icasa 
Act attempt to clarify issues of jurisdiction between the Minister and Icasa, but as they 
are not substantially different from the Amendment Act, they are unlikely to make much 
difference.  In addition, it is poorly drafted and leaves much room for interpretation, 
further taxing Icasa’s skills and resources.  All of these measures do not, however, go far 
enough to address the serious bottlenecks created by the policy and regulatory 
environment.   
7.5 Key Issues with the reform process in South Africa  
• Attempting to manage the onset of competition with widely varying philosophies.  A 
market-based philosophy combined with a socialist implementation regime; 
• Cherry-picking state assets and thus effectively excluding private-sector participation; 
• Duopoly policy and exclusivity is outdated and its success questionable;  
• Multiple, unstructured universal service obligations; 
• Lack of a clear, strategic framework and timeframes creates confusion and 
uncertainty; 
• Inadequate management of the dominant power of the incumbent operator and thus, 
unchecked anti-competitive behaviour for related services.  Containing monopoly 
power of the incumbent operator is vital in a newly liberalizing market; 
• Attempting to manage multiple processes of different state assets at the same time, 
creates confusion at all levels as well as the potential for competing objectives by 
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different government departments i.e., privatization of Telkom, liberalization of fixed 
sector and adding value to state assets; 
• Licensing technologies as opposed to services hinders market growth and is often 
quickly outdated and requires further legislation at great cost e.g. fixed-mobile; 
• Inconsistent application of regulation hinders market development and the onset of 
competition; 
• Allowing for regulatory independence and a firm commitment to market reform from 
government is vital.  A clear separation of powers between the executive and 
administrative arms of government is important. 
7.6 Conclusion 
The South African government has failed on a number of levels by its continued inability 
to provide a clear strategy and vision for the telecoms sector.  Despite a number of efforts 
through the formulation of an e-Strategy task team, the Presidential National Commission 
on Information Society and Development and Electronic Communications Act, these 
have failed to deliver a coherent strategy.  Further policy and regulation have failed to 
create an environment that can enable competition, lower prices, increase access, and 
introduce new technology, and enable South Africa to become globally competitive.  At 
the simplest level, the Telecoms Act fails to address the fundamental principles of good 
policy with which to attract private sector investment.  South Africa’s history of licensing 
delays and legal challenges has undermined the country’s ability to attract credible 
investors.  The South African telecoms sector is characterised by incumbent operators 
which enjoy entrenched rights, obligations and market positions that are proving to be 
hard to shift.  This has prevented the country and the sector from combining together to 
form a common vision and strategy to realize a knowledge economy.   
 
Managing telecoms sector reform is a complex and dynamic process, particularly for 
developing countries, as it is influenced by and in turn influences a number of elements.  
As a result, it requires careful balancing to meet the often conflicting interests of 
government objectives and private-sector investors, fulfil international commitments and 
continue monitoring a dynamic market sector.  South Africa’s reform process has been 
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characterised by delays, litigation and disputes.  These policy and regulatory problems 
are increasingly reflected in the development of the sector here.  As a result, South Africa 
has attracted little international investment in telecoms, effectively missing the telecoms 
boom of the late Nineties.  The conflicting nature of these issues underpins the 
competitive dynamics that drive the development of the South African telecoms market.  
Through the disputes, delays and litigation, this research has demonstrated that the 
institutional structures as identified by Levy and Spiller (1996) are lacking.  The real 
challenge is to develop and implement a regulatory framework that allows for the 
development of sustainable competition in the telecoms sector, lowers input costs, 
provides customer choice and develops new and innovative products to match market 
demand, in what can only be described as a sector currently in transition from a 
monopolistic fixed-line market.   
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8 Characteristics of the South African marketplace 
Introduction 
The development of the South African telecoms network market in the early 21st Century 
will be analysed within the following framework in order to evaluate how policy and 
regulatory interventions have shaped the 
competitive dynamics of the telecoms 
network market structure.  This chapter 
seeks to analyse whether the South 
African telecoms market structure enables 
the country to achieve its ICT ambitions, 
as outlined by the President and Nepad.   
8.1 South African economic overview 
Investment decisions are driven by a number of factors. Political stability, low crime, 
potential for growth and overall economic stability are significant factors that drive 
investment decisions.  South Africa has the largest economy on the African continent.  
“GDP generated by South Africa exceeds combined GDP of the other 13 SADC member 
states.” (BMI, 2002:19)  South Africa is often regarded as the leader on the continent and 
promises considerable economic potential with its natural resources, stable democracy 
and favourable position.  The South African economy is heavily reliant on agriculture and 
mining as its main export products, but is a complex mix of sophisticated secondary 
industries and fast-growing tertiary services.  The country’s infrastructure mirrors this 
complex mix, from first world developed infrastructure in some parts of the country to 
poverty-stricken informal urban settlements and rural subsistence lacking even the most 
basic infrastructure, like electricity and water.  Tertiary industries contribute over 60% to 
GDP, including ICT’s.  In an effort to stimulate the economy and create jobs, the 
government has embarked on an aggressive drive to grow GDP by 6% over the next few 
years.  A key factor constraining growth that drives the government’s growth strategy has 
been the impact of high input costs, most notably telecoms services.  As a result, it has 
embarked on a number of measures aimed at lowering input costs.  
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Table 11 — Contribution to GDP by sector  
Contribution to GDP by sector at current prices (%) 
Industry 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Primary 10.5 10.6 10.6 10.8 11.8 12.8 11.0 10.1 
Secondary 26.2 25.4 24.2 24.2 24.0 24.4 24.3 23.8 
Tertiary 63.3 64.0 65.2 64.9 64.2 62.8 64.8 66.1 
Communication 3.0 3.3 3.5 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.9 4.0 
GDP growth 2.6 0.5 2.4 4.2 2.7 3.6 2.8 3.7 
Source: Statistics SA 
8.2 The communications environment in South Africa 
In the information economy, economic growth and telecoms growth are integrally linked.  
To illustrate the growing importance of the telecoms sector, its contribution to GDP grew 
from 1.9% in 1999 to over 6% today.  Over a 10-year period, the revenue generated by 
the telecoms sector grew from R7 billion to R56 billion (Gillwald and Kane, 2003).  
These figures reflect the direct contribution of telecoms revenue from voice and data 
services.  They do not measure the significant downstream activities generated as a result 
of a world-class telecoms infrastructure with competitive prices, which adds to the 
overall attractiveness of South Africa as an investment destination.  Although South 
Africa is an attractive investment destination compared to other African countries, 
however, it has struggled to attract investment in telecoms because of delayed licensing 
processes, the uncertain regulatory environments and frequent court challenges.   
8.3 Market overview 
Because of the current regulatory regime, most players in the market lease infrastructure 
from the monopoly PSTS operator (Telkom), with the exceptions being Transtel and 
Eskom, which operate infrastructure for their own mission-critical private transport and 
electricity networks.  Telkom remains the incumbent fixed operator and held the 
monopoly on PSTS until May 2002 because of numerous licensing wrangles and 
legislative impediments; however, Telkom is still the de facto monopoly, with significant 
market power in critical elements of the telecoms value chain.  The three mobile 
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networks have developed some infrastructure of their own.  The two main players, MTN 
and Vodacom, provide approximately 90% coverage nationally.  The third operator, Cell 
C, is in the process of building its network.  The large Tier-1 VANs players all have 
significant VPNs and provide value-added network services to corporates.  In terms of 
international capacity, there are currently two submarine cables and three satellite earth 
stations.  Telkom owns the international gateway, with the SNO and Sentech currently 
licensed to provide services. 
 
Table 12 — Competitive status of the telecoms markets in South Africa 
COMPETITIVE STATUS OF THE TELECOMS MARKETS 
FIXED LINE 1996 2003 OPERATORS 
Local  Monopoly Duopoly 2 
National  Monopoly Duopoly 2 
International Monopoly 3 licences 3 
Pay Phones Monopoly Duopoly 1 
VANs Competition Competition 25 
ISPs Competition Competition 120+ 
    
WIRELESS OPERATORS   
Mobile Duopoly Competition 3 
Satellite  Competition Competition 4 
Radio paging Competition Competition 20+ 
Radio trunking Competition Competition 3 
Mobile data Duopoly Competition 5 
Source:  Adapted from BMI-T 
8.4 Market analysis 
The next section presents an overview of the South African telecoms market segmented 
into key network services:  fixed voice, fixed data and mobile.  The results of the research 
interviews and focus groups are incorporated at the end of this section.  The research 
results summarise the key issues in the market from the perspective of customers.  These 
have been structured in accordance with the second research sub-question – how has 
government’s commitment to managed liberalisation affected consumers of telecoms 
services and thus development of the information society? 
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8.4.1 Fixed line services — voice 
During the research period, it would seem as though Telkom has given up the battle for 
residential voice services to the mobile operators by choosing to concentrate on high-end 
residential customers and the more lucrative corporate sector.   
 
Telkom’s pre-paid services, launched to match the mobile offerings, has never been as 
popular, largely because of the high upfront and fixed costs.  Pre-paid denominations for 
fixed lines are much higher than for mobile.  In addition, Telkom’s public payphones, 
though cheaper than mobiles, have not been as popular.  Mobile operators have invested 
in containerised public phone shops, which are purchased by local entrepreneurs, who 
take over responsibility for these businesses and are accountable for their own profit or 
loss.  This market-based approach has ensured that entrepreneurs are actively involved to 
ensure they remained profitable.  Today, these containerised phone shops are highly 
sought after.  Telkom, on the other hand, viewed public payphones as an obligation, but 
embarked on a mass roll-out without any clear strategy.  So, despite being cheaper than 
mobiles, they are often vandalised, not in operation, in inappropriate areas and thus 
inefficiently utilised.   
 
When analysing the total fixed traffic in SA over the years, an interesting picture 
emerges.  Compound annual growth over a ten-year period (1.4%) illustrates marginal 
increases in traffic, alluding to the high cost of services in the sector.  Unlike most 
liberalised jurisdictions where fixed traffic has escalated, users have not significantly 
increased their usage patterns to take advantage of the new information-technology 
services.  Given the explosion in telecoms services internationally, South Africa’s 
marginal increase in traffic can be ascribed to Telkom’s monopoly pricing. 
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Figure 23 — Analysis of fixed traffic in South Africa 
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Source: ITU world telecommunications indicators database, 2005 
8.4.2 Fixed data services 
High speed customized fixed data services are primarily required by large businesses.  
This study has regarded business customers as particularly important because South 
Africa is trying to expand its services industry and become a business and trading hub for 
sub-Saharan Africa.  Access to high-quality voice and data communications services at 
competitive prices both inside and outside the country will therefore determine South 
Africa’s position as a leader on the continent.  Businesses in particular have become more 
and more reliant on network services because these create increased business efficiency 
and effectiveness by improving both internal and external communications and enhance 
customer service.   
 
VANs offering converged voice and data services form the foundation of new 
information economy services by providing enhanced functionality beyond the traditional 
circuit-switched voice services.  VANs services typically include data communication, IP 
voice, network management, private networks, internet services and security solutions.  
The VANs sector is totally reliant on the underlying telecoms infrastructure because these 
services run over the telecoms infrastructure.  The level of network unbundling and 
policy liberalisation therefore determines the level of VANs activity.  Historically, the 
VANs sector has developed and flourished as a result of technological and market 
developments.  Incumbent operators that focused on providing voice services were often 
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unable to conceive of new IP technology being able to offer specialised data services.  
VANs operators capitalised on this by providing specialized network management 
services for specific clients, mainly corporate.   
 
VANs sector development is primarily influenced by three factors: technological 
advancements, government policy and regulation, and the market structure of the VANs 
sector (Melody, Currie and Kane, 2003).  Internationally, the VANs sector is often 
completely liberalized, with key elements of the incumbent network being unbundled to 
allow for these competitive segments.   
 
“In many countries, VANs providers have been able to manage the communication 
capacity they lease from the incumbent telecom operator in any way they choose, in order 
to provide any form of communication service, including voice.  In other countries, the 
provision of all voice communication has been reserved to the incumbent operator for a 
period, and VANs have been restricted to the provision of data services and value-added 
network management functions.  In the most restrictive cases, a few countries, such as 
South Africa, have required that, in addition, VANs must lease their network facilities 
from the incumbent operator for a period.”  (Melody, Currie and Kane, 2003)   
 
In South Africa, VANs services developed in the early Nineties by harnessing the 
technological developments in telecoms and by addressing the lack of data services 
provided by Telkom which was slow to realise the importance and increasing customer 
demand for these services, so only started providing them much later.  As a result, a 
vibrant and innovative sector developed despite Telkom’s efforts to restrict VANs sector 
development.  VANs players typically service a large proportion of the corporate data 
requirements in South Africa.  The migration of managed and outsourced services such as 
virtual private networks, intranets and extranets to VANs operators is typical of more 
competitive markets but in South Africa only become common since the introduction of 
data services.   
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As a result of its entrepreneurial development without policy and regulatory hurdles, 
spurred on by technological innovation, competition within the VANs and ISP sector is 
fierce, with clear market stratification between business customers and consumers.  Most 
large corporates use VANs providers and ISPs for their data and internet services.  VANs 
operators and ISPs run managed services on their own virtual private networks, but, 
historically and legally, they are dependent on Telkom for their infrastructure.  Since 
becoming competitors with Telkom for data services, however, this has a range of 
competitive issues.  As analysed by Melody, Kane and Currie (2003), Telkom has 
frustrated the efforts of VANs players by interpreting the Telecoms Act as narrowly as 
possible so as to protect its monopoly rights and limit the growth of VANs operators.  
VANs operators, in turn, have tried to interpret the definition of services as widely as 
possible, to justify the business case and so be able to continue providing services. 
 
The lucrative corporate market for both voice and data services, which provides fixed 
annuity revenue, has focused Telkom’s attention on aggressively trying to secure a 
greater share of the market.  According to interviews, Telkom’s share of the data market 
has risen from 3-4% in the late Nineties to approximately 20-30% over a two- to three-
year period, which illustrates Telkom’s aggression in attacking this sector and also the 
inability of the regulator to curtail it.  Over the nine-year period from 1994 to 2002, the 
total number of VANs operators and ISPs in South Africa has grown from seven to 210, 
while the number of dial-up subscribers has grown from about 15,000 in 1994 to 
1,115,000 in 2002 (Goldstuck, 2002:21).  Although these numbers reflect the growth in 
the industry, they do not reflect the significant consolidation that has occurred over the 
same period.  “Since it controls most international bandwidth in South Africa, Telkom 
has the potential to drive massive growth of usage, and help boost an industry that has 
always been known for innovation and ingenuity, given limitations of operating in South 
Africa.  Instead, it has seen itself as being under attack from the ISP industry, and has 
waged a constant legal and strategic campaign against it.”  (Goldstuck, 2002:47)   
 
 
 
  158 
Table 13 — Large tier-one VANs players 
 Market Share Number of corporate customers 
Internet Solution 45% 4,000 
UUnet 23% 1,500 
Telkom* 20% 550,000 
MTN Network Solutions 4% 200 
Source: Market intelligence 
*Includes infrastructure customers, leased lines, etc. 
 
Telkom’s case against and attitude towards leading international operator, AT&T, 
illustrates Telkom’s tactics in the VANs market.  Telkom refused to grant AT&T new 
bandwidth because it deemed AT&T to be operating outside the regulatory boundaries, 
thus setting itself up as the enforcer of the regulatory framework.  The local general 
manager for AT&T at the time stated:  “Telkom is acting anti-competitively.  As a 
monopoly, it cannot also be a juror.  It withdrew our bandwidth without any 
investigation.  We’ve had to divert investments to the neighbouring states.”  Telkom’s 
pricing in the data market has long been an issue of contention.  To date, there are no 
wholesale prices or services, including for leased lines, with the exception of mobile 
operators.   
 
Despite a weak regulatory environment that has struggled to contain the power of the 
incumbent, the VANs sector in South Africa has survived because of the high demand for 
high-quality data services. 
 
While the mobile operators are currently the key providers of voice services for the 
majority of the population, growth of the Internet is likely to be severely hampered as a 
result of high fixed-call charges and affordable broadband consumer offerings.  The EIU 
notes that the future performance of South Africa’s communications industry will be 
“determined by telecommunications liberalization policies – or lack thereof – more than 
anything else.  Uptake of Internet services has been modest in South Africa at 7% of the 
population.  The high cost and inadequate coverage of high-speed connections, which can 
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be blamed partly on the lack of market competition, threaten to dampen the uptake of 
broadband.”  (EIU, April 2004) 
 
Recent statistics reveal that South Africa has regressed in terms of overall development.  
In 1996, South Africa was ranked 14th in the world in numbers of Internet users, but by 
2003 it had dropped to 28th.  The slow growth of Internet access in South Africa has been 
attributed to a “factor of delays in licensing a second network operator, Telkom’s own 
uncompromising attitude towards Internet service providers and market ignorance about 
the continued value of the Internet in the wake of the technology market crash of 2000 
and 2001.” (Goldstuck, 2002:5)   
8.4.3 Mobile services 
Two mobile licences were granted to separate operators in 1993 and a further operator 
was licensed in 2001, following a long court battle to challenge the licensing process.  
MTN and Vodacom were required to install 7,500 and 22,500 community service 
telephones respectively over a period of five years, in addition to paying ongoing license 
fees.  Both operators achieved this with ease and, in reality, provide significantly more 
commercial services in what were traditionally thought to be under-serviced areas.  As a 
result, new entrant Cell C was given the target of installing 52,000 community phones 
over a period of seven years, together with coverage obligations.  MTN and Vodacom 
were required to reach 60% of the population within two years and 70% within four 
years.  Cell C had an obligation of 60% population coverage on its own network within 
five years but has initially roamed on the Vodacom network.  Although the two 
incumbents remain exceptionally strong, the new entrant continues to struggle to gain a 
foothold.  The delays in licensing it as the third mobile seriously affected its ability to 
penetrate the market.  In addition, neither the policy framework nor its licencing terms 
have been friendly to a new operator.  Cell C was granted minimal 900 Mhz spectrum, 
whereas MTN and Vodacom utilise the bulk of the 900 Mhz and 1800 Mhz spectrum.  
Initially, the new operator was to be given 1800 Mhz but would be able to trade this 
spectrum for 900 Mhz, but numerous licensing delays led to both incumbents requiring 
more spectrum to operate their networks.  In the end, the regulator had to provide the 
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1800 Mhz spectrum.  Technology dependent licences dictate an expensive roll-out 
strategy.  In addition, competition-enabling legislation to enable access to infrastructure, 
the ability to roam and interconnect at favourable rates has not been implemented to aid 
the newest operator.  As a result, four years later, it continues to struggle to gain 
profitable subscribers and become financially viable. 
 
A relatively new player in the South African telecoms-operator landscape, the mobile 
market can be regarded as competitive and innovative.  The failure of fixed telecoms to 
deliver appropriate solutions to customers and the relative ease of getting a pre-paid 
mobile service without a large cash outlay or fixed place of residence have contributed to 
the success of mobile services.   
Table 14 — Market summary 
Operator Launched
Subscribers 
(March 2004)
Subscribers 
(March 2003)
Subscribers 
(March 2002)
Annual 
Growth
%  Prepaid 
(04)
Vodacom 1993 9,222,000         7,874,000 6,557,000         20% 85%
MTN 1994 7,296,000         4,723,000 3,877,000         22% 81%
Cell C 2001 2,555,000         1,250,000 300,000            317% 88%
Total 19,073,000    13,847,000 10,734,000 29%
Source: Yankee Group, 2003, Pyramid 2004 
Competitiveness within the mobile sector 
The Herfindahl-Hirshmann25 index measures the competitiveness of a market on a scale 
from 0 to 10,000.  A monopolistic market scores 10,000 and a perfectly competitive 
market 0.  According to this index, the South African mobile market compares 
favourably against some of its peer countries. 
 
 
                                                
25 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index or HHI, is a measure of the size of firms in relationship to the industry and an indicator of the amount of competition 
among them. It is defined as the sum of the squares of the market shares of each individual firm. As such, it can range from 0 to 1 moving from a very 
large amount of very small firms to a single monopolistic producer.  
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Table 15 — Mobile market competitiveness  
Market Number of carriers Herfindahl-Hirshchmann Index  
Mozambique 1 10,000 
Saudi Arabia 2 6,791 
Mexico 5 6,215 
Zambia 3 6,177 
Botswana 2 5,644 
Egypt 2 5,042 
Market Number of carriers Herfindahl-Hirshchmann Index 
Nigeria 4 4,855 
South Africa 3 4,106 
Spain 3 3,958 
France 3 3,907 
Italy 4 3,773 
Zimbabwe 3 3,404 
Poland 3 3,338 
Germany 4 3,322 
Chile 4 2,756 
United Kingdom 5 2,488 
Malaysia 5 2,482 
Source:  Finnie, Lewis, Lonergan, Mendler and Northfield, 2003 
Although this displays a degree of competitiveness within the South African market, 
there is still much room for improvement.  South Africa is the largest and most highly 
penetrated mobile market in Africa, with a current penetration rate approaching 70%.  
More developed markets in Europe have penetration rates around 80-90%.  Cell C’s rapid 
entry into the market gaining a market share of about 14% in two years, along with the 
potential growth still available, illustrates that the market could possibly bear another 
operator.  The entrance of Cell C spurred the two incumbents which were beginning to 
show signs of complacency towards lower prices or introducing additional new products 
(i.e. per second billing).   
 
Although the introduction of a third operator in 2001 has stimulated market competition, 
it was not enough to affect prices.  The lack of competition-enabling provisions plus 
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onerous obligations has prevented the third operator from competing effectively against 
the two incumbents.   
8.4.4 Results of interviews and focus groups  
How has policy and regulation affected consumers of telecoms services? 
Participants in the interviews and focus groups outlined that the key service areas for 
their businesses to run optimally were reliability, cost, availability and bandwidth.   
Reliability 
Responses from the focus groups and interviews illustrate that Telkom is unable to 
provide for sufficient reliability or redundancy in their network.  South African 
companies have traditionally also had no redundancy in their networks because they have 
had to rely solely on Telkom, yet, telecoms service providers must be able to ensure 
back-up and redundancy, as the “impact of network downtime is severe on the business”.  
One interviewee noted that when the business was offline, they lost R100,000 every half 
hour.  Currently, Telkom’s reliability, particularly in rural areas, is poor.  [Telkom] “does 
not tell us when they are going to do upgrades/changes.  This leaves hundreds of our 
people with no dial-up.”  Besides its inability to provide for redundancy in its network, 
Telkom’s response to line faults is particularly poor.  “When you have a problem with the 
lines, it’s a different story, then it just takes forever [because] the cables are zapped in 
Johannesburg.  We run a national network and the most frustrating thing is your lines get 
chopped.”  Mixed responses were given about Telkom’s ability to provide new lines.  
Larger corporates were able to acquire lines from Telkom quickly, while smaller 
businesses had to wait for service.  “We’ve been waiting seven months for a pair of wires 
between two branches, 500m from each other.” 
 
Respondents defined their ideal quality of service, “When you have a breakdown and the 
people come out quickly and repair it efficiently, if you have a query or request, you have 
a help desk that you can get through to and get a person that is able to answer the 
technical question and an organization that has got technically clued-up sales people that 
can come and say to you, here is the latest in fax technology, here is the latest in voice 
over IP, here is the latest in, etc.”   
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Service levels 
Network reliability goes hand in hand with service-level agreements.  Internationally, it is 
standard practice to offer service-level agreements (SLAs), which guarantee network 
uptime for a specified percentage of time, with punitive clauses for any network failure 
outside of the guaranteed uptime.  SLAs are particularly important for negotiating sales 
especially for corporate clients.  The interview and focus group research shows that 
Telkom does not offer this as a standard service and, where it does, it is punitively 
expensive and penalties are weak.  VANs, on the other hand, are prepared to negotiate 
aggressive SLAs for their portion of the network but do not include the Telkom network 
as it is out of their control.  “To go into the SLA agreement, we had to pay extra.  I felt it 
was unnecessary.  I didn’t see why, if we had an SLA, we had to pay.  We’ve already 
paid enough to go into that agreement as far as I was concerned.”  Telkom was also slow 
in delivering service: “[we] want three to seven day capacity upgrade service but Telkom 
offers one to two week minimum.”  “I went to the House and Garden Show and I put my 
name down and two weeks later I got a phone call and I said I’m interested in ISDN – 
‘Oh, we’ll get somebody to phone you’, and I’m still waiting.”  What both the interview 
data and the focus groups highlight is that SLAs, Telkom’s response time and customer 
service are all dependent on the size of the customer.  Customer size should not be a 
determinant in the quality of service received.  Any business customer requires good 
telecoms service to be able to operate efficiently.   
 
Telkom is slow to provide upgrade services with a one to two week minimum lead time, 
while corporates typically require three to seven days for capacity upgrades.  The lack of 
skilled human resources in project management also impedes service delivery.  Telkom’s 
lack of options, innovation and ability to respond to customer needs timeously all impact 
on the overall quality of its service.  One interviewee said that Telkom was stifling their 
ability to leverage telecoms with which to become a more efficient and productive 
business.  Telkom does not appear to have an understanding of what drives business 
strategy, especially for large businesses, and is thus unable to respond to customer 
requirements. 
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Cost 
The overall impression gained from the interviews and focus groups is that Telkom is 
expensive and provides poor service.  Telkom also tries to lock its major customers into 
long term contracts by offering more value regarding management of networks.  South 
African companies often concentrate on what they are able to afford for network/data 
services rather than what they need.  Scale and volume make little difference in 
negotiating better wholesale rates with Telkom.  Therefore, although costs do not 
decrease from aggregation of networks and services, consumers are offered a better 
quality of service.  The costs of relocation or changes on site are particularly high, with a 
long waiting period for service.  One interviewee, whose business is largely international, 
explained that about 30% of their total call costs are for international calls.  Interviewees 
welcomed the onset of competition because they believe it will allow for reduced prices 
and better service.  Interviewees also identified service as an important factor:  “What we 
need is quality.  Quality and continuity, because, bear in mind, with pricing, if you are a 
trading company, you can build the price into your cost, but you can’t build quality that 
you can’t provide.”   
 
Combined with Telkom’s high prices, interviewees expressed frustration with its billing.  
“When the line goes down for three weeks, you are still charged the rental for the 
month.”  Numerous interviewees have had problems with incorrect billing, being charged 
for services they have not received or services that have been discontinued, which is 
compounded by very little assistance to customers.  Telkom also often acts on incorrect 
billing information, so that clients’ lines get cut through non-payment.  Even if you were 
a reputable company with good credit rating, you end up – even getting Telkom give you 
a hard time through non payment.  This affects the credit rating of a business.  Most 
companies now do a monthly audit of Telkom’s bills to ensure that they are correct.  This 
additional process no doubt adds to the input cost of doing business. 
 
High prices were a resonating issue with interviewees.  As a result, corporates often 
purchase capacity because of affordability rather than their need.  Bandwidth is not the 
constraining factor in the provision of high-end services but rather the cost of these 
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services.  Telkom does not offer wholesale rates.  Flat pricing structures for data 
connectivity have been created to capitalise on its monopoly status.  As a result, 
bandwidth on both local and international connectivity in South Africa is over-
subscribed. 
VANs 
The largest single input cost for VANs is for Telkom services.  The VANs operators 
interviewed said that their ability to run their businesses was curtailed by Telkom’s 
pricing regime.  Telkom currently uses bundled pricing to be more competitive in the 
VANs market.  VANs operators are then unable to match Telkom’s prices.  “The 
predatory leased-line pricing undermines bulk buying, predatory frame-relay service 
pricing undermines VANs frame-relay pricing, and backbone provisioning suspension 
cripples VANs service quality.”  Most large VANs parent companies are large IT 
companies and, because Telkom is a large customer for equipment, it becomes aggressive 
with suppliers that purchase VANs services.  “VANs [sector] growth has been restrained 
to 20-30% from 100%.  Growth has levelled off unnaturally because of Telkom’s 
spoiling tactics.”   
 
Control over infrastructure is key for customers.  VANs must have the ability to 
guarantee network uptime and resolve any problems, should they arise, yet they are 
reliant on Telkom for backbone services.  Telkom also does not negotiate any meaningful 
back-to-back SLAs with VANs operators about network downtime, yet is prepared to 
negotiate SLAs with its clients putting VANs operators at a disadvantage and unable to 
compete by offering better quality services.  Over the two-year period during which these 
interviews were undertaken, there was a growing tendency to view Telkom more 
favourably.  Larger companies deliberately migrated to Telkom because it was prepared 
to negotiate SLAs, had some influence over the network and began to offer better prices.  
As a result of these improvements, some companies moved significant portions of their 
network management from Vans to Telkom, yet VANs operators do not enjoy the same 
level of service from Telkom.   
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This migration to managed and outsourced services, such as VPNs, intranets and 
extranets, is typical of more competitive markets.  As a result of the skewed introduction 
of competition in the services sector, some larger companies have outsourced these 
services.  In other instances, these were initially outsourced before being brought back in-
house — lack of control of infrastructure was cited as a key frustration.  These factors, 
along with an absence of policy and regulatory interventions, have resulted in many 
companies deciding to revert to in-house control or utilise the incumbent directly.  As a 
result, Telkom’s market share in data services has grown exponentially and it now 
occupies a dominant position.   
Mobile 
The escalating cost of calls to mobiles is a key issue of concern.  Several of the 
interviewees were not satisfied with the level of service from mobile providers, which 
were unable to offer tailored solutions for corporates.  Service differentiation between the 
incumbents was seen as important, as both “MTN and Vodacom offer the same services 
and prices”.  Key issues for mobile services were number portability and the lack of 
implementation.  Even when users were dissatisfied with their current provider, they were 
reluctant to change because of the number change this would require. 
 
Interviewees also described the impact of mobile telephony on their businesses.  One 
interviewee estimated that the use of mobile services had improved cash flow by 30 days.  
By sending out bulk SMSs on slow turnover days to advertise specials, “you are getting 
people buying on the last trading days as opposed to a new month and it just changed our 
whole cash flow of our business.” 
Impact on business 
The poor state of telecoms services has a severe impact on the way South African 
companies are forced to do business by comparison to their international counterparts.  
“We have been working for pretty much the last twelve months on an online ordering 
system throughout the world, and we launched with our UK division about a month and a 
half ago.  For South Africa and Africa, we are having to take a totally different approach.  
We’ve had to develop an offline system so that orders can be captured offline, verified 
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offline and then connect at a later stage when you want to capture all your orders, connect 
to the web, download your orders and get verification online, and then disconnect, 
because of the costs and the unreliability of the infrastructure in Africa.  Europe is not a 
problem; it’s going very well — cheap and reliable.  In Africa we’ve had to do it at a 
huge cost [and as a result] we’ve had to create two different solutions [to match the two 
different environments] — Europe is cheap and reliable and here it’s expensive and very 
unreliable.” 
 
Interviewees understood the benefits of competition.  One interviewee described his 
experiences in Spain at the time competition was introduced.  “I’m from Spain so I can 
explain much better what happened there, three years ago, and the same thing that is 
going to happen here happened there.  The change in service changed dramatically 
towards better service – we had a national provider like Telkom, it’s called Telefonica 
which was horrible, absolutely horrible.  And then two new contenders came into line and 
the amount of investment they did in services, maintenance in customer satisfaction was 
astonishing.  Not only did they keep the market share but increased it.  The new operator 
started – one of them competed on our service level, providing very good services and the 
other one went on a price-effective, cost-effective solution, very cheap access and they 
were quite good.” 
Regulatory environment 
Interviewees believed that Icasa was a weak regulator which was often unable to impose 
restrictions on Telkom.  They said that, if Telkom was to be challenged, there were three 
routes to take: (a) anti-competitive via the Competition Commission; (b) legal via the 
courts; or (c) regulatory via Icasa because Telkom makes such technical submissions to 
the Competition Commission or in court, cases had to be referred to Icasa, which, 
because of lack of capacity, was unable to deal with these queries speedily, thus crippling 
businesses.  In addition, SBC26 had expertise in pursuing regulatory avenues.  
Interviewees believed that competitors had to develop more market power with which to 
challenge the incumbent rather than go through the courts.  VANs operators in particular 
                                                
26 Telkom’s major shareholder 
  168 
said that South Africa’s over-loaded regulatory system, together with the lack of 
understanding about telecoms issues, was unlikely to lead to much improvement in the 
regulator for the next five to 10 years at least.  Even with additional financial backing, 
because of practical problems such as accumulated backlog and lack of capacity, it was 
unlikely that Icasa’s ability to regulate the sector would improve.  Government had to 
recognise the key role of the regulator. 
 
To test uptake of new services and product innovation from these new licence rights for 
fixed operators, focus groups were held throughout the country.  Most customers could 
not see any differentiation between the fixed-mobile product and the current fixed or 
mobile products on offer.  Ultimately, customers required a telecoms service regardless 
of technology.  Increasingly, users were prepared to switch primarily to decrease costs if 
the new fixed-mobile services were cheaper than the currently available fixed or mobile 
solutions, even if the mobile services offered less functionality or quality of service.  
Users were prepared to endure minor inconveniences in service (like dropped calls) for 
the cheaper rate.  Concerns raised as barriers to service uptake by potential customers 
included cost, quality of service and number portability.   
 
A number of South African companies are key players on the African continent, 
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa.  They suggested that regional pricing and incentives 
for connections should be examined, as there was no regional pricing currently.  The 
Southern African development community (SADC) should push for regional pricing 
together with enhancing regional regulatory issues. 
8.4.5 Competitive dynamics — overall comments on customer perspectives  
Customers were frustrated by Telkom’s lack of service level agreements, its inability to 
deliver on time, its lack of flexibility or adaptability about new products, and its lack of 
responsiveness to network failure.  The absence of new and innovative products and 
services were also recognised as hindrances to business, e.g. broadband, mobile data, and 
converged voice and data services.  Customers were keen to see these services offered to 
enable them to achieve business efficiency.   
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Over the two-year period of this study, it was noted that the anticipation of competition 
has had a significant impact on Telkom’s customer service.  Table 16 shows that 
although there has been a marked improvement in Telkom’s service, when benchmarked 
internationally, its faults per line do not compare well.  By the second round of 
interviews, this improvement in Telkom’s customer service was evident, particularly 
among large corporate clients.  Telkom had also launched an aggressive pricing strategy 
to ensure that VANs could not compete with it for data services. 
Table 16 — Faults per 100 main lines 
Faults per 100 main lines 
  Brazil Korea UK US Botswana Morocco Turkey Namibia SA India 
1992 3 12 16 19 38 84 64 78   218 
1993 3 11 15 18 39 67 66     220 
1994 3 17 15 16 35 63 61   80 215 
1995 3 18 4 15 33 49 60   90 196 
1996 4 15 4 13 23 55 61 76 72 206 
1997 4 2 4 14 37 46 58   67 209 
1998 5 2 4 14   37 56   49 203 
1999 3 1 4 14   32 56   52 186 
2000 3 2 5 14   25 55   52 166 
2001 3 1 4 13     48 52 53 150 
2002 4 1 11 12   25 37 42 48 126 
2003 2 1   13   25 30 40     
Average 3 7 8 15 34 46 55 58 63 190 
Source: ITU, world telecommunications database, 2005 
Interviewees expressed dissatisfaction with telecom operators as they were not seen to 
offer customised solutions.  Currently, voice services are typically separate from data 
services, but interviewees wanted converged voice and data services as a way to 
centralise costs.  Although technically able to offer such services, VANs operators 
prohibited by policy from offering them, even though Telkom does not, because of the 
impact this would have in other areas of its product portfolio.  
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The competitive dynamic between VANs operators and Telkom in this market is typical 
of an entrenched incumbent that seeks to stifle the ability of other upstream players to 
compete for services.  The VANs sector is therefore unable to compete with Telkom in a 
number of areas – price, service, network availability.   
Opportunities for new operators 
Deregulation and the emergence of competitive carriers for fixed services in liberalising 
markets result in intense competition, initially in the corporate sector but eventually 
across all market segments.  Competition for market share allows operators to reduce 
tariffs and by using enhanced public networking technology, to offer increasingly 
sophisticated network services.  The speed of migration of consumers is dependent on 
their level of sophistication as well as the ability of the incumbent to provide quality 
telecoms services at competitive prices.  In markets in which the incumbent is competent 
and entrenched, it is very difficult for new, unproven entrants to penetrate.  South Africa 
displays a mixture of both, with a sophisticated, entrenched incumbent and a consumer 
base that is ready for new, advanced services at competitive prices.   
 
Most of the corporates interviewed for this study acknowledged that, while they 
welcomed the prospect of competition, they were unlikely to move to a new operator 
immediately.  In addition, a single new operator was unlikely to provide any real 
difference in pricing, because even if new operators created an efficient, flexible and 
scalable network, they would still have to rely on Telkom’s network, particularly in the 
initial network roll-out period.  The extensive Telkom infrastructure could not be 
duplicated by newer operators, and operators would always have to rely on Telkom for 
access to the more remote areas of the country.  It would be a waste of the country’s 
economic resources to duplicate the incumbent’s infrastructure.  The challenges for new 
entrants are significant in the face of regulatory and market pressures.  Internationally, 
second network operators have only been able to gain a market share of between 5% and 
16%, even after several years in operation.  Because of these factors, it is fairly difficult 
to attract investment into liberalising markets for second and subsequent network 
operators, especially fixed networks.  
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In an environment where the incumbent operator is heavily entrenched, it is difficult for 
new operators to penetrate the market.  Even though high prices and service inefficiency 
suggest there is room for improvement by introducing competition, new users are often 
reluctant to change to a new operator until it has proven itself.  But, because the cash 
outlay for new operators in telecoms is large, market entry must be invited through a 
favourable policy and regulatory environment that encourages open networks and 
competition. 
8.4.6 Connectivity 
Figure 24 — Fixed and mobile connectivity in South Africa 
Connectivity in South Africa
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Source: ITU telecommunications indicators database, 2005 
The number of fixed lines in operation and the number of households with a fixed phone 
peaked in 1998/1999, when Telkom rapidly rolled out services in order to meet its 
exclusivity targets prior to the introduction of competition.  If Telkom was unable to meet 
its targets, stringent conditions were to be imposed.  If the conditions were met, it would 
receive an extension of its exclusivity period.  As a result, every effort was made to 
provide services. 
 
Mobile services, on the other hand, have enjoyed phenomenal growth.  Two of the largest 
network operators now cover 95.1% of the population and continue to build base stations 
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in areas that show demand for services.  The third operator is still rolling out 
infrastructure and is required to have approximately 60% of the population covered.  In 
terms of mobile infrastructure, the country currently has the choice of three infrastructure 
providers.   
Although Telkom met its target of installing 2,8 million lines, however, over two million 
of these are no longer operational because most people cannot afford them.  Like the 
community service telephones, these lines required more than just roll-out, they required 
subsidised rates.  When compared against its peers, South Africa compares favourably in 
terms of main lines per 100 inhabitants.   
Table 17 — Main lines per 100 inhabitants 
Country 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Ave 
Uganda 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 
Nigeria 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.5 
India 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.9 2.2 2.7 3.2 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.1 2.2 
Sri Lanka 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.5 1.9 2.9 3.7 4.2 4.4 4.7 4.9 5.1 2.6 
Morocco 2.6 3.2 3.9 4.2 4.4 4.7 5.0 5.3 5.0 4.1 3.8 4.0 4.4 3.9 
Botswana 2.7 3.1 3.5 4.1 4.8 5.6 6.5 7.7 8.3 8.5 8.3 7.5 7.6 5.5 
Egypt 3.7 4.0 4.3 4.7 5.1 5.7 6.5 7.5 8.6 10.4 11.5 12.7 13.5 7.0 
SA 9.3 9.5 9.8 10.1 10.6 11.3 12.0 12.8 11.0 11.7 10.4 10.1 10.1 10.7 
Brazil 7.3 7.5 8.0 8.5 9.6 10.7 12.1 14.9 18.2 21.8 22.3 22.2 23.5 13.3 
Malaysia 11.1 12.5 14.6 16.6 17.8 19.5 20.2 20.3 19.9 19.7 19.0 18.2 17.9 16.4 
Spain 35.4 36.5 37.5 38.5 39.2 40.3 41.4 41.0 42.6 43.4 42.9 41.6 43.2 39.3 
Singapore 36.2 37.6 38.9 40.5 42.6 44.4 45.3 47.5 48.4 47.1 46.4 45.2 43.2 42.2 
Korea  35.6 37.8 39.8 41.7 43.7 45.3 44.2 56.1 56.2 54.4 54.0 53.8 54.2 45.4 
Netherlands 48.7 50.0 51.1 52.4 54.2 56.6 59.2 60.6 61.9 50.7 49.6 48.2 48.4 52.4 
UK 45.7 47.0 48.6 50.2 52.2 54.0 55.4 57.2 58.9 59.4 59.1 59.5 56.7 52.8 
Germany 43.7 45.5 47.6 51.3 53.8 55.1 56.7 58.7 61.1 63.5 65.0 65.9 66.1 54.8 
US 56.2 57.4 58.8 60.0 61.8 63.8 65.2 67.9 68.4 67.2 65.8 62.9 59.9 61.7 
Canada 58.9 59.9 59.3 59.8 60.5 62.2 63.8 64.9 66.1 66.8 64.5 63.2 0.0 61.7 
Denmark 58.2 59.0 60.0 61.1 61.9 63.3 66.0 68.5 72.0 72.2 68.9 66.9 64.7 63.8 
Source: ITU World Telecommunications Indicators Database, 2005 
Nevertheless, a detailed analysis of the line numbers in the country reveals a different 
picture.  South Africa remains one of the few middle-income countries with a declining 
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demand for lines but without a corresponding increase in broadband services or an almost 
equal mix of business and residential lines.   
8.4.7 Telecoms sector investment and revenue 
Telecoms sector investment is cyclical because most capital expenditure is upfront, with 
very little expenditure after the initial investment.  Thus, to draw conclusions based on 
investment over a few years does not allow one to determine sector activity.  To 
understand activity in this sector, an analysis of revenue per capita and investment per 
capita has been done.  When compared to its peers, South Africa performs quite well, 
earning revenue per capita in line with its more advanced economy, and infrastructure. 
Table 18 — Telecoms revenue per capita (US$) 
Telecommunications revenue per capita US$ 
  India Morocco Namibia Turkey Botswana Brazil SA Korea UK US 
1992 $2.88 $22.07 $42.71 $51.13 $51.05 $36.36 $67.12 $151.88 $455.13 $578.23 
1993 $3.11 $19.20 $46.37 $53.88 $48.74 $45.93 $67.67 $166.32 $412.15 $601.81 
1994 $3.77 $21.09 $40.56 $50.25 $48.37 $46.84 $86.03 $185.95 $435.52 $631.74 
1995 $4.45 $24.77 $47.05 $33.51 $49.46 $60.12 $109.68 $238.43 $471.69 $656.36 
1996 $4.96 $25.60 $47.91 $52.65 $46.97 $80.11 $119.99 $313.73 $485.69 $705.29 
1997 $5.75 $24.83 $49.20 $68.00 $54.08 $93.97 $144.32 $300.84 $660.23 $847.87 
1998 $6.43 $27.92 $56.02 $79.62 $58.34 $120.28 $145.65 $222.34 $754.85 $893.20 
1999 $6.53 $31.14 $65.10 $74.66 $74.82 $102.45 $149.40 $348.65 $853.88 $962.25 
2000 $7.04 $40.71 $68.29 $82.28 $112.78 $130.85 $156.35 $451.01 $1,107.86 $1,040.30 
2001 $7.44 $46.12 $65.26 $75.82 $105.03 $118.89 $139.07 $434.26 $1,097.66 $1,058.60 
2002 $7.64 $52.27 $64.17 $109.58 $106.27   $128.17 $484.44 $1,232.67 $1,015.16 
2003   $65.26 $102.06 $141.19 $133.49   $192.32 $510.63   $1,000.65 
Average $5.45 $33.42 $57.89 $72.71 $74.12 $83.58 $125.48 $317.37 $724.30 $832.62 
CAGR 19% 16% 16% 14% 15% 21% 15% 15% 14% 8% 
Source: ITU World Telecoms Indicators Database, 2005 
South Africa’s GDP per capita is far larger than its Sub-Saharan neighbours, however, 
total telecoms revenue as a percentage of GDP is similar to its neighbours.   
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Figure 25 — South African telecoms indicators against Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Source: World Bank, 2004 
But for investment per capita, South Africa does not compare as favourably.  Given its 
infrastructure shortages and low teledensities compared to developed countries, South 
Africa should be spending much more if it is to catapult its economy into the information 
society.  Current levels of investment will maintain current infrastructure, and perhaps 
allow for marginal growth, but are unlikely to change the infrastructure dynamics or grow 
South Africa’s ICT industries to any significant degree. 
Table 19 — Telecoms investment per capita (US$) 
Telecommunications investment per capita US$ 
  India Turkey Morocco Namibia Botswana SA Brazil Korea US UK 
1992 $2.02 $16.21 $10.09 $4.76 $55.60 $13.60 $21.30 $70.00 $85.07 $83.89 
1993 $2.04 $20.99 $7.43 $5.45 $39.96 $19.31 $21.64 $72.22 $90.46 $69.31 
1994 $2.37 $10.62 $10.32 $12.86 $26.82 $25.52 $24.34 $82.00 $87.21 $84.47 
1995 $2.73 $7.23 $11.74 $27.87 $12.21 $28.64 $28.20 $98.07 $88.52 $122.63 
1996 $2.53 $6.91 $7.28 $25.79 $13.82 $27.67 $42.86 $130.26 $83.15 $160.83 
1997 $2.49 $8.74 $5.20 $29.43 $24.08 $43.43 $43.35 $179.44 $84.98 $212.47 
1998 $2.33 $9.51 $4.75 $29.03 $26.25 $72.13 $63.91 $98.64 $183.32 $211.05 
1999 $2.92 $8.93 $8.52 $12.07 $29.60 $45.24 $39.47 $154.03 $213.49 $244.83 
2000 $3.47 $9.62 $20.65 $20.24 $15.70 $39.91 $52.13 $168.89 $263.68 $278.13 
2001 $3.42 $5.27 $25.18 $12.85 $14.78 $31.28 $37.98 $134.59 $252.46 $265.37 
2002   $2.85 $21.73 $4.80 $7.19 $15.67 $29.94 $193.72 $120.91 $227.34 
2003   $3.25 $9.23 $9.00 $10.81 $18.79   $167.88 $92.28   
Average $2.70 $9.07 $12.28 $18.04 $21.04 $34.88 $38.38 $131.19 $146.82 $187.64 
CAGR 10% -12% 1% 12% -4% 4% 10% 10% 3% 12% 
Source: ITU World Telecoms Indicators Database, 2005 
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Table 20 — Annual telecommunication investment 
Annual telecommunication investment 
 Botswana Morocco US UK Korea SA India Namibia Turkey Brazil 
1993 -16.5% -18.1% 7.7% -2.5% 6.7% 66.0% 21.1% 34.6% 110.8% 1920.8% 
1994 -23.7% 37.5% -2.5% 20.0% 14.3% 46.9% 22.1% 163.2% 38.9% 2170.1% 
1995 -51.9% 7.8% 3.5% 41.4% 15.4% 17.1% 20.6% 127.1% 7.2% 68.8% 
1996 39.0% -35.4% -5.0% 33.0% 39.4% 17.1% 2.4% 12.6% 72.7% 69.1% 
1997 96.0% -21.0% 3.4% 26.3% 63.9% 71.9% 2.7% 25.5% 135.1% 9.3% 
1998 29.2% -7.2% 118.3% -1.4% -18.5% 103.6% 9.3% 21.4% 89.8% 64.6% 
1999 26.7% 84.0% 17.8% 19.6% 33.3% -29.2% 32.6% -52.9% 52.9% -2.4% 
2000 -40.3% 170.9% 24.6% 21.5% 5.0% 1.7% 25.9% 95.5% 63.1% 35.0% 
2001 10.3% 31.7% -3.0% 0.3% -6.3% -0.8% 5.0% -19.1% 12.8% -4.9% 
 Botswana Morocco US UK Korea SA India Namibia Turkey Brazil 
2002 -46.0% -14.5% -51.6% -18.2% 40.3% -37.5%  -53.1% -32.5% -1.3% 
2003 20.3% -62.5% -22.9%  -17.1% -12.2%  38.1% 15.5%  
Average 3.9% 15.7% 8.2% 14.0% 16.0% 22.2% 15.8% 35.7% 51.5% 432.9% 
CAGR -5.23% 1.92% 2.15% 14.05% 14.86% 16.46% 17.36% 20.88% 48.74% 142.61% 
Source: ITU World Telecommunications Indicators Database, 2005 
Growth in annual telecoms investment has decreased as a result of the failure of the 
government to introduce more competition into the sector.  Telkom’s investment in 
infrastructure has slowed since it completed the bulk of its mandatory infrastructure 
targets.  Its pricing policies largely match current market demand so there are no real 
incentives, in the form of additional competitors, for it to invest in additional 
infrastructure. 
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Table 21 — Revenue/main line in operation (US$) 
Revenue/main line in operation (US$) 
  Namibia Brazil Botswana SA Morocco India Korea UK US Turkey 
1992 $1,000.02  $418.47  $1,848.37  $659.06  $667.98  $351.68  $339.00  $541.45  $798.12  $279.13  
1993 $1,008.63  $535.95  $1,501.83  $654.45  $583.51  $336.76  $336.97  $514.41  $807.81  $260.08  
1994  $494.13  $1,313.41  $751.56  $453.75  $334.97  $367.25  $514.33  $1,101.35  $195.23  
1995  $542.13  $1,157.69  $853.30  $475.03  $327.45  $374.21  $552.75  $1,127.40  $132.79  
1996  $630.14  $850.55  $810.35  $465.01  $294.87  $365.99  $532.32  $1,177.56  $177.34  
1997 $667.85  $639.38  $853.93  $847.01  $418.47  $283.48  $286.85  $583.02  $1,138.80  $206.61  
1998 $776.41  $632.48  $765.80  $687.85  $471.67  $241.27  $185.98  $616.56  $1,167.64  $227.46  
1999 $889.51  $405.10  $846.80  $608.50  $482.60  $193.89  $279.71  $601.34  $1,160.99  $203.67  
2000 $853.23  $398.97  $745.48  $652.25  $571.28  $169.05  $288.72  $533.32  $1,198.68  $252.22  
2001 $756.06  $317.54  $569.90  $551.33  $732.45  $147.00  $248.71  $475.51  $1,184.75  $205.06  
2002 $700.39   $515.90  $473.87  $785.20  $148.12  $252.48  $504.67  $1,113.15  $254.84  
2003 $1,018.75   $724.38  $682.39  $821.52   $246.91  $530.79  $1,124.68  $334.49  
Source: ITU World Indicators Database, 2005 
South Africa’s revenue per main line does, however, illustrate higher levels of pricing 
than in most developed markets. 
8.4.8 Price 
Numerous studies have been done of telecoms pricing in South Africa, including an 
inquiry into pricing by the Department of Communications.  The next paragraph 
summarises key findings about pricing from various research. 
Yankee Group 
An international consulting company, the Yankee Group, was commissioned by the 
Department of Communications to conduct a market review in 2003.  The Yankee Group 
report is very comprehensive and deals with telecom trends, convergence, the South 
African market and regulatory environment.  Anti-competitive behaviour in the market, 
particularly from Telkom, in the Vans industry and the lack of wholesale service pricing 
were seen as constraints to growth.  The report links the low levels of Internet penetration 
in South Africa to the high cost of connectivity and suggests that Telkom has structured 
the pricing of its DSL product so that it does not threaten existing products like ISDN.  
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The report also suggests there is a need to enforce anti-competitive conduct rules in the 
wholesale market and to apply existing legislation more stringently.  
Nus Consulting 
In March 2004, international consulting firm, Nus Consulting released a report about cost 
conditions in the 14 countries in which they operate.  This study found that South Africa 
had the second most expensive local calls, and most expensive national and international 
calls but because the study sample included mainly developed countries this could have 
skewed the research. 
Efficient Research  
Efficient Research made a study of Telkom’s charge structure and a comparative analysis 
of its financial statements in 2004 and found that Telkom’s price structure was very high 
against a sample of about 30 developed and developing countries. (2004) 
SA Foundation 
Following a challenge from the President in 2004 to South African business leaders to 
help identify major business opportunities for the country, the SA Foundation 
commissioned a report from McKinsey and Company into business process outsourcing 
and off-shoring.  The study found that although there were major opportunities for this in 
South Africa, the exorbitant cost of telecoms was a serious inhibiting factor.  As a result, 
the South Africa Foundation commissioned a study into telecoms prices in South Africa 
from Genesis Analytics.  The study sample included an international peer group of 15 
countries (including South Africa) with similar GDP per capita, income levels and gini-
coefficient, and a “best-practice” comparison group.  A range of products were tested and 
South Africa was frequently one of the most expensive within the selected comparison 
group.  Of the 15 countries sampled, South Africa was the most expensive for broadband 
services, for both business and retail products.   
 
For international leased lines, South Africa was 31 times more expensive than the 
cheapest country.  In terms of retail voice, both fixed and mobile calls, South African 
costs were still on the high side.  The study also found that Telkom’s pricing structure 
  178 
had a negative impact on the VANs and call-centre industries, in particular, and has also 
affected the roll-out of the Internet and pricing of telecoms products in downstream 
markets, especially international bandwidth.  The study concluded that Telkom’s pricing 
structure was excessive and suggested market intervention at the regulatory level, 
especially between Telkom and VANs. (Genesis Analytics, 2005) 
Andisa Securities 
Andisa Securities is a brokering firm that specialises in investing and providing 
investment advice.  Its report was an attempt to provide guidance to the financial 
community about potential legislative changes following on the Department of 
Communications pricing enquiry.  The report made a comprehensive analysis of mobile 
pricing, taking into consideration handheld subsidies, connection incentives, and 
community phone obligations.  It concluded that South African mobile prices are in line 
with international prices.   
 
All the studies analysed pricing as a single input on its own.  This research argues that 
high prices are symptomatic of a more fundamental problem in the underlying market 
structure which drives high prices and subsequently the unaffordability of telecoms.  This 
study also shows that the introduction of a single competitor to Telkom will not 
significantly affect prices, as illustrated by the mobile industry.  Only multiple 
competitors would have the power to take control of the marketplace, not individual 
firms. (Carrot, 2005) 
Fixed voice pricing 
As illustrated in the table below, the SA Foundation survey revealed that telecoms pricing 
in South Africa is excessive.   
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Table 22 — Overview of telecoms service prices in South Africa 
Product Rank Countries surveyed
No of times more 
expensive than 
cheapest price
%  higher than the 
average price
Business ADSL 1 15 9.3 148%
Domestic leased lines 1 12 14.7 102%
International leased lines 1 11 31.4 399%
Retail ADSL 1 15 8 139%
ISP fees 4 13 5.1 45%
Business — local calls 1 15 10.7 * 199%
Business — international calls 5 15 3.3 -14%
Business — mobile calls 2 15 22.7 107%
Retail — local calls 4 14 7.9 * 79%
Retail — mobile calls 5 15 10.7 37%
Source: SA Foundation, 2005 
High monthly rentals, the high cost of local calls and the widespread availability of 
mobile prepaid at attractive prices have all contributed to the number of disconnections.  
Voice revenues remain a key revenue stream for Telkom and the operator is unlikely to 
jeopardise these revenues unnecessarily.   
Figure 26 — Fixed connection charges 
Year
Cost of a local 3-
minute call 
(peak rate)
Residential 
monthly 
subscription
Residential 
connection 
charge
Business 
telephone 
monthly 
subscription
Business 
telephone 
connection 
charge
1992 0.19 29.85 195.00 29.85 195
1993 0.22 34.20 222.81 34.20 222.81
1994 0.23 38.76 241.68 38.76 241.68
1995 0.22 42.52 265.62 44.23 265.62
1996 0.24 45.60 292.98 49.59 292.98
1997 0.31 49.59 171.00 55.86 171
1998 0.39 55.54 192.38 64.24 192.38
1999 0.46 55.58 207.77 72.62 207.77
2000 0.63 62.70 207.77 83.30 207.77
2001 0.63 62.70 207.77 83.30 207.77
2002 0.99 67.72 239.00 89.97 239
2003 1.11 76.20 268.98 101.23 268.98001
CAGR 19.39% 9.82% 3.27% 12.99% 3.27%
CAGR (00-03) 20.87% 6.72% 8.99% 6.71% 8.99%  
Source: ITU, World Telecoms Indicators Database, 2005 
Despite almost 10 years of privatisation and liberalisation, fixed connection charges have 
not decreased in real terms.  In fact, rates have climbed almost to 1995 peaks.  A look at 
the tariff increases in South Africa provides another interesting perspective on the 
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dominance of Telkom.  Over a 10-year period, peak rate local tariffs have seen a 
compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 5%, where these tariffs have been decreasing 
in most other countries. 
Mobile pricing 
The introduction of the third operator in 2003 has significantly affected the connection 
charges and monthly subscriptions of the mobile operators.  It spearheaded the 
introduction of innovative services aimed primarily at the lower economic segment of the 
population.  But, given the investment required by a third operator in an entrenched 
market, along with limited competition-enabling legislation and delays in licensing, the 
new operator has not been aggressive in its pricing policy but has merely tracked the two 
incumbents.   
 
Table 23 — Mobile connection charges 
Mobile costs — connection fee and subscription (US$) 
  India SA Botswana Namibia Korea US Morocco UK Turkey Brazil 
1992         46.12 123.58 0.00 155.59 516.56   
1993         44.85 97.51 193.57 132.32 232.14   
1994         44.81 110.41 195.59 134.88 344.49 343.17 
1995   62.87   96.50 46.68 105.20 193.21 139.01 267.20 389.77 
1996   55.68   81.41 114.36 47.70 114.73 137.50 190.41 355.04 
1997   54.51   75.96 92.51 42.78 83.97 144.28 165.77 331.17 
1998   47.94 52.06 63.31 62.79 39.43 83.30 145.95 5.75 314.21 
1999 27.87 43.37 47.62 57.28 74.02 41.24 38.78 142.15 33.43 13.81 
2000 36.09 38.90 43.14 50.43 58.36 45.27 25.40 90.91 3.42 13.66 
2001 29.71 31.36 37.67 41.23 50.35 47.37 23.89 76.09 2.94 12.54 
2002 13.37 22.01 34.76 8.06 51.95 48.40 24.50 78.36   10.89 
2003 13.95 19.71 44.44 11.24 53.71 49.91 26.12     7.65 
Average 24.20 41.82 43.28 53.94 61.71 66.57 83.59 125.18 176.21 179.19 
Source: ITU, World Telecoms Indicators Database, 2005 
Analysis by Carrot of mobile pricing in the South African market revealed that the most 
expensive segment of the South African market is of the high-end contract customers, 
with tariffs 51% above Eastern Europe (2005:1).  While South African prepaid and 
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contract tariffs appear to be 21% to 23% more expensive than emerging market averages, 
there are two factors unique to the South African market which must be taken into 
consideration:  subscriber acquisition costs (essentially handset subsidies) and 
community phone obligations.  Currently, users get a free phone with new contracts and 
the value of the phone is amortised over the period of the contract.  The network 
operators essentially carry the upfront costs of these phones.   
Data services pricing 
International telecoms union (ITU) surveys have indicated that affordability remains a 
key limiting factor for the further development of the Internet and the communications 
sector in South Africa.  “Using the cost of Internet access as a percentage of monthly per 
capita gross national income (GNI) as an indicator, South African consumers (15.4%) are 
paying the equivalent of 5 times more than Malaysians (2.9%) and 15 times more than 
Koreans (1.2%) and Australians (1.1%).”  (ITU, 2003)   When compared to other 
countries, like Japan and Korea, that have specifically targeted mass-market broadband 
services, South Africa’s prices are extraordinarily expensive.  Thus, the high cost of 
services impedes development of the Internet and its related services:  e-commerce, 
online advertising and content.  It is unlikely that Telkom will aggressively sell 
broadband services in the near future or cannibalise its attractive narrowband revenue 
through dial-up call charges. 
 
The analysis by internet.org.za below is a stark illustration of the actual costs of ISP 
services in South Africa.  The study analysed the cost of spending 20 hours online per 
month for the period 1993-2003.  Average costs were based on information provided by 
members of the Internet Organisation of South Africa and readers of its mailing list.  The 
Telkom costs are peak local call charges and comprise line rental plus the call costs. 
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Figure 27 — Actual cost of Internet access over a ten-year period 
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Figure 28 — Analysis of Internet costs in South Africa 
52 54
62 65 68
73 75 77 78
84 85
48 46
38 35 32
27 25 23 22
16 15
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
ISP share (%)
Telkom share (%)
 
Source: internet.org.za 
Telkom announced the total tariff increase for a basket of services for 2002 at 12% 
explaining that this increase was inflationary.  Its tariff increase for 2003 clearly 
illustrated its strategy in the data market.  Internet Solutions calculated the full impact of 
this increase, and revealed that its impact on data services was in fact higher.   
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Telkom’s minimum fee for the first 89 seconds was 0,49 cents and users were thereafter charged at a rate of 
0,549 cents per second.  Previously, users were charged 0,58 cents for the first 189 seconds and 0.307 cents 
per second thereafter.  “According to a sample of 150 000 connections by both unique and repeat users, 
connecting through various virtual Internet service providers on Internet Solutions’ network, the average 
time per connection is 22 minutes.  A small office/home office user may log onto the Internet every 
working day, or 20 times a month, thus incurring a charge of approximately R7,25 per connection or R145 
month.  Using the same analysis, previously users would have been charged approximately R87,24 per 
month – thus an increase of 67%.  (Bidoli, 2001) 
 
South Africa is one of the few countries that has not introduced flat-rate Internet pricing.  
As a result, Telkom receive significant revenues from consumer dial-up services.  The 
table below provides a comparison of South African bandwidth costs against more 
competitive markets.  South Africa is by far the most expensive. 
 
Table 24 — Comparative international bandwidth costs 
Route Circuit Miles Cost p/month Cost per mile Cost per Mb 
Joburg - Cape Town E1 (2Mbps) 773 $9,340 $12.08 $4670 
LA - Miami T1 (1.5Mbps) 2348 $2,000 $0.85 $1333 
Joburg - Cape Town E3 (34Mbps) 773 $111,842 $144.68 $3289 
London - Glasgow E3 (34 Mbps) 409 $10,138 $24.75 $3289 
London - New York T3 (45 Mbps) 3470 $8000 $2.30 $178 
Currency in US$ per month, excluding installation costs and SLA. 
Source:  Finnie, Lewis, Lonergan, Mendler and Northfield, 2003:82 
Interconnect  
A key driver of overall market pricing is the rate of interconnect.  At present, all calls 
need to be routed through the Telkom network, even if made from a mobile phone to 
another mobile phone.  Even though technically these calls could bypass the Telkom 
network and thus alleviate the interconnect costs effectively decreasing the cost of the 
call.  Artificial regulatory boundaries have increased the call costs.  These inputs affect 
retail call costs.  South African fixed interconnect rates are R0.24 against a European 
average of R0.11.  The figure below illustrates Telkom’s high fixed-line termination 
costs. 
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Figure 29 — South African landline termination rates 
South African Landline termination rates
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Mobile termination is largely in line with international pricing. When benchmarked 
against a range of countries, both developed and developing, South African mobile 
termination rates compare favourably. 
Figure 30 — South African mobile termination rates 
South African mobile termination rates
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At present, interconnect is negotiated between the operators.  It is governed by the Icasa 
interconnection guidelines, which stipulate non-discriminatory treatment for all 
interconnection seekers, with maximum charges to be no higher than the equivalent retail 
service.  To finalise these agreements without regulatory intervention requires co-
operation between all parties.  Given the high concentration of market power with the 
operators, there is significant risk of collusion between the players.  Effective price 
regulation is necessary to prevent manipulation of prices through the interconnect rate.  
Internationally, call termination is now regarded as a monopoly and is thus regulated on a 
cost basis. (Carrot, 2005)   
8.4.9 Innovation — New technologies, new services, new regulations  
Broadband services for consumers are almost non-existent.  Telkom launched its DSL 
services late in 2003, with no wholesale offering.  As a result, VANs and ISPs are unable 
to compete with Telkom.  Broadband services are also priced to prevent competition with 
the existing dial-up services.   
 
Conversely, the mobile industry has had to innovate in order to meet the unique demands 
that characterise the South African marketplace, and to keep pace with competitors.  
Some of these innovations are believed to be either developed in or unique to South 
Africa.  The introduction of pre-paid services changed the face of the South African 
mobile market.  Subscriber uptake was unanticipated.  Users who were previously unable 
to get bank accounts, fixed-line phones, etc because they had no credit listing, fixed 
address or salary slips could now get access to a mobile phone service.  Thus, any user 
who could afford a service was able to purchase a mobile service.  For the average South 
African user this now enabled them to leave contact details for a job, advertise to start a 
company, etc.  Further, this changed the mobile business for operators.  Other 
innovations include, mobile phones which are able to allow real-time access to traffic 
updates through mms traffic “cameras”, transfer of airtime from post-paid to pre-paid 
customers and to make financial transactions through the banking network, top up 
airtime, even do full-service banking.  In addition, these innovations have allowed the 
export of services to other African operations.   
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8.5 Conclusion 
The research revealed that market development has been constrained when analysed 
against internationally accepted competitive indicators: connectivity, investment, prices, 
customer services and investment.  High prices for fixed services have resulted in limited 
consumer uptake, and almost non-existent broadband services.  Mobile was able to 
address the gap left by Telkom through innovative packaging and pricing models, but this 
does not solve the fundamental issue of basic access and broadband services.  When 
benchmarked against a range of countries, Telkom’s pricing strategies clearly illustrate its 
significant market power and abuse of its monopoly position.  The interview and focus 
group data showed that current infrastructure providers have been unable to deliver 
efficient, cost-effective services to consumers.  Service levels and network reliability 
varies widely.  The research data emphasized the market impact resulting from the lack 
of a competitive environment.  The differences between fixed-line services and mobile 
services can be attributed to the levels of competition between the two services.  Further, 
the lack of competition at the core infrastructure level has constrained growth and 
innovation at the upper levels of the value-chain that are dependent on access to the fixed 
line network.  While South Africa compares with its peers in terms of key benchmark 
indicators, it has not attracted the levels of investment required to catapult the South 
African economy into the services industry.  Further, activity in the services sector is 
constrained as a result of high prices, poor service and a lack of products to service 
information sector requirements.  While mobile provided competition in voice services, 
data services has seriously lagged.  The introduction of mobile virtual network operators 
will give much-needed impetus to the South African market, lower prices and increase 
consumer choice.  South African consumers have borne the brunt of the government’s 
managed-liberalisation policy.  Its failure to introduce competition has had a significant 
impact on the ability of small, medium and large businesses to grow.   
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9 Company dynamics 
Introduction 
A range of international, large, fixed and mobile operators was selected against which to 
benchmark the financial and operational performance of South African operators.  This 
section seeks to answer research sub-question three — how has government’s managed 
liberalisation policy affected firm performance and behaviour?   
 
Recent developments in industrial organisation theory have stressed the importance of 
strategic behaviour by companies.  It is difficult to argue that the level of market 
concentration is directly related to a company’s profitability because the relation between 
market structure and performance is dependent on the precise nature of strategic 
interactions between companies (Young, 2000:28).  Sutton (in Wirth and Bloch, 1995:24) 
argued that “strategic behaviour is most effective in preventing entry and thereby 
affecting market structure when entry involves substantial commitments to cost that 
cannot easily be recovered on exit (sunk costs).”  The telecoms industry is a good 
example of this.  Strategic company behaviour affects market structure so that it can no 
longer be assumed to be just externally determined but is also influenced by company 
behaviour.  As the variables of market structure, particularly in the telecoms industry, can 
be manipulated or changed through policy intervention to improve company conduct and 
in turn, market performance, there is significant room for influencing policy or company 
behaviour.   
 
Drawing from the literature review of selected country experiences with market 
liberalisation, operator performance in these markets was analysed.  Because of the 
unavailability of historic data and differences in financial reporting, comparisons and 
trends are, however, difficult to analyse, but do provide for a high-level overview.  While 
every effort has been made to include developing-country operators to allow for a fair 
comparison, financial information for them is not readily available.  Where data is 
available, it lacks detail or does not allow for historical comparisons.  The data for the 
performance of developed-country operators, on the other hand, is useful as a benchmark 
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for the performance of South African firms.  Detailed spreadsheets of the analysis on 
individual companies are provided in Appendix four. 
9.1 Financial performance — fixed line services 
Table 25 — Telkom Group five year financial review (includes mobile stake) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 CAGR 
Operating revenue 27,015 31,243 34,087 37,507 40,795 10,9 
Operating profit 3,908 4,984 4,191 6,514 9,088 23,5 
Earnings per share 274 291 219 293 812 31.2 
Cashflow from operations 4,917 6,165 8,171 9,748 13,884 29,6 
EBITDA margin (%) 29,9 33,0 29,5 43,7 40.0 7,5 
Capex to revenue (%) 35.0 31.7 26.4 15.2 13.0 (21.9) 
Return on assets 10.0 10.2 6.6 10.5 17.8 15.5 
(in R millions except %)  
Source:  Telkom (www.telkom.co.za) 
Telkom has performed strongly by capitalising on its monopoly status and government’s 
inability to manage or regulate the sector.  A key indicator of telecoms operator 
performance is EBITDA27.  At 40%, Telkom’s EBITDA margin is above most fixed-line 
operators in liberalised countries.  Internationally, mobile operator EBITDA margins in 
liberalised markets are generally higher than fixed.  Over the four-year period, revenues 
have increased and profitability has been impressive (23%).  Profitability has been driven 
by improved operating efficiencies and maintaining above inflationary increases in 
prices.  Improved operational efficiency has been a key focus for the strategic equity 
partner but, given Telkom’s large inefficiencies, there is still room for improvement.   
 
The tables below provide comparative financial and operational data for a range of 
international fixed and mobile operators similar to the incumbent operators in South 
Africa.   
 
                                                
27 EBITDA - earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, amortisation 
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Telkom outperforms its international counterparts in more developed markets on a 
number of performance indicators.  A comparison with British Telecom’s total number of 
lines and revenue per line over a five-year period illustrates Telkom’s superior financial 
performance. 
 
Figure 31 — Fixed access lines Telkom versus British Telecom 
Fixed access lines - Telkom vs BT
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Source: Annual reports  
Even in a market with high fixed-line penetration, British Telecom has had to increase its 
fixed access lines and broadband products in an effort to meet market demand and remain 
competitive.  Telkom, however, has not had similar impetus in the form of additional 
competitors to increase its capital expenditure and thus increase its lines, even though 
South Africa only has 10% fixed-line penetration. 
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Figure 32 — Revenue per fixed access line Telkom versus British Telecom 
Revenue per fixed access line
-
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
T
e
lk
o
m
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
/l
in
e
-
200.0
400.0
600.0
800.0
1,000.0
1,200.0
B
T
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
/l
in
e
Telkom
BT
 
Source: Annual reports 
Telkom’s revenue per line has increased dramatically as a result of more operational 
efficiency and higher revenues.  This increase in revenue is particularly evident in the 
period after Telkom’s exclusivity ended but before a competitor was licensed between 
2002-2004. 
 
Figure 33 — International comparison of key operational data 
Entity Country Service Period  Customers 
(000) 
Fixed Lines per 
Employee - 
CAGR
Revenue per 
Employee - 
CAGR
BTC Botswana Fixed 2001-2004 131.8                  16.7% 16.3%
Telecom Namibia Limited Namibia Fixed 2002-2004 7.6%
Telkom SA SA Fixed 2000-2005 4,726.0               8.2% 12.5%
British Telecom UK Fixed 1999-2005 30,567.0             
AT&T/SBC US Fixed 1999-2004
Operational Data
Source: Annual reports 
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Figure 34 — International comparison of fixed and mobile operators 
Entity Country Service Period Revenue - 
CAGR
EBITDA - 
CAGR
EBITDA 
Margins  - 
CAGR
Operating 
Profit 
Margins  - 
CAGR
France telecom France Fixed & Mobile 1999-2004 9.6% 11.3% 1.6% 5.7%
Deutsche Telekom Group Germany Fixed & Mobile 1999-2004 8.5% 7.4% 1.2%
Telkom Group Pan African Fixed & Mobile 2000-2004 8.6% 15.1% 6.0% 9.0%
Telefonica S.A Spain Fixed & Mobile 1999-2004 4.7% 3.3% (1.4%)
Financial Data
Source: Annual reports  
Compared against both fixed and mobile operators, Telkom Group’s EBITDA and profit 
margins surpass its counterparts. 
9.2 Financial performance — mobile services 
Fixed operators’ low service levels, its lack of penetration into all regions, the high 
market demand for services and high prices were some of the factors that stimulated the 
massive uptake of mobile services and enabled the superior returns that mobile operators 
have been able to enjoy.  Company performance has matched the huge market demand.  
This enabled mobile operators to earn good profits over a short period of time. 
 
Table 26 — Mobile operators financial review: South Africa  
 Cell C MTN  Vodacom 
 2003 2004 2000 2004 2000 2004 
Operating revenue 2463.07 4029.58 12298 15098 18544 21981 
Operating Profit (Loss) (1599.12) (621.38) 2336 2339 4476 5466 
Operating Profit (Loss) 
margin 
(64.92%) (15.52%) 18.99 15.49 24.87 24.14 
(Figures quoted in R millions except %);  
Source: Icasa 
MTN, a South African company formed in 1994, now has a market capitalisation of some 
US$15 billion.  Because of an aggressive expansion strategy, it now operates in 11 
countries.  Given the huge demand for services in the South African market, mobile 
operators were able to exceed their business-plan expectations very early in the 
investment.   
  192 
 
Figure 35 — MTN mobile subscribers against initial business plan 
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Conservative estimates based on industry knowledge indicate that a large proportion of 
Vodacom’s revenues and profitability are from within South Africa.  For both Vodacom 
and MTN, the success and profitability of their South African operations have enabled 
both to become strong regional players.  Both launched aggressive expansion strategies 
into Africa and the Middle East which offered high-growth areas.  As a result, their 
efforts have attracted significant investor attention. 
 
Figure 36 — International comparison of mobile operators 
Entity Country Service Period Revenue - 
CAGR
EBITDA - 
CAGR
EBITDA 
margins  - 
CAGR
Operating 
profit 
margins  - 
CAGR
MTN Group Pan African Mobile 1999-2004 29.4% 36.8% 5.7% 0.0%
Celtel Pan African Mobile 1999-2003 87.2% (257.2%) (183.9%) 0.0%
Orascom Pan African Mobile 2002-2004 45.4% 61.1% 10.8% 0.6%
MTN SA South Africa Mobile 1999-2004 22.9% 25.2% 1.9% 0.0%
Turkcell Turkey Mobile 1999-2004 14.0% 12.9% (0.9%) (9.1%)
Vodafone UK Mobile 1999-2003 55.3% 59.8% 2.9% 0.0%
Vodacom South Africa Mobile 2000-2004 18.2% 16.8% (1.1%) 0.0%
Financial Data
Source: Annual reports 
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When benchmarking a more competitive sector like mobile, South African operators are 
in line with international firms and, in most instances, could do better, which is indicative 
of a more competitive market. 
Figure 37 — International comparison of mobile operators’ operational data 
Entity Country Service Period  Customers 
(000) 
 ARPU - 
CAGR 
Revenue per 
Employee - 
CAGR
MTN Group Pan African Mobile 1999-2004 9,543.0            (11.0%) 3.0%
Celtel Pan African Mobile 1999-2003 1,700.0            (13.5%) 42.8%
Orascom Pan African Mobile 2002-2004 14,499.8          
MTN SA South Africa Mobile 1999-2004 8,000.0            (9.8%) 4.9%
Turkcell Turkey Mobile 1999-2004 23,400.0          (14.8%) 9.4%
Vodafone UK Mobile 1999-2003 119,709.0        -                
Vodacom SA Mobile 1999-2004 -                   (7.8%) 19.4%
Operational Data
Source: Annual reports 
Both mobile operators in South Africa are in line with international comparisons when 
benchmarked over a five-year period for key operational data. 
 
Internationally, regulators in most developing markets have been slow to introduce 
competition in mobile once the initial two or three licences were granted.  Entrenched 
incumbent operators have often convinced regulators and policymakers that a third or 
fourth operator would be unviable.  Research shows that considerable opportunity still 
exists to gain new subscribers and make profits, and that even small markets are able to 
absorb more competition.  When penetration increases rapidly, with new operators 
competing for market share, the focus shifts to improving customer service and lowering 
prices.   
 
The financial analysis below indicates that third entrants have been profitable and have 
also spurred further market penetration by targeting low-end subscribers using lower 
prices and better deals.  This in turn, impels the rest of the industry towards with greater 
efficiency, while at the same time maintaining service levels, prices and continuous 
network investment.   
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Table 27 — Financial analysis of third entrant mobile operators 
Entity Country ARPU 
ARPU @ 3rd 
Operator launch 
EBITDA 
margin 
Market EBITDA 
Margin 
Partner Israel $37  $61  31% 32% 
Amena Spain $33  $43  30.60% 41% 
Aria Turkey $6  $20  Negative 38.50% 
Globul Bulgaria $13  $32  10.20% 50% 
Bouygues France $37  $65  26% 41% 
Cosmote Greece $28  $55  41% 35% 
Cell C SA $22 $27.5 6.8% 33% 
Source: Pyramid 2005, researcher estimates 
9.3 Conclusion  
This analysis across both fixed and mobile has illustrated that South African operators are 
able to perform either in line with or above international averages in terms of key 
financial indicators.  The absence or lack of competition in both fixed and mobile has 
allowed incumbents to extract value from the South African market.  Although this 
allowed investors and shareholders to recoup investments quite quickly, as the market 
analysis demonstrates, this has been to the detriment of consumers and the overall 
development of the ICT sector.  The South African government’s managed liberalisation 
policy has allowed Telkom to make super-profits and abuse its monopoly power, 
entrenched its status and hampered the attainment of South Africa’s ICT goals.  The 
introduction of competition in both fixed and mobile highlighted that it spurred operator 
performance, increased penetration and market efficiencies.  Further, the introduction of 
additional operators did not devalue the overall market revenues as more subscribers 
were added to the network.  However, a lack of competition highlighted limited 
investment in an effort to maintain profits. 
 
  195 
10 Conclusion 
The purpose of this research was to analyse the changing configuration and structure of 
the South African telecoms network market during the transition from monopoly to 
competition within the framework of competition rules to determine how government’s 
managed-liberalisation policy has shaped the competitive dynamics of the South African 
market.   
 
This chapter will draw together the analysis of the preceding chapters, based on the 
literature review, the international case studies, the policy and regulatory analysis and 
how these affect market structure.   
 
The British experience shows that limiting reform by allowing a single entrant does not 
stimulate market competition, nor create rapid network roll-out.  The strategy of gradual 
implementation of reform in developed countries was adopted amid different social and 
market dynamics: the cost of network deployment was higher and customer demand 
differed, among other factors.  New technologies led to changes in cost structures, and 
shifted market dynamics.  The trends from developed countries demonstrate how 
incumbent operators continue to dominate the market for many years after liberalisation.  
British Telecom remains the largest player in the UK’s telecoms sector, many years after 
liberalisation.  British Telecom’s market shares have declined, though it still has 
monopoly power over local loops and basic phone services.  There is probably more 
competition in the UK than any other country.  All of this was achieved by the aggressive 
stance taken by the regulator towards British Telecom in introducing competition and 
strong institutional structures which assisted in creating an increasingly competitive, 
deregulated telecoms market.  Reform models based on developed country experiences, 
like the UK and the USA, while useful for gaining insight into market development, are 
inappropriate for direct implementation in developing markets.  Further, network 
investment, customer choice and lower tariffs are some of the key issues driving market 
reform.   
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The example of developing countries shows the necessity of making telecoms policy 
decisions part of an overall macro-economic strategy for outlining clear objectives at the 
outset and developing a path for reform.  The research also shows that, although these 
strategies work at the start of reform, new technologies, market developments and the rise 
of increasingly powerful new mobile players, these decisions must be re-examined often 
in the transitional phases of market liberalisation.  Driven by rapidly changing 
technology, developed markets have continued to reassess the level of competition and 
make necessary policy and regulatory amendments as appropriate.   
 
The entrance of multiple competitors during the stages of reform into various sectors of 
the telecoms value-chain allows for the development of rapid competition.  This in turn 
forces competition on the incumbent operator, especially, if it is unable to compete in a 
liberalised environment.  In the cases of Nigeria and India, competition lowered prices 
and enabled technological and service innovation, creating customer choice.  In both 
countries, market development at the peripheries, in what are regarded as non-threatening 
technologies like CDMA and fixed-wireless, drove competition for telecoms services and 
thus forced policy liberalisation.  Creating the rules of entry and operating early in 
operator licences prior to licensing, as in the case of Uganda, clarifies the investment 
environment.   
 
The international benchmarking analysis has demonstrated that attracting infrastructure 
investment and enabling competition in telecoms is a complex issue.  The key lessons 
from both developed and developing countries are outlined below: 
Developed country experience 
• Reliance on underlying administrative structures to regulate the industry; 
• Strong administrative structures, independent judiciary; 
• Well-developed, highly resourced policy and regulatory capability; 
• Developed market system that allows for technology and innovation to force reform; 
• High consumer activism and mechanisms for consumer activism; 
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• Duopoly policies are unlikely to significantly stimulate competition or massive 
infrastructure investment; 
• Even in highly developed market systems, the power of the incumbent can be 
significant; 
• Privatisation and increased competition have increased overall industry revenues, 
sector contribution to GDP and increased consumer benefits; 
• Liberalising the licensing regime will allow market forces to enable convergence of 
services and thus stimulate competition and innovation; 
• Complicated implementation regimes can hamper progress and allow incumbents 
time to ward of competition. 
Developing country experience 
• Government reluctance to follow through on sector vision, particularly jeopardising 
revenues from incumbent fixed operators; 
• Often structural components of reform have been broadly followed according to 
international best practice, however, there have been problems in implementation; 
• Weak, under-resourced regulators, combined with weak administrative traditions 
have difficulty in implementing policy, particularly anti-competitive behaviour; 
• Increasing convergence of services have pushed unified licensing regimes; 
• The success of mobile technology as a result of allowing competition to develop; 
• Privatisation, before liberalisation, often results in stronger incumbents; 
• Competition can be accelerated through licensing a number of operators; 
• High license fees is often unlikely to result in increased spending by newly licensed 
operators; 
• Clear separation of powers between government departments, regulators and 
operators assist in enabling a competitive market, particularly in countries lacking a 
strong administrative tradition; 
• Technological and market changes sometimes demand new approaches to policy and 
regulation; 
• A flexible regulatory framework is required to allow for new technologies eg wi-max, 
wi-fi, cdma; 
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• Reform is most successful when backed by overall macro-economic reform, 
including a more liberal tax regime, lower customs and excise duties, etc. 
 
A key research objective was to examine the extent to which the managed liberalisation 
process demonstrates the South African government’s commitment to the creation of 
effective competition in telecoms services, driven by private sector investment.  
 
South Africa made a number of fundamental errors in its approach to market 
liberalisation.  The reform model focused on privatisation rather than on market 
liberalisation.  The short-term goal was to optimise revenues from the sale of state assets, 
but this was at the expense of longer term sector development.  Without clearly defined 
objectives at the beginning, the process became a morass of political manoeuvring to 
please diverse stakeholders during South Africa’s transition to democracy.  The 
government’s muddled state philosophy of managed-liberalisation reflects conflicting 
objectives, sending mixed signals to the investment community and creating confusion 
around the implementation of policy.  From the start, managed-liberalisation was not 
conceived.  None of the literature on the telecoms reform process has alluded to a concept 
of managed liberalisation.  It became current around the time of the introduction of the 
SNO, and appears to be a delaying tactic to retain government control of the market.  
Complex policy choices like managed liberalisation will always be problematic if they 
are not backed by a strong democratic tradition with a strong institutional history, neither 
of which are South Africa’s strengths.  Policy and regulatory enforcement of sometimes 
unpalatable solutions requires a strong administrative tradition with the “ability to 
undertake commitment that can endure any political interference backed by an 
independent judiciary that is able to make enforceable decisions.” (Malik, 2004:27)  
South Africa’s political, administrative and judicial powers have not yet developed this 
independence from interference and these conflicts of interests and interference have 
manifested themselves in various forms in the South African environment.   
 
Policy development process should determine priorities, identify the constraints and then 
devise a market structure to achieve these priorities.  In South Africa, both the Telecoms 
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Amendment policy and the Convergence Legislation have short-circuited this debate.  
They focus directly on the intended market structure, without building consensus on the 
key priorities and constraints. At its simplest level, the Telecoms Act fails to address the 
fundamental principles of good policy that will attract private sector investment because 
it cherry-picks state assets and favours these to the exclusion of the private sector.  
Government’s shareholding in the incumbent and the sector as a whole holds the 
potential for abuse and favouritism in the regulatory environment.  Government is 
currently the largest single stakeholder in the sector, through its varied shareholdings in 
telecoms.  It is the largest shareholder in Telkom, controls almost a third of the SNO 
through its ownership of Transtel and Esitel, and has a 100% stake in Sentech.  “There is 
no example of [state] ownership in telecoms that has not proved to be more trouble that 
it’s worth.  Government’s shareholding in SA telecom providers have complicated every 
move it has made to liberalise the market.” (Financial Mail, South Africa, 2005)   
 
The failure to implement the Act’s key provisions has not created competition to enable 
price decreases, innovation or service quality with which to meet the needs of corporate 
business and SMEs.  As a result, potential investors remain uncertain about government’s 
expectations and plans for the sector.   
 
The proposed Convergence Bill attempts to rectify errors in the Amendment Act and 
introduce competition among existing market players, but these measures do not go far 
enough to address the serious bottlenecks created by the current policy and regulatory 
environment.  Serious process, conceptual and drafting flaws render the Bill problematic 
at best and meaningless at worst.  The Bill sets no liberalisation plan or timescale match 
the Act’s objectives.  The Convergence policy is simply an amalgamation of the 
objectives for broadcasting and telecoms and makes no attempt to converge these sectors.  
It is unlikely that the final framework will be coherent or consistent with other parts of 
government policy.   
 
The literature review highlighted a number of areas where the emerging policy and 
regulatory framework is incongruent with international best practice or the expectations 
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of potential private investors.  Both the Amendment Act and the proposed Electronic 
Communications Bill lack an overall defining vision that would form the framework 
within which the appropriate policy could be informed.  In the absence of an overarching 
framework, simply debate the pros and cons of each area of regulation in isolation, 
creating a policy framework that is incoherent and inconsistent with other areas of 
government policy.  The poor execution of policy processes, indecision, frequent changes 
and failure to adhere to timeframes, has also undermined the stability of the policy 
framework. 
 
It is also doubtful whether government is truly committed to effective competition, given 
the dominant role of state entities in the transition to full liberalisation.  Although 
government’s rhetoric is in line with market reform, its actions contradict this. 
 
Technological changes and market realities demand a rethinking of initial policy choices.  
Mobile operators have developed widespread networks and increased subscribers since 
licensing, while fixed subscribers have declined.  Fixed telecoms services are undergoing 
a fundamental shift because the majority of the population cannot afford them.  
Corporates are increasingly demanding faster speeds, better services and increased 
choice.  Technological changes are enabling convergence of voice and data networks to 
enable cheaper, faster and better access to services.  Given these changes in the market 
environment, South Africa should have reassessed its policy priorities at the start of the 
Amendment Act process to determine the progress against objectives set at the inception, 
understand the new environment and delineate new objectives, targets and policy based 
on the new competitive dynamics instead of viewing this phase simply as a continuation 
of the original liberalisation process.  This process would have informed the debate on 
the optimal market structure while also clearly signalling government’s intentions to 
investors.   
 
The analysis illustrates that South Africa’s policy and regulatory problems are due to a 
failure to define the vision and objectives of the sector and create a policy framework to 
support this.  The current framework is the result of a haphazard process cobbled together 
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from many adhoc initiatives.  The South African government undoubtedly faces a 
difficult task in determining the optimal path to liberalisation of the hybrid South African 
market.  Government has to balance the requirements of enabling infrastructure 
investment in previously under-serviced areas, while also creating a market structure that 
encourages innovation and competition in the provision of advanced communications 
services. This would improve the competitiveness of the business sector and provide 
affordable services for consumers, and thus fuel economic growth.  The presence of 
powerful incumbent operators in both fixed and mobile, the level of investment required 
and the operational risks of doing business in Africa make it difficult to achieve all of 
these objectives immediately.  With careful planning, clearly defined objectives, and 
continuous market assessment, however, these objectives could be met in the medium to 
long term.   
 
Another research objective was to evaluate how government’s commitment to managed 
liberalisation has affected consumers of telecoms services and thus development of the 
information society. 
 
The South African policy and regulatory environment has struggled to facilitate 
competition or develop a market structure that enables competition.  It can be argued that 
the telecoms market has developed despite an enabling environment rather than because 
of it.  Market realities, customer sophistication and market demand have gone ahead of 
the current policy and regulatory framework, and have driven telecoms service 
development.   
Fixed Line 
The research has illustrated that a policy and regulatory vacuum, ineffective competition 
and inadequate regulatory oversight have allowed Telkom to entrench its monopoly 
position.  This has led to high prices, abuse of its monopoly status through cross-
subsidisation, and bullying tactics.  The regulatory system has been unable to cope with 
this powerful privatised incumbent.  Any challenges to its status have been dragged out in 
court, which most small operators cannot afford, or operators have been bullied into 
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settling by the threat of suspension of services.  Overall revenue growth in the industry 
has been driven by massive market demand, but masks the lack of market competition 
and has led to high prices for services.  Failure to introduce a competitor to Telkom early 
has hampered the development of the market, particularly broadband services. 
Fixed data 
The key inhibiting factor in the data services market is that Telkom is currently the only 
service provider of key inputs for VANs services like leased lines and bandwidth, and is 
also a competitor to VANs operators.  Entry into the data services market is not difficult 
because VANs licences are easily obtained from the regulator.  There are currently more 
than 200 VANs operators.  Ineffective regulatory policing of Telkom’s monopoly power 
has led to anti-competitive behaviour, as previously outlined.  Telkom has also passed on 
its high input costs to clients, further hindering development of the data services sector.  
Telkom inputs for leased lines and international bandwidth account for some 70% of the 
total costs of VANs operators.  (Gillwald and Kane, 2003)  ISPs also do not have direct 
access to their clients but are reliant on Telkom for the last mile.  The absence of a 
wholesale price strategy allows Telkom to control the input costs of data services.  The 
Vans sector itself is fairly competitive and is often regarded as a leader on the continent.  
So, although VANs operators do give Telkom some competition in the data services 
market, especially for higher value-added services to corporate clients they are unable to 
challenge Telkom’s power, in particular for broadband services.  It is unlikely that 
broadband services will be widely adopted in South Africa until Telkom is compelled to 
provide wholesale pricing, unbundle the local loop and is monitored for cross-
subsidisation, predatory pricing and anti-competitive behaviour. 
Mobile 
In the absence of fixed line competition, particularly on the consumer side, mobile 
services have capitalised on an unprecedented increase in subscribers and profits.  Mobile 
operators have rapidly become the de facto providers of communications services.  “They 
have brought much-needed business expertise and created new employment with very 
few failures over ten years.” (Southwood, 2005)  Although mobile providers were able to 
meet the demand for services and provide access, they are beginning to resemble the 
  203 
fixed provider by locking consumers into contracts, charge high prices.  There is little 
differentiation between services and products. 
 
New entrant Cell C has struggled to compete against the incumbents, gaining only a 10% 
market share since it entered the market in 2001.  Its small market share can be attributed 
to the delay in licensing the third entrant, strongly entrenched incumbents and the 
ineffective policy and regulatory regime.  High interconnection costs, difficulties in 
switching and the current mandatory minimum two-year contract period has inhibited 
consumer switching to the new licensee.   
 
The absence of number portability has made users reluctant to switch to the new operator.  
Cell C also had to pay a higher licence fee and take on obligations, despite having a 
smaller market opportunity.  The incumbent operators had already exploited access to the 
best high sites and key areas.  Key incentives had not been determined upfront, such as 
access to infrastructure, wholesale price regulation, and access to spectrum.  Thus, apart 
from the licencing delays that would have affected Cell C’s business strategy, the policy 
and regulatory environment also did not assist in creating an enabling environment.  
These factors ensure that Cell C’s focus is on coverage, brand building and, to a certain 
extent, customer service rather than price.  (SA Foundation, 2005)   
 
As the South African market has shown, introducing new mobile operators into a market 
with entrenched incumbents makes it difficult for the new entrant to gain a foothold and 
compete effectively, so that consumers can enjoy the benefits of competition.  Policy and 
regulatory mechanisms must stimulate competition by creating attractive licence 
conditions and regulatory mechanisms aimed at reducing the power of established 
operators.   
 
The research has also shown significant potential for growth of new subscribers and for 
more service-based competitors, especially if it became mandatory for the three existing 
operators to share infrastructure.  Adding further service-based competitors would ensure 
vigorous competition based on price, service and increased innovation. 
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This research has illustrated that government’s managed liberalisation policy has 
increased the power of incumbents and hampered the development of the ICT sector by 
limiting sector investment, to the detriment of consumers. 
 
A third research objective was to examine how government’s managed liberalisation 
policy affected company performance and behaviour.  
 
A weak policy and regulatory environment has led to unchecked company behaviour in 
both fixed and mobile.  Superior financial performance alongside inadequate customer 
services, high prices and a lack of innovation illustrates that consumers have been unable 
to benefit from competition.  For change to come about, a fundamental rethinking of the 
policy and regulatory framework is required, to enable market forces to create 
competition and thus force the currently complacent, highly profitable incumbents to 
respond to market demand.  This approach is likely to stimulate further investment in 
network development, encourage service innovation and bring down prices. 
 
Finally, this research has sought to examine how policy and regulation have shaped 
the structure of the market in South Africa during the transition from monopoly to 
competition. 
 
Because of the huge disparities in income and availability of infrastructure, the telecoms 
market is highly stratified and presents challenges to both regulators and investors.  Some 
areas of the market are open to a high degree of competition and are relatively 
sophisticated by First-World standards, while others lack the most basic services.  
Typically, the business segments are well serviced, even though prices remain high and 
levels of service differ depending on the size of the client.  The VANs and ISP segments 
have low margins yet offer low prices with high levels of service.  The range of mobile 
products on offer at competitive prices reflects a maturing industry, but in other parts of 
the market, such as PSTS, the market is still regulated and immature.  The high cost of 
basic telephony for the majority of the residential market, lack of product choice and 
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differing levels of customer service are symptoms of an ineffective monopoly market.  A 
serious hurdle is the lack of broadband services in any sector.  Compared to other 
jurisdictions internationally, in terms of industry size and growth since liberalisation, the 
South African market has grown very slowly. 
 
Table 28 — International industry growth since liberalisation 
Country Principal convergence regulatory 
and policy reforms 
Year Industry size 
before reform 
Industry size 
2004* 
Annual 
growth  
India Telecommunications Policy 
• Fixed-mobile convergence 
1999 3,650.2 7,959.2 23.6% 
Korea e-Korea Plan 
• Cross platform competition 
1998 10,703.3 21,737.2 17.2% 
Malaysia Communications and Multimedia 
Act  
• Technology neutral licensing 
1998 2492.1 4,791.8 15.4% 
South 
Africa 
Telecommunications Act  
• Awaiting further reform 
1996 3675.0 5338.8 5.6% 
Industry size quoted in (USD Million) 
Source: ITU, 2004 
This extract from the 2001 Report on African Telecommunication Indicators summarises 
the performance of South Africa’s telecoms sector: 
South Africa was once the envy of the African telecom sector. In 1991, it had the 
highest fixed-line teledensity on the continent (behind Réunion and Seychelles). It 
was also among the first to introduce competition in the mobile segment (in 1994) 
and to partially privatise its incumbent telecom operator Telkom (in 1997). The 
results were impressive, with the GSM network becoming one of the largest 
among developing countries.
28
 
However, very little has changed since this ITU assessment and is unlikely to show major 
growth unless there are fundamental changes in the policy and regulatory framework.  
The following section provides recommendations to increase competition in South 
Africa.  
                                                
28 ITU (2001) African Telecommunication Indicators 2001. Geneva, ITU, in Melody, W, 2002, Link 
Centre, Policy Research Paper, No 2, Assessing Telkom’s 2003 Price Increase Proposal:  Price Cap 
Regulation as a Test of Progress in South African Telecom Reform, and E-economy Development 
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11 Recommendations for creating an enabling environment to 
encourage ICT investment 
South Africa has a sophisticated business IT environment, superb infrastructure in key 
parts of the country, a large, low-cost English-speaking workforce and is well-positioned 
geographically to position itself as an international location for ICT services such as call-
centres, support services, and business process outsourcing, and could thus attract further 
investment.  Nevertheless, the current state of telecoms hampers efforts to increase ICT 
investment here.  Developing South Africa as an ICT-friendly destination would require, 
among other things, a more liberalised telecoms environment with a clear, simple 
licensing process to encourage market entry by network innovators, as well as stringent 
enforcement of general competition principles, especially for operators with a large share 
of market power.  The high demand for telecoms services, high prices and the large 
profits made by incumbent operators, both fixed and mobile, highlight the necessity for 
further market reform in most of South Africa.  The next section suggests the key reform 
initiatives needed in the telecoms sector. 
11.1 Recommendations to increase investment in the South African ICT sector 
11.1.1 Clarify national policy objectives and review current licensing framework 
The South African telecoms policy environment is currently plagued by unclear and ever-
changing liberalisation policy, uncertain timeframes and the multiple, unprioritised and 
often conflicting objectives contained in disparate legislation governing the sector.  The 
1996 Telecommunications Act, the Amendment Act and the proposed Convergence Bill 
are examples of the unco-ordinated efforts to create legislation.  All of the existing 
legislation should be consolidated and clarified prior to any major legislative and policy 
overhaul.  An over-arching, long-term vision must be articulated to set out clear 
objectives for the sector.  Conflicting objectives must be reconciled and government 
should make its expectations clear.  All stakeholders must be involved in the process.  
This would enable the continuation of market reform after a period of stalemate. 
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Further, policy and regulation must focus on increasing customer choice and lowering the 
cost of communications services.  A liberalised, unified licensing regime that lets the 
economics of market demand determine infrastructure roll-out is recommended.  
Restrictions on licensing should be minimised to minimise barriers to entry.  Geographic-
area licensing for under-serviced areas should be abolished to stimulate market 
competition.  As it now stands, the proposed Convergence Bill is unlikely to be able to 
address these objectives.   
11.1.2 Implement widespread market reform 
The delays in the licensing of the SNO have hampered the onset of competition and 
created uncertainty which hindered the efforts of the SNO to get established.  The failure 
to licence an SNO timeously can be attributed to a number of factors, primarily investor 
uncertainty over the commitment of government to implement real competition in the 
sector, allow for greater independence and strengthen the regulator to enforce policy and 
regulation. Technology and customer demand have grown far beyond the capacity of two 
national operators to deliver.  Given the serious constraints on telecoms services, it is 
unlikely that an SNO with many small shareholders and limited funding can be a serious 
threat to Telkom’s hegemony.  But South Africa’s vibrant VANS sector has adequate 
infrastructure, particularly in the urban areas.  Thus, it is recommended that the current 
restrictions on VANS are lifted.  VANS should be licenced to set up their own 
international gateways and have unrestricted access to customers.  This approach would 
introduce multiple broadband data providers and allow market demand to determine 
infrastructure roll-out.   
11.2 Institute proper market and competition review processes periodically 
As competition is introduced, mechanisms to ensure the continuing exercise of market 
power are necessary.  The establishment and implementation of thorough market and 
competition review processes, together with more stringent enforcement of existing anti-
competitive conduct provisions, are fundamental to the success of any liberalisation 
initiative, especially given the power of the incumbent in South Africa.   
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Processes to identify dominant operators with strong market power, preferably on a case-
by-case and market-by-market basis must be established, to force a more granular 
analysis of designated markets rather than limiting it to a single monopoly operator.  
South Africa must address the designation and enforcement of dominant operator rules, 
and regulatory intervention should be based on the market-power status of each 
competitor on a market-by-market basis.  This approach will ensure that abuse of power 
and anti-competitive conduct can be detected in any market segment.  This will further 
inform the remedies necessary to create competition within a particular market.  
 
Additional pro-competitive regulatory measures are required to enhance market 
development and curb the excessive power of the incumbent operator.  Key regulatory 
provisions should include: 
• The introduction of wholesale price regulation, particularly for key market segments 
like ISDN, ADSL, etc, for the VANs and ISP sectors;   
• Development of clear processes to facilitate timely resolution of disputes with 
competitors; 
• Determine rights of way access for new entrants and the extent to which other 
operators, e.g. Vans are also granted rights of way; 
• Immediate implementation of carrier selection, pre-selection and number portability; 
• Ensuring access to facilities at cost.  Set favourable terms and conditions for co-
location, including processes and time-frames for dispute resolution; 
• Immediately unbundle the local loop to ensure that Telkom no longer controls last-
mile access and increase broadband connectivity; and 
• Stringent enforcement of Telkom’s accounting separation policies. 
The implementation of these measures requires effective regulation and an effective 
regulator.  Thus, the policy and regulation must be changed to reflect these provisions.  
Further, this also requires an effective regulator to implement. Strategies for this are 
discussed in the next section. 
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11.3 Strengthen Icasa by allowing for increased independence and accountability  
The independence of Icasa has been repeatedly questioned.  The dual responsibilities 
shared by the Minister and Icasa must be clarified as well as the requirements for 
ministerial approval of regulations.  Structural issues about the demarcation of roles 
between the Minister and the regulator must be addressed and a firm political 
commitment to maintaining the independence of the regulator must be made.  The 
independence of Icasa and clear demarcation of roles are of paramount importance if the 
sector is to gain credibility.   
 
Because the Telecoms Act was enacted prior to the Competition Act, the oversight roles 
of the Competition Commission and Icasa overlap, creating confusion.  As a result, it has 
created the opportunity for forum shopping and inconsistent treatment of anti-competitive 
conduct by the two regulatory bodies.  This jurisdictional ambiguity must be clarified.  
Because of the highly technical nature of telecoms internationally, telecoms issues have 
been left to telecoms regulators.  In South Africa, Icasa deals with technical and 
economic regulation although the Competition Commission is better equipped to deal 
with anti-competitive behaviour.  The Commission to date, has a better history of ruling 
independently without political and corporate interference.  At the very least, the 
conflicting definitions, scope and ability to impose fines should be aligned with the 
Competition Act, which is in line with internationally recognised standards.  To counter 
the problem of forum shopping, one solution would be to compel parties to choose either 
the Competition Commission or Icasa at the outset of an arbitration process.  Choice of 
one regulator would mean giving up the right to pursue the matter with the other 
regulator at a later point, thus avoiding jurisdictional disputes once a ruling has been 
made.  In addition, the Competition Commission should be able to seek advice and 
support from Icasa, particularly on technical issues. 
 
All of these measures are intended to create a competitive market environment to enable 
South Africa to become an ICT-friendly destination.  This approach would create an 
environment of robust competition, which would enable the use of new and innovative 
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technologies that take full advantage of existing infrastructure and remove the artificially 
created boundaries between services.   
11.4 A framework for policy-makers and regulators in shaping telecoms network 
markets in transition 
South Africa is not unique in its attempts to institute further market reform.  Many 
developing countries are struggling through the same process.  The recommendations of 
this study should serve as a useful guide to developing countries seeking further market 
reform.  Capital markets significantly influence private-sector investment.  At the time of 
the Telecoms Amendment policy process, after the dot.com sector bust, the market did 
not view telecoms investment favourably and so much of the policy framework was 
influenced by the downturn in investor sentiment.  Subsequently, however, the good 
performance of mobile operators in the developing world restored the attraction of 
telecoms as an investment, and private-sector investors now increasingly look for 
opportunities in the sector.  On the other hand, policy and regulation cannot be led by the 
fickle nature of capital markets.  Provided there is credible market opportunity for 
investment, however, private-sector investment will be willing to enter a stable, well-
managed policy and regulatory environment.   
 
Developing countries have very distinctive characteristics and requirements that demand 
a different approach to policy and regulation.  Network development is particularly 
important in developing countries as a result of the infrastructure shortages.  As a result 
of the need for network development, weak administrative traditions and under-resourced 
policy-makers and regulators, competition is likely to be less effective.  Therefore, more 
proactive regulatory monitoring is needed on a continuous basis to ensure progress.  Low 
GDP’s and high rates of poverty in most developing countries make issues like price and 
access particularly important. Thus, greater focus and attention on public issues like 
access for the poor and lowering prices must be made.   
 
As the South African example illustrates, it is difficult to continue liberalising a market 
once its incumbent operators are entrenched, whether fixed and mobile.  This impedes the 
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introduction of new entrants and hampers their ability to compete.  High prices, 
substantial latent demand, entrenched incumbents and the high profit margins of 
incumbents are sufficient justification for further liberalisation.  It is recommended that a 
comprehensive market review be conducted once the initial stages of market reform are 
concluded.  This should determine the level of demand and potential for new licences, 
create processes to gain stakeholder consensus and develop a vision and objectives for 
the sector in line with the development of the market.   
 
Key issues to consider for the licensing of new entrants, in a market where reform has 
already begun and the initial exclusivity period ends are outlined below:   
11.4.1 Ensure political commitment to market liberalisation 
Broader commitment to liberalisation and telecoms development must be enshrined in 
policy and regulatory mechanisms.  Potential investors investigate the overall policy 
environment to assess the degree of its alignment with their own strategic positioning.  
Investor requirements are implicit in the definition of market structure, but these must be 
balanced against the needs of the entire population and the economy. There is little merit 
in a policy that delivers what investors desire but leaves the majority of consumers 
dissatisfied.  Commitment must be made to timeframes, methods and processes for 
disposing of state assets.  Government must demonstrate its commitment to independence 
and market reform by creating a stable regulatory environment and separating judicial 
and administrative processes.   Once investors are satisfied that government is truly 
committed to competition driven by the private sector, private-sector investment will 
follow.  
11.4.2 Institute market-driven macro-economic policies 
Attracting private-sector investment for telecoms is not limited to telecoms-related 
policy.  Market-driven policies throughout the economy enhance the attractiveness of 
licences including implementing import duty exemptions or lowered import duties, a 
favourable taxation regime and a focus on maintaining currency and interest rate stability.  
Creating a favourable investment climate so that investors are convinced that their 
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investments will be safe from “de facto expropriation through arbitrary changes in prices, 
taxes and service obligations.”  (Private sector, 1999) 
 
License fees and license conditions can also play a key role in enhancing the 
attractiveness of a license.  Low start-up license fees or even deferment for a set period 
will allow for investment in network development.  The obligation of providing for 
universal service must be taken into account when deciding the overall cost of a license.  
All additional costs are eventually added to the cost of a license from the operator’s 
perspective.  High acquisition costs are likely to lead to operator’s demanding special 
favours or renegotiation.  In South Africa, these obligations range from providing 
payphones to fixed lines for computer labs, and have resulted in inappropriate and 
ineffective services that have led to high costs for consumers.  Policy options must 
clearly determine these requirements and be flexible instruments to accommodate 
changes in technology and consumer demand.  Licencing policy should favour those 
operators that are able to provide services at the lowest cost.  Effective planning and 
centralized oversight is required, as this cannot be done by a single operator.  In South 
Africa, the Universal service fund was created to do this but failed for a number of 
reasons including implementation, lack of skills, inadequate resources, among others.  
Thus, this study argues for a commercial approach to extending access to rural and low-
income urban areas as in the case of Uganda - reverse subsidy auctions to operators who 
are willing to provide the service.  Overall co-ordination and monitoring can be done by 
the regulator. 
11.4.3 Focus on licensing the major operators 
Focus time and resources on the investment intensive licenses.  Many services can be 
provided without a license.  The international trend is for licensing, subject only to 
declaration for the public record and for statistical purposes.  Class licences can be 
automatically granted to any applicant meeting set criteria.  Network operators should be 
free to establish prices and conditions for service but must grant access to essential 
services on a non-discriminatory basis.  These can be defined in law as: interconnection, 
signaling, caller identification, billing data, number portability and directory databases.  
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This strategy reduces the regulatory burden and allows the focus on major licenses and 
allows market forces to operate.  Many countries are implementing or planning to convert 
to unified licenses as in the case of India.  This strategy allows any operator to utilise any 
technology to provide a service.  While this strategy reduces the regulatory burden on 
licensing, it does require stringent enforcement of anti-competitive laws to enforce 
incumbent operator behaviour.  It does, however, ensure that the technology decisions are 
left to those best equipped to make those decisions ie operators. 
11.4.4 Institute technology-neutral licensing 
Technology-neutral licenses are an important lever for attracting investment because they 
allow investors to determine the optimal technology required to deliver a service.  As in 
the case of India, optical fibre will continue to be deployed where it makes economic 
sense.  Broadband mobile technologies will continue to service the needs of the rural 
poor until the economic situation changes. In larger markets with high latent demand as 
in Nigeria and India, policy and regulatory flaws mean investors are often prepared to 
take on the regulatory and political risk because of the possibility of high returns, but, 
smaller markets offering fewer opportunities are unlikely to attract the same interest.  
Policy-makers must understand the potential value and size of the market if they wish to 
attract investors. 
 
Liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation in the mobile sector, have increased 
competition and demand for mobile services and, consequently, have increased the 
demand for more spectrum.  In a market like South Africa, in which incumbents have 
operated for a long period, much of the available bands in 1800 Mhz29 and 90030 Mhz 
spectrum has been allocated.  Access to these spectrum ranges influences the cost of 
network roll-out and is therefore critical to the success of third or fourth operators.  The 
licensing process must address this issue. 
 
                                                
29 1800 MHz is more suited to denser traffic constrained areas like city centres and busy roads   
30 900 MHz spectrum is ideally more suited to covering rural areas as it is able to cover larger areas 
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Regarding the demand gaps created by scarcity of spectrum, regulatory authorities have 
begun to consider new market-led approaches towards spectrum liberalisation and 
spectrum trading, rather than the traditional centralised administration of spectrum which 
is slow to react to market changes and results in inefficiency of usage and allocation.  
(Ofcom, 2004) 
 
Besides the inherent weaknesses of a centralised approach, it is increasingly 
acknowledged that an administrative body cannot know as much as market players, like 
operators and equipment manufacturers, about the spectrum required, which technologies 
are appropriate or what consumers prefer.  Market forces must be allowed to decide the 
best way to allocate new spectrum, even trade spectrum in the open market, in line with 
the development of new technologies and services.  This should increase the amount of 
licence-exempt spectrum. 
11.4.5 Consider mobile a communications services platform option 
Developing countries have shown far more demand for telecoms services than either 
regulators or operators have anticipated.  Markets have therefore grown faster than policy 
and regulation have been able to keep pace with.  This rapid development has come at a 
price, often at the expense of consumers.  Although mobile has alleviated the serious 
bottle-necks created by fixed-line and provides much needed telecoms services, there is 
surprisingly little price competition in much of Africa.  Prices for local mobile calls are 
between five to 10 times higher than fixed, even though the costs of connecting 
subscribers and operating a GSM network are lower than for fixed networks (Southwood, 
2005).  Policy-makers and regulators should therefore conduct regular market reviews to 
keep pace with market development and regulate accordingly. 
 
Mobile operator networks can service most existing voice demand but may be less able to 
meet medium to long-term data demands unless they can upgrade the capacity of their 
entire networks.  The unprecedented growth of mobile has created new problems of 
monopoly power.  This dominance by the initial mobile licensees presents an additional 
challenge to policy-makers and regulators as they strive to lower prices, open access to 
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networks and enable further sector innovation.  Thus, for most markets in transition, 
mobile cannot be left to its own devices under the guise of competitive markets, but must 
also be regularly reviewed in terms of competition legislation to prevent abuse, and 
regulated where there is monopoly power accordingly.  
11.4.6 Create competition-enabling mechanisms for new entrants 
Fundamental to market reform, particularly in the transitional phase, is regulatory 
protection from abuse of dominant position by incumbent operators, because they have 
the power to frustrate the efforts of new entrants.  New licences should include 
competition enablers such as international gateway licenses and the right to self-provide 
own transmission and link facilities, with the right to resell these to third parties.  Other 
enablers include access to government facilities.  Interconnect prices should also promote 
competition.  High interconnect rates is likely to result in high retail prices.  Ideally, 
conditions must be as equal as possible for the market to work. 
11.5 Reduce the need for regulatory decisions by accelerating competition  
Best practice suggests developing regulatory agencies modelled on the concept of the 
American public utility commissions.  The developing countries case study has 
highlighted that in theory most countries have set up independent regulators, but in 
practice, these regulators are under-resourced, and unable to govern effectively.  Levy 
and Spiller (1996) outline that for this model of regulation to work, certain conditions are 
required:  a strong administrative tradition, the ability to undertake commitments that 
endure from one government to the next and a judiciary that is impartial, immune to 
government and political pressures and able to make enforceable decisions.  Developing 
countries display very few of these characteristics.  Thus, for developing countries, the 
regulatory strategy should also focus on reducing the need for regulatory decisions by 
accelerating the introduction of competition.  Allowing competition early in network 
markets ie fixed-line and mobile, especially before or at the same time as the incumbent 
is privatised.  This allows both incumbents and new entrants to grow while there is still 
large, unmet demand.  Pre-packaging regulatory rules by preparing licences for operators 
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prior to licensing reduces the burden on the regulator and reduces regulatory uncertainty 
for investors.  Further, it eliminates the potential for lobbying during the policy process.  
11.5.1 Pool resources by enhancing regional cooperation  
Regulators in each country have access to operator and market information.  Pooling all 
of this information to create a regional skills base and research capacity will enhance the 
strength of regulators.  It will also create best-practice guidelines to implement in their 
respective markets.   
 
Developing markets, particularly, have seen the emergence of large, multi-national 
mobile operators.  Often mobile operators have a number of licences in the same region 
eg MTN in Sub-Saharan, West and East Africa and Orascom in North Africa and Middle 
East.  These operators have significant resources and research capability.  They are often 
well versed in key telecoms issues including pricing trends and technology innovation.  
Regulators can utilise this capacity by introducing regional forums where operators can 
present cross market information.  All of these resources can be utilised to ensure 
regulatory best practice as well as comparative pricing and services across regions. 
11.6 Contribution to knowledge and linking the theoretical basis 
ICT market development and policy is rooted in and influenced by many factors and 
disciplines, including economics, law and communications.  The technological, economic 
and political factors that has driven the development of the sector over the past 30 years 
has implications for the governance of the sector and must inform the theoretical 
foundations including the formation and implementation of policy.   
 
Where the Pyramid model emphasised the importance of a holistic framework and the 
creation of proper structures at the outset, this research demonstrates that often developed 
markets do not have the sophisticated structures to implement and support market reform.  
Although simplistic policy instruments were able to facilitate good market performance 
during the monopoly era, they are no longer adequate because they work indirectly and 
are often counter-productive.  Sector performance can only emerge from decentralised 
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market decisions.  This research suggests a greater focus on utilising market indicators 
and company performance to guide the reform path throughout the transitional period.  
The model below summarises the research findings and suggests a more integrated and 
holistic approach for analysing network markets in transition.  It suggests that, although 
overall objectives are necessary at the outset to create a road map for reform, market 
performance is the final arbitrator.  Intervention at any level will influence every level of 
market performance. 
 
Figure 38 — Recommended model of reform for markets in transition 
 
 
11.7 Areas for further research  
The liberalisation of telecoms network markets is a relatively new concept in developing 
countries and offers a range of possibilities for extending the scope and depth of this 
study, including: 
• Evaluation of the impact of policy and regulatory factors on other liberalisation 
processes in South Africa to test whether the issues raised in this research are 
specific to the telecoms sector, or whether they also arise in other privatisation 
processes. 
Business 
Environment 
Communication
s Environment 
Firms 
Markets 
• Commitment to market reform at all levels 
• Macro-economic strategy supporting market reform 
• Commitment to 
regulator independence 
• Continuous market 
assessment and reviews 
• Continuous stakeholder 
engagement  
• Utilise industry 
resources and research 
capability to assist in 
regulatory oversight 
• Accelerate competition 
to improve market 
performance 
• Treat mobile as a 
communications 
service platform 
• Market competition spurs company 
performance 
• Ensure firm performance is in line 
with international peers 
 
• Technology-neutral 
licensing 
• Open licensing regime 
• License only major 
operators 
• License services 
• Allow market forces 
to play rather than 
imposing regulation - 
intervene in cases of 
market failure 
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• A detailed evaluation of mobile sector development and the potential for further 
liberalisation, driven by private-sector reform.   
• An assessment of options for the regulation of scarce resources in competitive 
markets, particularly the issuing and usage of spectrum.  For instance, how do new 
operators gain access to spectrum in the high-demand bands already allocated to 
incumbents.   
 
It is hoped that regulators will find the conclusions of this research useful for 
understanding how to regulate the telecoms sector, both fixed and mobile, to allow for 
healthy competition and sectoral growth that will be of real benefit to consumers, the 
economy and society. 
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13 Appendix 1 
13.1 Semi-structured interview guidelines — Categories of questions 
Company overview/Profile 
• Industry sector, key services, high-level overview of current telecoms usage 
 
Mobile 
• Current supplier, range of services purchased and description, quality of service  
Data 
• Current supplier, range of services purchased and description — new capacity, satellite, internal 
network (VPN, intranet), remote access – ISDN or dial-up 
Voice 
• Current supplier, range of services purchased and description, convergence plan – voice/data, 
voice/mobile 
Quality of service 
• Current satisfaction/dissatisfaction with suppliers 
• Has service from Telkom changed? 
• Has perception of Telkom changed over last year? 
• Quality of service and service-level agreements/compensation 
• Customer service/support — provisioning, billing, flexibility in providing solutions to 
customers  
Switching dynamics 
• Propensity to change – triggers/drivers and barriers 
• Price sensitivity – trade off between price and service/technology/QoS 
• Products, service integration, SLAs  
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14 Appendix 2 
14.1 Focus group discussion guide — medium and large business 
Background - Current and future voice and data strategies 
Benefits and/or frustrations experienced with these issues  
• Service delivery and support of current telecom providers (cover repair, response, flexibility)  
• Current service level agreements  — are they meeting expectations? 
• Telkom — aspects respondents were most satisfied with or least satisfied with? 
• Other providers — aspects respondents were most satisfied with or least satisfied with? 
• Costs and charges for services (reductions, special offers, increases in charges) – pay too much, 
about right or is it good value for money? 
 
Awareness of the current and future telecoms events in SA  
• How aware are the respondents of Telkom’s exclusivity period along with related issues? 
• Brief strengths and weaknesses analysis of Telkom as an operator, plus Cell C, MTN and 
Vodacom.  What has each done well or badly? 
 
Second Network Operator  
• What kind of time period would respondents need to assess a SNO before switching? 
• What would be the drivers and/or inhibitors to switching?  
• Comments on the trade-off between service, products and costs — Are respondents willing to 
pay more for better service and/or technology? 
 
Testing the concept of fixed-mobile  
• What do respondents understand by the term fixed-mobile?  
• Do the benefits outweigh the extra cost? E.g. convenience, flexibility and mobility. 
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15 Appendix 3 
15.1 Focus group discussion guide — consumers 
Background — historical information of the current telecoms infrastructure  
• Current and future voice usage – major investments or changes.  
• Discussion about the drivers of telecoms usage: 
o Internal and external needs?  
o Number of users in the home and propensity for fixed vs mobile usage? 
o Range of Telkom products and services respondents are aware of/currently using? 
o What telecom needs are currently not being met? 
 
Benefits and/or frustrations experienced with these issues  
• Service delivery and support (repair, response, flexibility, etc,) of current telecom providers. 
• The costs and charges for services (reductions, special offers, increases in charges) –pay too 
much, about right or is it good value for money? 
 
Awareness of the current and future telecoms events in SA?  
• How aware are the respondents of Telkom’s exclusivity period, with all the related issues? 
 
Levels of change and why? Switching strategies  
• What kind of time period would respondents need to assess an SNO before switching? 
• What products and services in home usage would respondents switch? 
 
Testing the concept of fixed-mobile 
• What do respondents understand by the term fixed-mobile?  
• Do the benefits outweigh the extra cost? E.g. convenience, flexibility and mobility. 
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16 Appendix 4 
16.1 Detailed company analysis  
Country : Botswana
Company : Botswana Telecommunications Corporation
Focus : Fixed
Ownership : State Owned
Source : Annual Reports
Years Currency 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 CAGR
%
Key Financial Data
Revenue P 610.7              605.0              615.4              621.3              636.9              0.8%
- Revenue growth (%) (0.9%) 1.7% 1.0% 2.5%
Operating expenditure P 492.2             511.3              534.7 2.8%
EBITDA P
- EBITDA growth (%)
Operating Profit P 7.9                 62.9               100.2 133.6%
Profit/(Loss) before tax P
Net Profit/(Loss) P 2.2 (24.2) (39.1) 90.3 139.1 129.2%
Capex P 131.6 145.1 78.3 94.2 167.4 4.9%
Cash Flow Data
Cash flow from operating activities P 162.2 124.4 226.1 11.7%
Cash flow used in investing activities P (82.9) (92.8) (156.3) 23.6%
Cash flow from/(used in) financing activities P (7.6) 332.7 (9.4) 7.0%
Cash and cash equivalents at the end of period P 10.4 374.7 435.1 247.2%
Financial Ratio
EBITDA margins (%)
Operating profit margins (%)
Net profit margin (%)
Capital expenditure to revenue (%)
Return on assets (%)
Asset Turnover
Operational Data - Fixed-line
Fixed access lines (thousands) 135.9              142.6              142.3              131.8              (0.8%)
Revenue per fixed access line P 4,494              4,243              4,324              4,715              1.2%
Total fixed-line traffic (millions of minutes)
Fixed-line employees 1,771              1,724              1,694              985                 (13.6%)
Fixed-lines per fixed-line employee 77                   83                   84                   143                 16.7%
Revenue per employees P 344.83            350.93            363.30            630.74            16.3%
(In Pula millions, except where otherwise indicated)
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